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ABSTRACT 
‘THE PRACTICALITY OF THE IMPOSSIBLE’: STUDIES IN 20th- and 21st-CENTURY PIANO ÉTUDES 
NAOMI MEGHAN JIA-LING WOO 
This thesis examines piano études by John Cage, György Ligeti, Conlon Nancarrow, and 
Nicole Lizée that push the limits of the human body in performance. The thesis opens 
with an account of the origins of the piano étude in the works of Chopin and Liszt, 
situating it within the political, economic, and aesthetic conditions of the 19th century. 
Subsequently, sets of études by Cage, Ligeti, Nancarrow, and Lizée are studied, each 
using a different body of theoretical literature—including utopian thought, queer theory, 
and posthumanism—to understand how this limit manifests in musical works. These 
analyses enrich understanding by bridging gaps between musical performance studies 
and other areas of knowledge. For example, the chapter on Cage’s Études Australes 
addresses the notion of the limit using the utopian aesthetic philosophy of Ernst Bloch, 
thereby demonstrating novel correspondences between Bloch studies and performance 
studies. The thesis concludes by describing new forms of virtuosity that have emerged in 
the 20th and 21st centuries, and ties together the divergent modes of analysis used in 
each section. 
Theoretical investigations are interspersed with case study demonstrations from 
piano études, which draw on scores, recordings, and my personal experience as a pianist. 
This approach advocates the importance of embodiment, phenomenology, and 
performance research as key ways of knowing, and contributes to the growing field of 
artistic research at the piano. 
The project offers an original exploration of the performing body at its limits and 
presents a theory of contemporary virtuosity. In the process, it makes a multi-faceted 
contribution to scholarly work in musical performance and offers ways of thinking about 
musical aesthetics applicable to other genres and areas of study. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This project examines the limits of the body in musical performance in 20th- and 21st-
century piano etudes by John Cage, György Ligeti, Conlon Nancarrow, and Nicole Lizée. 
This exploration presents a novel account of the étude, suggesting that it operates at the 
limits of bodies, genres, and ideas. By tracing the experimental notions of virtuosity 
explored in these contemporary études to the historical origins of the étude in the 19th 
century, the thesis both finds continuity in the experimental étude-thinking across 200 
years of études, and also suggests that new forms of post-transcendental virtuosity have 
emerged in the late 20th century.  
 The underlying assumption that grounds the research is the importance of 
centring the body in musical discourse. The presence of the body in musical events is an 
increasingly important subject of contemporary musical research. Its study within 
musicology relates to the growing interest in embodiment in humanities scholarship in 
general, often drawing on literature from phenomenology, cognitive science, and 
theatrical performance studies. The originality of this particular approach is its attempt to 
integrate other disciplines into the study of musical performance, to treat performance 
not only as an event or activity, but also as a fundamental way of knowing and 
understanding, and to explore a subject that is by nature liminal, attending to the fluidity 
of the performance event itself. It is also a contribution to a growing understanding of 
the body in performance as conditioned and produced by social relationships and 
material conditions. 
The study of music is often interested in the exploration of limits. Music criticism 
tends to focus on pieces that are deemed extreme or exceptional, rather than those that 
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are ordinary. The history of music is often interested in transitions, from one era to the 
next, and ‘watershed moments’ in which a set of conditions produce a musical event 
that—by breaking past a pre-existing limit—alter the course of future artistic endeavours. 
Even efforts to define and understand ‘music’ itself often take the form of seeking to 
define the line between music and non-music. Attali’s Bruits, for example, is an important 
exploration of music through the lens of ‘noise’.1 
The extremes of embodiment in musical performance, however, have not yet been 
the subject of extended study within musicology. This is in spite of the fact that physically 
extreme musical performances are so common. From the 19th century virtuoso, to 
hypercomplex music in the 20th century, to technically masterful concert soloists and 
competition winners, challenging and pushing the body is a common feature of Western 
classical music. However, studies of musical virtuosity have generally focused on 
historical accounts of virtuoso performers and aesthetic considerations of virtuosic 
materials, rather than on the questions of embodiment that virtuosic performance poses.2 
As Antoine Hennion notes, even the notion of virtuosity itself, despite its ever-presence 
in musical composition and performance, has been largely pushed to the margins of 
analysis and musicological discourse. This lack stems from a long-standing hierarchy of 
mind over body, with a legacy in both Romantic and Modernist conceptions of musical 
aesthetics, by which logic virtuosity is ‘stripped […] of any aesthetic value.’3 
The primary exception to this lack is the emerging and important field of musical 
 
1Attali (1977). 
2These include the investigations of virtuosity in the 19th century that I will discuss later in this thesis: Susan 
Bernstein’s Virtuosity of the Nineteenth Century: Performing Music and Language in Heine, Liszt, and 
Baudelaire (1998), Paul Meztner’s Crescendo of the Virtuoso: Spectacle, Skill, and Self-Promotion in Paris 
during the Age of Revolution, and Jim Samson’s Virtuosity and the Musical Work: The Transcendental Studies 
of Franz Liszt (2004). 
3Hennion (2012), 133. 
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disability studies, such as Joseph Straus’ 2011 Extraordinary Measures: Disability in Music. 
Straus’ title is borrowed from Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s seminal disability studies 
text, Extraordinary Bodies: figuring physical disability in American culture and literature, from 
1997. Her use of the ‘extraordinary body’ to expand our understanding of bodily 
difference—as a feature of social relationships rather than an inherent property—offers an 
example for musicologists to consider the production and understanding of ‘unusual’ 
bodies in music. This model has been taken up and expanded by scholars of musical 
disability studies, including in the recently published Oxford Handbook of Music and 
Disability Studies, edited by Blake Howe, Stephanie Jensen-Moulton, Neil Lerner, and 
Joseph Straus, and containing particularly relevant contributions on performance from 
Jennifer Iverson (on the construction of cyborg bodies in Björk’s music) and Blake Howe.4 
The questions of embodiment, subjectivity, and normativity that disability studies raises 
are important inspirations for my own work. I endeavour to take these assumptions 
seriously, even in contexts in which disability per se is not the subject of research. 
My decision to study the limits of the body stems from a belief that the most useful 
and telling cases come from the extremes rather than from the average. In order to 
understand a phenomenon, boundary cases help us to determine what is essential about 
this phenomenon in particular, and what remains outside of it. The extremes and limits 
show us with clarity what quotidian examples cannot so starkly reveal. The experience, 
presence, and role of the body is no exception. It is at the body’s limits that we might 
better understand how it operates. 
This is certainly true in other forms of embodied research.  In medicine, advances in 
understanding are made when bodies fail and reach breaking points. In sports, new 
supportive technologies and ergonomic advances develop only when existing physical 
skills are pushed to their extremes. These points are made especially clear in research on 
 
4Blake Howe, ‘Disabling Music Performance’ (2016) 
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differently-abled bodies, which demonstrate the ways in which the limit-behaviour of 
bodies with different abilities allow us to better understand the limitations of all human 
bodies, regardless of ability. As Judith Butler describes, going on a walk with disabled 
artist Sunaura Taylor allows an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which all human 
bodies rely on significant aids for everyday pedestrian activity—from sidewalks, to 
streetlamps, to wheelchairs.5 
In order to clearly define the kind of physical limit in which I am interested, I focus 
in particular on experiences of the ‘impossible’. I am inspired by this word as both a 
provocation and a paradox, and consider the impossible to be a threshold rather than a 
fixed inaccessible space. The idea of the impossible with the respect to the human body—
the physically, bodily impossible—also implies the possibility of extension. As different-
abled bodies of all kinds demonstrate, the impossible of the body is contingent on 
specific bodies, dependent on tools and technical supports, and varies across time and 
space. Activities that are beyond the limits of one body may not be impossible for 
another. What is possible for even a given body will change over time. This is why I 
choose not to see ‘impossible’ in opposition to the more positivistic term ‘possible’, but 
instead recognize that ‘impossible’ extends across a much wider and more slippery 
terrain. Its embeddedness in specific bodies renders it a useful site for the study of 
performance, just as practice-based methods are essential for its study. 
The specific focus of my dissertation is the way that keyboard études, in particular, 
attempt to transcend, alter, or question the body’s limits. I have focused on sets of études 
by John Cage, György Ligeti, Conlon Nancarrow, and Nicole Lizée, all of which date from 
the second half of the 20th century onwards. As a genre, études composed in the last 
century pose especially interesting problems. On the one hand, the genre seems an 
outdated relic of 19th century romantic pianism and virtuosity, tied to its origins in the 
 
5Astra Taylor, Examined Life (Canada: Zeitgeist Films, 2008). 
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concert études—or Grandes Études—of Fryderyk Chopin and Franz Liszt. On the other 
hand, contemporary études often offer a subversive take on technique, the instrument of 
the piano, performance practice, and musical institutions. This tension lies at the heart of 
the étude, a genre whose origins amidst Romanticism and modernity reveal a complicated 
relationship to the social conditions in which it arose. Indeed, I will suggest that the étude 
questions and reshapes our very understanding of genre, by focusing on physicality and 
practice as its most defining characteristic. 
 Methodologically, one of the contributions that I seek to make in this thesis is to 
incorporate a range of approaches—often disparate—that allow me to interrogate themes 
of impossibility, embodiment, and liminality without ascribing to fixed or even 
conventionally related schools of thought. I have chosen these approaches for different 
reasons, but in many cases it would be more appropriate to say that the approaches have 
chosen me; or, more accurately, that they have chosen each other, and chosen the topic. 
In this approach, I am inspired especially by Shoshana Felman, whose Scandal of the 
Speaking Body links the discourses of (Lacanian) psychoanalysis and J. L. Austin’s theory of 
linguistic performativity. She allows the two fields to be linked according to the logic of 
coincidence, in the literal senses of the word as both ‘spatial-geometrical (two 
superimposed figures) and temporal-historical (two simultaneous elements—events that 
happen together through a convergence of circumstances apparently due to chance)’.6 
The adherence to coincidence is—fittingly to the material that I will discuss—very Cagean, 
allowing for the aleatory to wield aesthetic and conceptual power. For Felman, though, it 
is through a psychoanalytic lens that such coincidences can be taken to have analytical 
power and legitimacy, governed by the logic of the unconscious.7 It is also psychoanalysis 
 
6Felman (2002), 58. 
7Felman asks provocatively: ‘Psychoanalysis teaches us, however, that coincidences, in the history of the 
subject, are governed not by chance, but by another kind of logic, specifically that of the unconscious. 
Would the same thing not hold true for the overall history of ideas? Might not the history of thought 
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that Felman claims to be ‘seduced’ by theories such as Austin’s, as I am by many of the 
methodological vantage points which I employ in this thesis. The logic of psychoanalysis—
with its assumption of a divided and unruly subject and location of meaning at the limits 
and recesses of understanding—thus also underpins many of the ways in which I work 
through and with the ideas of the thesis. 
Especially insofar as the performance-based aspects of my research are concerned, 
phenomenology forms another underlying methodological principle throughout the 
thesis. This broadly phenomenological approach has inspired me to treat impossibility and 
performance as the subject of the study, rather than a passive object. Although 
performance is an important part of this research, I have avoided the use of many 
common forms of musical performance research, such as video, interviews and recording 
analysis. This is largely due to my attempt to attend to the inscrutable thrownness 
(Geworfenheit) of the performance experience, rather than to seek more ‘objective’ forms 
of performance analysis.8 Given the slippery nature of the topic, it is my belief that 
conducting interviews, for example, would too significantly attempt to pin down concrete 
facts of performance. Thus, instead of observing performance at a distance and 
describing it, I try to account for the fact that performance is inevitably and 
fundamentally the lens through which I understand music. I have let performative 
impulses guide everything from repertoire choices to research methodologies. I have 
practised the repertoire I discuss until it becomes part of my body, and thus take the fact 
of performance as an assumption in ways that are both conscious and unconscious in my 
work. At times, I have attempted to gesture toward my own experience of performance, 
such as in the Case Study on John Cage’s Etude Australe VIII (coincidentally, Étude 8). 
 
itself be governed in its turn by a logic of the analytic type, of which “coincidences” would be both 
symptoms of signs?’ Felman (2002), 58. 
8To use Heidegger’s term for the ‘that-it-is’ of Da-sein (being), the arbitrary nature of its ‘whence and wither’. 
Heidegger (1996), 127. 
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However, I also treat this aspect of the research as ephemeral and inherently ‘subjective’ 
and employ ‘subjectivity’ as a form of access into the nature of experience, rather than a 
hindrance to be avoided. 
In addition to these foundational methodological presuppositions, three more 
specific theoretical frameworks guide my study of the études by Cage, Ligeti, Nancarrow, 
and Lizée. I have chosen these in order to focus on particular issues raised by each 
composer’s sets of études. In my discussions of John Cage’s Études Australes, I focus on 
utopian studies, drawn largely from literary criticism and the writings of Fredric Jameson 
and Ernst Bloch. This offers a novel contribution to music studies particularly because I 
apply the musical philosophy of Ernst Bloch—whose works have only recently been taken 
account of in musicology—to the discipline of performance studies. 
The sections of my thesis which pertain to Ligeti’s Études pour piano draw on 
literature about failure, which I take from various sources in queer theory, theatre studies, 
and psychoanalysis. This analysis furthers research on the relationship between failure 
and modernism, as described by theorists such as Seth Brodsky,9 while also attempting to 
understand Ligeti as an avant-garde composer, in relationship to his own experiments 
with Fluxus and in conversation with experimental and post-modern approaches to an 
aesthetics of failure.10 Equally, it reframes Ligeti’s impossible requests of the performer to 
notice a way in which failure is always a facet of live musical performance, and in the 
process expand our understanding of musical performance studies and bring it closer to 
contemporary discourses from theatre and live art.11 
 
9Seth Brodsky (2017) describes the logic of European musical modernism as ‘an axiom of failure’. Brodsky 
(2017), 17. 
10Ligeti’s Fluxus experiments are documented in Eric Drott’s 2004 article on the subject, ‘Ligeti in Fluxus’, 
which offers a thorough account of this period in Ligeti’s composition and its resonances in the rest of 
his output. 
11In theatrical performance studies, failure is an important theme. The chapter draws also on this literature, 
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The final distinct methodological approaches that I use are posthuman thought and 
feminist new materialism, primarily taken from the works of Katherine Hayles and Rosi 
Braidotti. Through posthuman thought, I examine how the limits of the body change and 
are reconfigured in interaction with machines; new materialism guides my interpretation 
of this interaction as driven by material composition and, indeed, embodiment. I use 
these theories to study two sets of extremely different études. The first set, by Conlon 
Nancarrow, is written not for live pianist but instead for player piano. This non-human 
instrument thus challenges the very nature of the étude as a training piece for the human 
body, while recognising the inherent interactions and continuities between body and 
machine. By contrast, the études of Nicole Lizée are multi-media études for piano, 
electronics, and video. They thus extend the human body by adding technology as both a 
prosthetic and collaborator. In this repertoire, both composers attempt to accomplish the 
impossible through technology in novel posthuman ways. I am drawn to these new 
materialist and posthuman thinkers because of their methodological overlaps with the 
concerns of performance studies, especially as far as integrating the contingent, fallible 
materials of both bodies and machines into theoretical discourse is concerned. 
On the whole, this project aims to offer the following contributions to musicological 
discourse, to performance studies, and to interdisciplinary artistic research: 
 1. An account of the étude as an experimental genre, pushing at the limits of the 
body and the possible. This account thus reframes what might otherwise seem a 
backward-looking genre, and incorporates discourses generally reserved for more 
extreme forms of experimentation into traditionally notated musics. 
 2. An emerging theory of virtuosity, the impossible, and the limits of the body in the 
20th and 21st century, at the intersection of musical performance and its cultural 
context. 
 
focusing on Sara Jane Bailes’ Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure (2011). 
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 3. A comparison of four composers who are generally considered to come from 
separate traditions of musical composition, which discovers surprising common 
themes in their work based on their shared interest in the keyboard étude. 
 4. An argument for the importance of embodiment in areas of musicological study 
that have often neglected it, such as genre theory; in the process, the thesis 
offers a new way of thinking about genre that expands current accepted models. 
 5. A contribution to various areas of interdisciplinary research in musicology, such 
as: 
• A contribution to the emerging field of Ernst Bloch studies, offering an 
initial account of how Bloch’s musical philosophy might be especially 
valuable for the field of performance studies. 
• A contribution to existing historical and aesthetic studies of musical failure 
by linking them with performance research, and by combining this 
literature with work from theatre studies. 
• A contribution to an understanding of the intersection of the body and 
technology in musical performance, using a combination of posthumanism, 
materialism, and disability studies. 
Musical Examples 
The specific pieces that I examine in depth in this dissertation are four sets of 
études: the Études Australes (1974) of John Cage, the Études pour Piano (1985-2001) by 
György Ligeti, the Studies for Player Piano (1949-1989) by Conlon Nancarrow, and 
Nicole Lizée’s Hitchcock Études (2010). The composers have little in common by 
conventional modes of analysis or historical genealogies. Nonetheless, they are drawn 
together not only by their penchant for études, but also by conceptual links that I will 
thread through the dissertation. In particular, each is interested—both explicitly in writing 
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and in their musical language—in the question of the ‘impossible’. They explore this topic 
both by challenging bodies to accomplish impossible tasks and by redefining how 
possibility is defined in performance. Many of them combine their musical ideas with 
political ideology, a theme that will be important throughout the project. Equally, all of 
the works offer challenges to dominant narratives of virtuosity, pedagogy, and 
possibility—contributing and responding to a changing sense of what the étude might be. 
The composers are also drawn together by the logic of performance. The examples 
in this thesis are curatorially interesting, fitting together as a set of pieces might in a 
musical programme. Hans Ulrich Obrist’s book A Brief History of Curating features Anne 
d’Harnoncourt’s advice for curators: ‘to look and look and look, and then to look again, 
because nothing replaces looking…. I mean to be with art.’12 Being-with this repertoire as 
a listener and performer is a large part of what has inspired me to synthesise it in my 
research and is indicative of the phenomenological underpinnings of my methodology.  
 Although my research focuses on these specific examples, I acknowledge that the 
features, innovations, and analyses I discuss are applicable to a much broader range of 
repertoire, including to many forms of music production that are not called or considered 
to be études. Rather than offering a challenge to the project, this is in fact an essential 
component of my understanding of the étude itself. These pieces, and études in general, 
are critically amplified examples of what happens when the body is pushed to its limits or 
destined to fail. However, forms of étude-thinking can occur in any music. In fact, 
perhaps aspects of the étude are present in all forms of music-making. As will become 
clear throughout the project, this is inherent in the very nature of the étude from its 
earliest origins, as its emergence as a pedagogical genre positions it as both a stepping-
stone to other repertoire and a reflection of existing music and performance. 
 
12Obrist (2008), 4. 
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A Thesis in Two Books 
The dissertation is divided into three sections. I have called the first two sections Books I 
and II, following the convention of étude titles used by both John Cage and György 
Ligeti, both of whom follow the études of Claude Debussy—who published his 12 études 
together as ‘Livres’ of six studies each. In Book I, I lay the groundwork for my 
investigations by examining the origins of the étude genre. The Book is comprised of six 
short études, which introduce ideas pertinent to the étude genre in the 19th century. The 
first five examine various social and cultural aspects surrounding the birth of the concert 
étude genre in the hands of Franz Liszt, Fryderyk Chopin, and their contemporaries, 
providing an overview of the cultural and musical conditions under which the étude came 
to become an important genre in performance, pedagogy, and composition. These short 
études are designed neither to be comprehensive or conclusive, but rather to offer an 
introduction to relevant features of the étude genre and the emergence of virtuosity in 
the 19th century. Each of these themes—virtuosity, the work of art, the bourgeois subject, 
pedagogy, the embodiment of genre—will be returned to repeatedly throughout the later 
discussions of études in the 20th and 21st century. 
 The sixth étude is a performance-based Case Study, in which I use Chopin’s 
Étude Opus 10 no. 3 to illustrate the theoretical points from one of the previous études—
specifically, to articulate my theory of genre as a form of embodied practice. This ‘case 
study’ genre recurs throughout the dissertation. In these studies, I use performance-
based methods to explore the theoretical ideas presented in the preceding chapters. This 
approach allows me to explore the different registers of discourse and modes of 
exposition that are often necessary for attending to the contingencies of practice, while 
still connecting this with rich theoretical tools. 
In Book II, I proceed to the study of contemporary études. This section consists 
instead of seven études, which are significantly more expansive. Étude 7 takes the 
example of utopian thought in literary science fiction as an example of impossibility. This 
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theoretical background is used as a way of thinking about John Cage’s Etudes Australes. 
Étude 8, meanwhile, uses another practice-based Case Study to examine the utopian 
impulse in Cage’s Étude Australe no 8. Étude 9 turns to György Ligeti’s Études pour piano, 
which it analyses using theory about failure from psychoanalysis and queer theory; Étude 
10 then explores some of this theory from a performance perspective, focusing on 
Pierre-Laurent Aimard’s online project ‘Inside the Score’. The final three études all 
examine the limits of the body between human and machine, and turn to posthuman 
studies, with quite different examples. Étude 11 focuses on Conlon Nancarrow’s Studies 
for Player Piano (which explore impossible themes without the presence of a human 
pianist), while Étude 12 turns to Nicole Lizée’s Hitchcock Études, for piano, electronics and 
video. Étude 13 offers a final performance-based case study, which looks at pedagogical 
aspects of Lizée’s Hitchcock Études. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with a ‘Coda’. It is in this section of the dissertation 
that I put the études in conversation with each other. This investigation allows me also to 
assess what these pieces—and the diverse theoretical modes that I have used to study 
them—have in common. I argue that they are linked especially by their shared attempts to 
explore the impossible in performance and to challenge the limits of the body: whether 
by extending, challenging, or reframing the boundaries of those limits. In the coda, I also 
examine ways in which these works of music that might seem to be purely abstract, 
academic, or apolitical, should be thought of as subversive and experimental.  
The Coda is also where I return most significantly to the ideas introduced in Book I, 
in order to reflect on continuity in the étude over time as well as on the novel ideas 
explored by the four composers in my case studies. In both continuity and change, the 
rich relationships between the genre, performance, virtuosity, and social conditions at the 
étude’s origins lend important insight into the ways in which the étude has developed in 
the 20th and 21st centuries. Perhaps the coda is also a manifesto of sorts, or at least a 
message of hope, that if—as Cage says—pianists can accomplish ‘the practicality of the 
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impossible’, perhaps we can keep trying to understand, to theorise, and hopefully also to 
accomplish the impossible in many other ways, on and off the stage. 
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BOOK I 
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As I have suggested in the Introduction, the genre of the étude is slippery and surprising. 
Its first connotations and earliest origins are in training and pedagogy. The word étude, of 
course, means ‘study’, and the étude genre began as didactic pieces from which students 
might learn and improve. Études have also functioned as sketches and compositional 
models for composers. For Debussy, they were often compositional explorations of 
specific intervals or melodic features; for Messiaen, of rhythmic modes. Equally, as the 
genre has developed since the 19th century, keyboard études have become much more 
than ‘exercises’, and form an important part of the performance canon. The genre of the 
concert étude emerged as the notion of the ‘work of art’ was also coming to prominence, 
and exercises morphed into concert études in part by assuming the characteristics of 
Werktreue. 
Even the most work-oriented études, though, maintain a relationship to 
performance. The predominant trait of the étude is virtuosity—a property that emerges in 
the performer’s body, and in relationship to the audience. Furthermore, the original 
purpose of the étude as a device for training still lingers over the genre for composers 
and performers. As a result, études always ask performers to push at the limits of their 
own bodies: to use them as opportunities to learn, change, and grow in practice and 
performance. In this respect, the étude always proposes a difficult—perhaps impossible—
challenge or problem. With it comes the responsibility and desire of the performer to 
work through and solve such a problem with their body. Perhaps this is what John Cage 
meant when he referred to ‘an étude period of history, in which… what we have to do 
appears to many to be the impossible….’1 
The purpose of this section—which I organise as a ‘Book’ of six short études—is to 
understand the historical genre of the étude, in order to later contextualise its 20th and 
21st century manifestations. I focus on the emergence of the étude in the 19th century, 
 
1Cage and Kostelanetz (1987), 296. 
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especially in the concert études of Chopin and Liszt. The étude, I will argue, is a genre 
uniquely at the intersection of performance, politics, and aesthetics. This is partly due to 
its close connections with virtuosity. As other scholars have discussed, virtuosity is a 
unique musical property: manifested in performance but closely connected with literature 
(Susan Bernstein), industrialisation (Richard Leppert), and the work of art (Jim Samson). 
The genre’s further associations with pedagogy also contribute to its close connection 
with its social and cultural context. The étude as a subject of research also allows me to 
reflect critically on the concept of genre more broadly. The étude offers challenges to 
genre theory in general that help to refine our understanding of genre more explicitly in 
terms of performance and embodiment. Equally, the composition of études by the most 
established composers of the century and the use of études in performance to amplify 
the talents of specific performers make it impossible to discuss the étude without 
attending to the notions of individual subjectivity that were also nascent in the 19th 
century. 
These facets of the étude do not present a coherent picture of a clearly defined 
genre, but rather emphasise the fact that the étude itself poses problems. It is a genre of 
oppositions: between virtuosic performance and Werktreue, between training and display, 
between admiration and suspicion, between the individual virtuosos and the anonymous 
diligent student. Not only does it occupy a liminal space between different poles, but also 
exists at the limit of the human body: études are designed to challenge individual 
performers to accomplish previously impossible tasks, as well as to challenge 
performance and composition in general to strive towards new goals. 
This Book itself is organized into six short Études, each of which offers specific 
insight into one aspect of the étude genre in its historical development. Like musical 
études, these are each relatively focused on a specific problem. They are designed, 
similarly, to push that problem in a new direction in a focused way. However, they are 
neither progressive nor strictly chronological. Echoing the modular form of the étude, 
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they may seem more repetitive and less linear than would be traditionally expected for a 
series of sections. Equally, they are intended as short introductions, rather than 
comprehensive explorations. The first five of these Études investigate the topics of 
virtuosity, the work of art, the subject, pedagogy, and genre. 
Rather than focusing on theoretical and historical problems at the heart of the 
étude, the final Étude of this Book is rather a more extensive case study on Chopin’s 
Étude Opus 10 no. 3, focusing on the topic of genre. Here, I use performance-based 
methods to explore genre in a personal, practical, and performance-based way. I focus on 
analysis by two performers, John Rink and Alfred Cortot. At the same time, my 
observations as a pianist allow me further access to the ways in which musical events, 
human interaction, and embodied knowledge are contained within the works. It is also a 
form of what Diana Taylor refers to as the ‘repertoire’ of history; a kind of historical 
engagement that goes beyond the limited nature of what can be found in the archive.2 
 
2Taylor (2003), 1-4. 
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Étude 1: Virtuosity 
 
For the virtuoso, musical works are in fact nothing but tragic and moving 
materializations of his emotions; he is called upon to make them speak, weep, sing 
and sigh, to recreate them in accordance with his own consciousness. In this way he, 
like the composer, is a creator, for he must have within himself those passions that 
he wishes to bring so intensely to life.3 
 
An essential component of the étude genre in the 19th century was the display of 
virtuosity. As Dana Gooley describes, ‘the musician, the athlete, and the magician are 
potentially virtuosos as soon as they cross a limit—the limit of what seems possible, or 
what the spectator can imagine.’4 Although today, the idea of virtuosity and the figure of 
the ‘virtuoso’ are almost entirely associated with music and musicians, it was originally a 
more all-encompassing term. In The Crescendo of the Virtuoso: Spectacle, Skill, and Self-
Promotion in Paris during the Age of Revolution, Paul Metzner explains that in a variety of 
fields other than music, including public chess, cooking, and automaton-building, the late 
18th century saw in Paris a rise of virtuosos, which he defines in his book as people ‘who 
exhibit their talents in front of an audience, who possess as their principal talent a high 
degree of technical skill, and who aggrandize themselves in reputation and fortune, 
principally through the exhibition of their skill’.5 
In all of these fields, virtuosity became a matter of public attention and recognition. 
Many scholars have noted the way in which virtuosic performance—and virtuosic musical 
 
3Liszt, cited in Huneker (1911), 303. 
4Gooley (2004), 1. 
5Metzner (1998), 3. 
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performance in particular—defined the era.  In an age of individualism, of industrial 
capitalism, and of a growing bourgeoisie, virtuosity came to represent and be supported 
by many of the defining values and conditions of the age. Susan Bernstein’s account of 
virtuosity notes the way it intersects with a new preoccupation with music, over 
language, as the defining artistic medium, with the most unmediated access to individual 
subjectivity and inner expression. Inner expression, in turn, was the very signal of 
bourgeois identification. 
The attention accorded to virtuosity was not, however, uncomplicated or 
unequivocally positive. Public fascination encompassed suspicion as much as admiration 
in the public reception of virtuosic performance. Susan Bernstein’s work on virtuosity 
considers some of the conditions and origins of this suspicion by drawing a link between 
virtuosity and journalism. With the increase of journalistic practices and discourse 
following the rise of print, journalism became an easy symbol of the ‘instrumentalisation 
of language and the waning dream of communicative expression’.6 The critique of 
journalism carried with it suspicion about both medium and content—about the linguistic 
and communicative quality of the writing and about the authenticity and veracity of the 
statements professed. The close relationship between gossip and journalism in the 19th 
century contains both of these suspicions. Both virtuosity and journalism are tinged with 
the possibility of deceit. 
In this respect, suspicion is also related to the excess of the virtuoso. As Bernstein 
describes, virtuosic surplus is ‘the distance between performance and the reality to which 
it relates’.7 When the performer surpasses the limits of what seems possible at the piano, 
exceeding the limits of the body, they are distancing their act from a stable reality. This is 
much like the act of gossip, which also enacts a distance between performative utterance 
 
6Bernstein (1998), 11. 
7Bernstein (1998), 85. 
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and factual reality. The suspicious element of virtuosity, at its most extreme, led to 
associations between virtuoso performers and artists with the supernatural. Maiko 
Kawabata, for example, has effectively described the physical, visual, and technical 
virtuosic aspects of Paganini’s playing that directly contributed to his depiction as 
‘demonic’, noting especially his ‘performance of seemingly impossible feats, and, beyond 
that, from the spectacle of his bravura showmanship.’8 
The relationship between gossip and virtuosity also extended to the immediacy and 
presence of the performance experience. It was tied to the specificity of a particular, 
ephemeral moment, and attached to the body of a particular human performer.  As such, 
virtuosity made itself apparent to the listeners who were present in that moment; 
however, it could not be conveyed or communicated. This is both part of its danger and 
its appeal. In order to experience the virtuoso, you must hear and see them live—‘you had 
to be there’—and yet for that very reason, one cannot trust accounts (especially not 
journalistic accounts) of virtuosic performances. Much of the discourse around virtuosity, 
then, is limited to ‘hearsay’. The public may be suspicious not only of the virtuoso himself, 
whose talents seem to be accrued from a dangerous source, whose powers are deceptive 
illusions, but also of those who wish to sing the virtuoso’s praises, and especially the 
medium by which they do so. 
It is perhaps ironic that the suspicious medium of journalism is among the only 
sources of information that we have about the content of virtuosic performance. It is 
easy—and not altogether uncommon—for concert reviews to be treated as unmediated 
sources of information about musical events of the past. We should, however, be 
suspicious of these, and not only because of the suspicion with which they were 
accorded in their own time. For example, Katharine Ellis has observed the ways in which 
Maurice Schlesinger, editor of the Revue et gazette musicale de Paris, was under economic 
 
8Kawabata (2007), 101. 
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and societal pressures that skewed the editorial contents of the paper.9 
Many of the existing studies of virtuosity in the 19th century have focused on the 
pianist and composer Franz Liszt, who is—along with violinist Niccolo Paganini—almost 
synonymous with the idea of the romantic virtuoso. These have attempted to deal with 
the limitations of sources and attend to the question of 19th century virtuosity in 
different ways. Dana Gooley notes that by observing trends and motifs in writings about 
Liszt, rather than taking the opinions of individual writers for granted, he is able to avoid 
some of the perils of using periodicals as sources, by de-centering individual writers in 
favour of ‘a more general cultural interpretation of Liszt’.10 Another account of Liszt and 
virtuosity in the 19th century is that of Richard Leppert, who attempts to situate the 
virtuoso amidst the broader cultural and social issues of modernity.11 
Meanwhile, Jim Samson attempts to recover a 19th century concept of virtuosity 
less from accounts of performances and more from the content of Liszt’s compositions: 
focusing in particular on Liszt’s études. Concert études are fundamentally tied to the 
property of virtuosity. Designed to develop and showcase specific technical skills, études 
necessitate live, public performance and the virtuosic display of a talented performance. 
In order to understand the role performance and virtuosity play in these works, he 
focuses on Liszt’s Études d’exécution transcendante, as well as his two earlier published 
versions of these études. With this approach, Samson treats performance as one among 
many recompositions that Liszt might have undertaken, and understands that—in the 
étude—performance is an emergent property of musical composition, contained within 
the notes themselves rather than a separate phenomenon. His focus on the étude genre 
for understanding virtuosity and performance relies on the assumption that the genre 
 
9Ellis (1995). 
10Gooley (2004), 6. 
11Leppert (2002). 
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‘exemplified an aspect of practice’12 without which these pieces could not be studied.  
Evidently, virtuosity in the 19th century both enabled the emergence of the étude 
and shaped its development and remains a consistent feature of the genre. The nature of 
virtuosity in the 19th century thus points to the close relationship between the étude 
genre and contemporary society, given the pervasiveness of virtuosity in practice and in 
discourse during the era. Equality, the slippery nature of the concept itself and essential 
liveness of the experience of virtuosity make the étude a complicated phenomenon to 
investigate. Samson’s excellent analyses—finding the nature of Liszt’s virtuosity in the 
musical scores of his études—provide useful examples for understanding the genre. 
However, his work also gestures toward the fact that virtuosity must also inevitably be 
understood through and with the body. It is in the body that the phenomenon of crossing 
‘the limit of what seems possible, or what the spectator can imagine’13 is produced in the 
études, a fact that will be important throughout this research. At the same time, virtuosity 
is by no means the only important characteristic of the étude in the 19th century. In fact, 
its influence on the étude is in almost direct contradiction to the subject of Étude 2: the 
work of art.  
  
 
12Samson (2003), 32. 
13Gooley (2004), 1.  
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Étude 2: The Work of Art 
 
Jim Samson claims that treating the content of Liszt’s études in terms of ‘virtuosity’ 
‘brings into sharp focus the relationship between music’s object-status and its event-
status’.14  Part of the reason for his focus on the presence of virtuosity in musical scores 
is the central opposition that he draws in his work between the concept of virtuosity and 
the ‘work of art’ . These two concepts, which emerge and gain importance almost 
simultaneously throughout the 19th century, operate—in Samsons’ words—as a kind of 
‘dialectic’. 
Although the concept of Romantic virtuosity that we hold today—dating from the 
19th century—is a strictly performative concept, Lydia Goehr notes that prior to 1800 the 
‘virtuoso’ in music also included skill in composition and improvisation. In particular, she 
notes ‘the respect accorded to eighteenth-century composer-performer virtuosi, who 
were able to demonstrate their talents most immediately in extempore performance.’15 
The change that shifted the notion of virtuoso to its current meaning of a strictly 
performative quality is a change in the way music was conceived, and in particular, the 
emergence of the idea of the ‘work of art’. In her iconic book, The Imaginary Museum of 
Musical Works, Goehr writes: 
Things had begun to change in significant ways in the 1770s (if not before), 
numerous changes occurred around 1800, and many if not all the changes stabilized 
during the course of the nineteenth century. All these changes shared a common 
aim. They marked a transition in practice, away from seeing music as a means to 
seeing it as an end. More specifically, they marked a move away from thinking about 
musical production as comparable to the extra-musical use of a general language that 
 
14Samson (2003), 2. 
15Goehr (1992), 189. 
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does not presuppose self-sufficiency, uniqueness, or ownership of any given 
expression. In place of that, musical production was now seen as the use of musical 
material resulting in complete and discrete, original and fixed, personally owned units. 
The units were musical works. 
As a result of this change, the role of the performer thus shifted from a 
collaborative creator—whose contribution to the creation of music might include 
extemporaneous practices—to an executor of pre-existing, imaginary works. As a result, 
virtuosity—and especially, improvisatory virtuosity above and beyond the text of the 
music—gained additional suspicion in its challenge to this notion of the work. According 
to Goehr, ‘extemporization was not now generally thought to approximate to the 
condition of composition “proper” and less respect was gradually given to the virtuoso 
performer, who had quickly come to be associated more, as it was said, with 
‘charlatanism’ than with ‘the legitimate objects of art.’16 Though performative virtuosity 
and the work concept emerged partly in parallel, they are conceptually opposed. The 
persistence and popularity of performative virtuosity throughout the 19th century thus 
offered a further subversive challenge to the novel idea of the music work. 
If the work-concept and virtuosity are in constant tension, the genre of the concert 
étude holds a somewhat paradoxical place between these dialectical poles. On the one 
hand, the genre of the étude emerged alongside and in tandem with the work of art. The 
composition of Chopin’s Études Opus 10 (dedicated to none other than Franz Liszt) in 
1833 was a major step in the development of the étude genre as a genre of great works. 
Chopin was not the first to write études for piano, as his contribution built on and 
referred to pre-existing didactic pieces, which existed under the names of studien, 
exercices, Etüden, schulen, and more. However, scholars and pianists agree that Chopin’s 
études have a special role in the emergence of the concert étude as a specific genre. 
 
16Goehr (1992), 233. 
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Donald Tovey, writing in 1900, describes them as ‘the only extant great works of art that 
really owe their character to their being Etudes’.17 
As both Jim Samson and Simon Finlow have described, despite his evident 
influence from early composers including Cramer (1804), Field (1816), Moscheles (1826) 
and Czerny (1830), Chopin’s innovation was largely in effectively fusing technique and 
form. A distinctive feature of the étude—in both Chopin’s antecedents and in his own 
work—is its reliance on limited technical and compositional means for an entire piece. Its 
defining characteristic for Chopin, though, is the use of innovative solutions for resolving 
‘the unique creative problems that attach to constructing convincing musical statements 
exclusively from such material’.18 In other words, while earlier études simply reduced a 
work to the repetition and elaboration of a technical idea, Chopin found ways to 
transform a technical idea into the content of a convincing work of music. The capacity to 
transform a technical problem into the material for a musical work—to transform 
technique from simply the medium of a work to its very content—speaks to the special 
role the ‘work of art’ plays in the development of the étude. A distinguishing feature of 
Chopin’s études in comparison to earlier ‘exercises’ is their coherence, and the cleverness 
with which this transformation is effected. This is clearly indebted to the idea of musical 
form as autonomously generated and organic. 
At the same time, the étude pushes against many of the tenets and conventions of 
the emerging work-concept. First of all, its reliance on virtuosic content already puts it in 
tension with the work. The fact that, for example, Liszt ‘conceived his musical works with 
his own public performance of them very much in mind’19 at the height of his virtuosic 
years (roughly 1835-1847)—including his Études d’exécution transcendante d’après Paganini 
 
17Tovey (1944), 156. 
18Finlow (2011), 56. 
19Samson (2003), 84. 
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(1838), later published as the Grandes Études de Paganini (1851), and the Douze Grandes 
Études (1837), later published as the Études d’exécution transcendante (1852)—is 
testament to this blurring. Although Liszt’s études, too, are notable for their adherence to 
a work-character rather than being merely exercises, Liszt actively subverted the idea of 
the work by composing them with his own performances in mind, and, indeed, changing 
them from performance to performance. There is much evidence of this in the historical 
record, but perhaps the most conclusive is the changes Liszt made to these works in 
between their earliest appearances and their final publication. The Douzes Grandes Études 
were in fact revisions of an even earlier work, the Étude en douzes exercises. Samson’s 
attentive accounts of the differences between these versions has demonstrated the 
many aspects of the performing Liszt that can be found between the revisions, and that 
demonstrate an attitude toward the pieces in which performance and ephemeral 
experience is evidently prioritized over a static concept of music-as-work. Roger Moseley 
also makes this point in his discussion of the contentiousness of fingering the opening of 
Chopin’s op. 25, no. 6, in which ‘the performer’s task is not merely to play the notes, but 
to transform the jagged edges of their bitmapped information into vectors at the 
keyboard by the co-ordination of a supple wrist and precise digital motions.’20 The choice 
of fingers is of course not the only way in which a performer transforms the notes of the 
score, but is a particularly telling one in the context of Chopin, for whom there are ‘as 
many different sounds as there are fingers’.21  It is in the translation of these notes to 
fingers at the keyboard that the études come alive. 
The formal simplicity of many concert études generates further challenges to the 
work concept and the idea of complex, organic forms. The structures generated by the 
use of technique itself as musical material are often painfully straightforward, even as the 
 
20Moseley (2015), 18. 
21‘Autant de différents sons que de doigts.’ Chopin, Ésquisses pour une méthode de piano, 74; F.-Henry 
Peru, quoted and trans. in Eigeldinger (1988), 32 
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‘surface’ technical material is anything but simple. A particular striking example is Liszt’s 
12 Grandes Études no. 1, which Jim Samson compares to its early predecessor in the 
Etude en forme de 12 exercises no. 1.  Samson notes that in this case—and in other similar 
transformations—as Liszt expands the technical material and adds further layers of 
technical details and difficulty, rather than correspondingly expanding the harmonic and 
structural underpinnings, these instead become simpler. As he writes, ‘The work 
character of the exercise, predicated on conventional formal symmetries, has been 
replaced by a single anacrustic, performance-orientated gesture. In a word, a piece has 
been replaced by a flourish.’22 
At the edges of the work-concept, études play a unique role within the context of 
keyboard music in general. As others have noted, the technical figurations on which 
Chopin’s études are based are often elaborations of figures that appear in Chopin’s other 
works, and the keyboard works of other composers.23 These figurations also relate to the 
kinds of technical concerns explored by other étude composers of the time. Moreover, 
the title of étude suggests that the pieces serve some ulterior goal for the pianist, beyond 
simply their own performance. In an article in 1836, Schumann includes Chopin’s recently 
published opus 10 études in his elaborate list of ‘The piano studies, ordered according to 
their goals’.24 He categorizes 350 individual études and exercises—by Chopin, Moscheles, 
Hiller, and more—according to such technical problems as repetitions, octaves, trills, 
leaps, extensions, and so on. The first étude in C Major, for example, Schumann lists 
under ‘Spannungen, rechte hand’. Chopin himself evidently saw the pieces in this way: as 
tools that would alter and affect the performer’s body, and assist them in the 
performance of other works of music. Of the same piece, Madame Streicher recalls in her 
 
22Samson (2003), 92. 
23See Simon Finlow’s discussion of the four-note figure in Chopin’s op. 10, no. 4 in comparison to a similar 
passage in Hummel’s Piano Concerto Opus 84. Finlow, 54. 
24‘Die Pianoforte-Etuden, ihren Zwecken nach geordnet.’ Schumann (1836), 45. 
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diary that Chopin told her that to play it slowly every morning ‘would do you good. If you 
study it the way I intend, it broadens the hand’.25 The idea that the work exists in order to 
do the performer good—rather than the performer acting in service to the music—
emphasises that the étude genre is unusual in the context of the ‘work of art’. The 
translation of notes on the page to fingers on the keyboard—an essential and subversive 
component of these works—thus not only renders them intelligible but also profoundly 
purposeful. 
In the genre of the étude, then, many elements remain in play at once. It is easy to 
assume that by creating ‘convincing musical statements’ out of technical figurations, 
composers such as Chopin ‘transcend’ their technical bases. Equally, one might think that 
because of their evident didactic utility and reliance on repetitive technical formulations, 
they are reducible to ‘large exercises’.26  Instead, the interpretation given by Finlow is 
accurate: ‘these etudes are discrete works of art in which the musical ideas constitute an 
embodiment of technical material, in which the music is technique’.27 Embedded in this 
claim is an important point about the relationship between material, embodiment, and 
work. Although Finlow describes musical ideas as ‘an embodiment of technical material’, 
we must not forget that technical material itself is embodied, and is ‘material’ not only in 
the metaphorical sense of the word. A figuration becomes technically difficult or useful—
appropriate for an étude—only through the engagement of a body in relationship to the 
affordances of the material instruments. From its origins, the étude genre emerges both 
by strengthening an abstract concept of the musical work, and also by maintaining ties to 
the material conditions of performance, including instruments and bodies. 
 
25‘”Cette etude vous fera du bien," he said. "Si vous l'etudiez comme je l'entends.”’ In Niecks (1902), 1690. 
26Finlow (2011), 59. 
27Finlow (2011), 60. 
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Étude 3: The Bourgeois Subject 
 
The nineteenth century was intensely preoccupied with the self, to the point of 
neurosis. 
 --Peter Gay28 
 
Of course, both the concept of the work of art and the genre of the étude emerged 
within a rich and varied cultural context in the late 18th and early 19th century, and amidst 
the changing landscape of industrial capitalism, the appearance of a bourgeois class, and 
the wake of the French revolution (and impending revolution of 1848). Among the 
important social trends that permitted the proliferation of the concert étude genre and a 
public interest in virtuosity was an increasing sense of the ‘individual’ in society. This 
concept of the self was directly related to the changing nature of individual subjectivity 
after the Enlightenment and extended to many other areas of society. For example, 
Metzner notes the emergence of the term ‘égoïsme’ in France from the mid-18th century, 
and the proliferation of writing about the self, dating from the same period.29  Or, as 
Peter Gay opens volume four of The Bourgeois Experience: ‘The nineteenth century was 
intensely preoccupied with the self, to the point of neurosis.’30 
The relationship between individual subjectivity and the virtuoso has been 
thoroughly explored, in particular by Liszt scholars. The medium of virtuosity became, in 
the hands of Franz Liszt, the solo piano recital.  Despite its ubiquity now, the notion of a 
 
28Gay (1995), 3. 
29Metzner (1998), 174. 
30Gay (1995), 3. 
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single pianist performing alone for an entire concert was foreign at the time Liszt and 
other contemporaneous virtuosos first began to explore it. Kenneth Hamilton notes, 
Fanny Mendelssohn once complained that Clara Wieck’s programmes contained too 
many bravura solo works in comparison to chamber music.31 Liszt gave his first entirely 
solo piano recital in Rome in 1839, under the title monologues pianistiques (previously he 
had attempted, in a letter ‘musical soliloquies’, adding ‘(I do not know what other name to 
give to this invention of mine)’).  Meanwhile, the first use of the term ‘recital’ was the 
following year, at Liszt’s concert at the Hanover Square Rooms in London as part of his 
tour of England in 1840, during which he performed in over 50 cities, in recitals that 
were well-attended and closely attended to by critics, musicians, and the wider bourgeois 
public. This radical, self-interested move—of which he famously wrote to his friend 
Princess Belgiojoso, in a line often (including here) taken out of context, ‘Le concert—c’est 
moi!’—was made possible only by the a growing culture of individualism and sense of 
individual subjectivity in society. The rise of the virtuoso required an interest in seeing 
individual performers operate at the limits of their ability and display technical skill, and 
an interest in the individuality and unique subjectivity of these specific performers. The 
solo recital was an important venue for the emergence of the concert étude as a genre; it 
was in recitals that Liszt both performed and revised his sets of études, and it was the 
recital that distinguished concert études from other études that were simply exercises 
not designed to be performed. 
Equally, the economic conditions of industrial capitalism—and the rise of the middle 
class—create a changing sense of public space which is also a necessary precondition to 
the emergence of romantic virtuosity. The phenomenon of the virtuoso—both within and 
outside music—required display in front of an audience. As numerous scholars have 
described, most notably Jürgen Habermas, the rise of bourgeois society in the late 17th 
and 18th centuries cultivated and upheld the notion of a public sphere (Öffentlichkeit). 
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Habermas’ theorisation of the public sphere is largely literary and discursive. He includes 
journalism, Parision salons, and London coffee houses in his discussion, and is especially 
interested in the public sphere as not only a physical location but also a venue of public 
opinion, accessible to all.  However, the concert hall is equally an example of an emerging 
and growing public sphere, and is especially connected with capitalist commodification 
and bourgeois identification. Of the concert hall, Habermas writes: ‘admission for a 
payment turned the musical performance into a commodity; simultaneously, however, 
there arose something like music not tied to a purpose. For the first time an audience 
gathered to listen to music as such—a public of music lovers to which anyone who was 
propertied and educated was admitted.’32 The concert étude required both of the these 
changes: the presence of a physical and metaphorical space in which a public could 
gather to observe the performer, and a notion of listening to ‘music as such’, without 
other purpose. 
The concert étude’s ability to flourish in the bourgeois concert hall in the 19th 
century is also connected with other aesthetic and cultural shifts, including those already 
discussed. For example, the idea that music could be a commodity not tied to a specific 
function is inherently related to the idea of the musical work. As Naomi Miyamoto writes, 
‘a demand for serious listening can be viewed as a compliment to these new aesthetic [of 
autonomy]’.33 Equally, this concept is also connected to capitalism and commodification. 
As a commodity, art is beholden only to the choice and preferences of individuals. As 
Habermas continues, ‘released from its functions in the service of social representation, 
art became an object of free choice and changing preference.’34  On the one hand, this 
economic change is one of the factors that permits the emergence of the ‘work concept’. 
‘Instead, musicians—especially the composers amongst them—were sharing in the 
 
32Habermas (1992), 39-40. 
33Miyamoto (2013), 112. 
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revolutionary freedom claimed by a rising professional middle class, and gradually, 
through their liberation, were coming to be seen as independent masters and creators of 
their art.’35 
Richard Leppert notes that ‘the virtuoso was a troublesome paradox: he was the 
literal embodiment of extreme individuality, but one that ran the risk of exceeding the 
demands of bourgeois decorum, reserve, and respectability’.36 At the same time as Liszt’s 
individualism emerged in the context of bourgeois subjectivity, and his platform for 
virtuosity relied on the changes in public space and the emergence of a bourgeois public 
with the means to attend concerts and pay for tickets, he was also prone to scandalizing 
audiences with excess. Furthermore, he scandalized audiences by the very fact of his 
popularity: 
Bourgeois identity, gradually consolidated first against the entrenched aristocracy 
and later against what came to be understood as the working class, was distinctly 
anxious about popular appeal: popularity was politically suspect, due to a cultural fear 
of “the mob”; popularity likewise was culturally suspect to the extent that mass 
appeal risked blurring the lines between those values that defined and divided the 
social classes.37   
The same individualism that permitted an interest in virtuosity also created suspicion of 
the popularity accorded to virtuosic performance. 
The tensions of bourgeois individualism are also an important feature of the 
concert étude. The étude’s ubiquitous fixation on some kind of technical figuration—in 
the case of both Chopin and Liszt—operated both in the service of the work of art but 
also as a legitimate source of content in its own right. In order for technique to be on 
 
35Goehr (1992), 206. 
36Leppert (2002), 200. 
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display as content, the piece must then be performed and displayed in the concert hall. 
Thus, Chopin’s and Liszt’s études draw attention to the individual performer and the 
specificities of the body who is performing them. Whilst prior exercises for training 
anonymise, making performers equivalent to each other, the virtuosic étude instead 
separates individual virtuoso performers from one another. Thus, the growing importance 
of the individual in public life affected and made possible the concert étude as a genre 
that would grow in popularity with composers and audiences alike. However, the 
construction of a musical work out of ‘surplus’ rather than substance undermined the 
idea of the ‘work’ and the notion of music as a supreme, sacred, and transcendent form 
of communication. Given that this notion was an important aspect of the bourgeois 
construction of inner life, individuality, and expression, the concert étude thus also 
contradicted an important aesthetic manifestation of bourgeois subjectivity. 
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Étude 4: Pedagogy and Discipline 
 
Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all 
resemble prisons? 
--Michel Foucault38 
Another facet of the étude genre was its utility for training. I have already discussed the 
way in which this purposefulness interacted with a growing concept of the work of art. It 
was equally related to a changing landscape of music education and pedagogy over the 
course of the 19th century. Although Chopin’s Études Op. 10 (1833) and Op. 25 (1837) 
were reserved for only the most advanced pupils,39 and Liszt’s sets of études published 
and republished between 1826 and 1852 were largely not treated by teachers and pupils 
as pedagogical, the landscape of learning and pedagogy formed an important part of the 
formation of the étude genre and its acceptance into a canon of music works that was 
forming and solidifying over the course of the 19th century.40 
William Weber suggests that the formation of the musical canon was primarily 
taking place at the level of performance on the stage, and arguing that its ‘most basic unit 
of analysis…[is] the genre’.41 Nevertheless, in the case of the étude, its solidification as a 
genre and place as part of the canon was also taking place in private engagements with 
musical scores. Just as études were an important part of critical discourse about music 
pedagogy—as Schumann’s list of études for different training purposes in the Neue 
 
38Foucault (1977), 228. 
39See Mikuli’s comment in the introduction to his published edition of Chopin Op. 10, or Henry Lemoine’s 
remarks about the pieces in his Les Tablettes du Pianiste (1858). 
40William Weber identifies the period of 1800-1870 as that in which the canon is emerging, and 1870 as the 
period beyond which it is undeniable. Weber (1999), 341. 
41Weber (1999), 347. 
 35 
Zeitschrift für Musik shows—they were also practical pedagogical tools for amateur 
musicians and students to hone their craft. The act of purchasing published scores of 
études and practising them in the home was thus an important way of confirming the 
growing role that études were beginning to play as a genre. 
Over the course of the 19th century, an important social and cultural development 
that accelerated the spread of music education and thus the étude genre is the rise of the 
music conservatoire in France. The Paris Conservatoire itself was founded in 1795, and 
eventually expanded to other cities—generally taking over existing musical training 
institutions in those regions—and developed a centralized form of educational control 
throughout France, as Katharine Ellis has shown.42 Although these are less well-known 
today, the piano teachers at the Paris Conservatoire during the middle of the 19th 
century—Louise Farrenc, Henri Herz, and Antoine François Marmontel—wrote between 
them hundreds of études.43 Chopin, too, composed études for specific pedagogical 
purposes, and his ‘Trois Nouvelles Études’ were originally published in a training method 
known as the ‘Méthode des Méthodes’, specifically written ‘for the piano classes at the 
Brussels conservatory’.44 
The creation, spread, and importance of the conservatoire as a model was 
inherently related to many other aspects of bourgeois society in the 19th century. In its 
capacity for monitoring, assessing, and evaluating—as well as, of course, educating—
bodies, the conservatoire is a particularly important example of Foucault’s suggestion of 
discipline as an institution of power in the era. The conservatoire fulfils the main 
functions of ‘disciplinary institutions’ that Foucault, especially insofar as it became in 
France an instrument of centralized power, and was a space for monitoring and 
 
42Ellis (2015). 
43Louise Farrenc’s étude output alone includes her 12 Études de dexterité Op.41, 20 études de moyenne 
Difficulté pour Piano Op. 42, 25 Études faciles Op. 50 and 30 Études Op. 26. 
44‘Pour les classes the piano du conservatoire de Bruxelles.’ Gabrowski and Rink (2010), 599. 
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recording, alongside training. Equally, its ability to affect the ‘docile bodies’ of musical 
studies required not only the means to monitor, but also the capacity to maintain the 
disciplinary individualism. 
 Études—given to students at varying stages of their learning processes—became a 
means of evaluating, standardizing, and judging the progress of pupils. The ample 
treatises and pedagogical tools published and distributed that listed or published études 
in orders of difficulty allowed such monitoring to happen both alone and through the 
institution; and likewise, the choice available maintained the individualization of discipline. 
Although, as Foucault writes, discipline ‘cannot be identified with any one…apparatus’, it 
is instead a ‘type of power, a technology, that traverses every kind of apparatus’.45 This 
notion is crucial for understanding the role of discipline in the étude; it is not so much 
that discipline is located within the étude, but rather that it operates through the étude.  
Alongside this disciplinary and pedagogical context, it is no surprise that the études 
also bear a resemblance to the also-disciplinary environment of the factory. As Julian 
Johnson writes: 
The Grandes Études of the nineteenth century, in their display of speed, 
power, agility, and control mixed with danger and exposure, thus come close 
to fetishizing the technological precision of the new machinery of the 
industrial age. The new pianos were increasingly products of that age, with 
the outer-casing of the piano’s wooden box hiding the iron work within that 
gave the instrument its industrial strength, an aesthetic cover of ‘nature’ for 
the modernity of the material it masks within.46   
The power, strength, and industrial precision captured by these études further cements 
their interpretation as instruments of 19th century discipline. Referring to the pedagogical 
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works of Carl Czerny, Jordan Musser has suggested that the cumulative logic of étude 
books reflects was Kittler would call a ‘mechanical programme’, writing that ‘the logic 
suffusing [Czerny’s opus 500] operated according to processes of formal assembly, 
augmentation, and progressive development’.47  
 In this respect, the close connection of the étude to the technology of the 
keyboard and pianoforte is also crucial. The instrument itself was at the time evolving 
alongside industrialism and indeed as a machine, and the apparatus of the keyboard 
figures prominently in developments in computation.48 That virtuosity was associated 
with both automatons and human performers is thus not a surprise. Performers’ attempts 
to push themselves to their limits were similar to—if not directly imitating—machines 
(even as automated machines were seen to be imitating humans49). The emergence of the 
étude alongside and in connection with technology sets up the études that would be 
composed Conlon Nancarrow and Nicole Lizée, and is a theme to which I will return later 
in the thesis.  
   
 
47Musser (2019), 366. 
48Moseley (2015).  
49A famous example is the late 18th-century ‘Mechanical Turk’, seemingly an automaton that could play chess, 
that eventually was exposed as a fake. Metzner (1998), 181-182. 
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Étude 5: The Embodiment of Genre 
 
These ambiguities, redundancies and deficiencies remind us of those which doctor 
Franz Kuhn attributes to a certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled ‘Celestial Empire of 
benevolent Knowledge’. In its remote pages it is written that the animals are divided 
into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, 
(f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) 
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just 
broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. 
 --Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’ [1942]50 
 
Although the previous section reflects on the origins of the genre of the étude, it has left 
an important question untouched, which must now be addressed before we can consider 
the étude in contemporary society. What is the étude as a genre? Despite the lengthy 
pedigree of genre theory in literary and film studies, and more recently musicology, a 
number of unresolved problems perpetually pervade the understanding of genre. These 
are not simply problems of definition, although definition presents a useful start point: 
what is a genre?  The etymological origin of the term—from the Latin genus (kind, type, 
class)—suggests that a function of genre is typological. Despite the scientific and 
objective connotations of genus, the inconsistencies involved in classification are 
demonstrated aptly in Borges’ anecdote about the Chinese encyclopedia. The categories 
into which the animals are divided here are as natural as they are arbitrary. Among the 
many dangers of the list is the fact that each itemization attends to a different kind of 
property in the animal: some properties rely on the interpretation of the observer (‘that 
from a long way off look like flies’), some rely on properties contained within the animal 
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(‘enbalmed’), and others rely on action, behaviour, and practice (‘having just broken the 
water pitcher’). 
Indeed, the ‘what’ of genre is not its only—or not even its most difficult—problem. 
Borges’ admittedly absurd list reveals the essential difficulty in also determining how 
categories are constructed and defined. To what extent do genres emerge from 
properties within artistic works and to what extent are they defined by reception and 
practice? These questions of both ontology and epistemology have plagued genre theory, 
even as genre is frequently taken for granted in commentary and analysis. 
Within music studies, genre theory has mostly emerged out of literary 
investigations. Much of it has centred on the 19th century, and especially on the works of 
Chopin. The most influential essay on genre in Chopin is Jeffrey Kallberg’s 1988 ‘The 
Rhetoric of Genre: Chopin’s Nocturne in G Minor’. Kallberg’s crucial innovation in genre 
theory is to recognize that pre-existing musical literature about genre—which he primarily 
draws from Carl Dahlhaus—overemphasises genre’s ‘characteristics’ from the perspective 
of the composer, and underemphasizes the role that genre plays in audience reception.  
Instead, he proposes a model of genre based on communication and persuasion between 
composer and audience, encapsulated by the term ‘rhetoric’. In this way, he turns the 
understanding of genre away from a static set of characteristics contained within the 
work, towards an understanding of genre as a process. In his reading, genre is then 
studied through the effects it provokes and the relationship that it creates between 
composer, work, and listener.  He proposes to assess ‘a more extensive range of 
functions that genre performs in both the composer’s and the listener’s experience of a 
musical work’, focusing primarily on the communication of meaning, and in this respect, 
concerns himself with how genre informs the interpretation of listeners.51 
 
51Kallberg (1988), 242. 
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Another key text in musical genre studies—also focusing on Chopin—was published 
only the following year. Jim Samson’s ‘Chopin and Genre’ explores many complementary 
ideas, by also recognising and attending to the flexibility of genre. Samson is interested 
not only in genre’s capacity as a relationship or tool of communication, but also as a 
framework, which will differ according to different contexts, audiences, and communities. 
He focuses especially on some of the specific characteristics of Chopin’s work that make 
him an exemplary case for genre study. In particular, he notes the lyric piano piece of the 
early 19th century as an emerging genre that is both defining itself against the past 
(sonata form for example) and actively forming its own identity, both traits that are an 
important part of genre theory. Equally, he considers that Chopin’s genres not only 
integrate to form a conceptual unity, but also incorporate elements of external popular 
genres—as references and counterpoints that both confirm and fragment the traditional 
generic contexts of the works. In this essay, he particularly attends to the Impromptu as 
an example of a lyric piano piece, expanding the theories to the ballade in his 1992 book 
Chopin: The Four Ballades. 
Samson acknowledges multiple possible generic ‘frame[s] of reference’52 for 
understanding Chopin pieces. Genre is a fluid, changing category, not only found in the 
characteristics of a work, but also found in the vantage point from which these 
characteristics are observed: whether the work itself, the genre title, the Chopin canon, 
or the 19th century lyric piano piece. These frameworks inform, among other things, the 
relationship between the title and content of a work, which may be an interaction of 
subversion or of confirmation. In recognizing Chopin’s own propensity to fragment within 
individual genres, Samson suggests that Chopin is already looking ahead to the 
disintegration of genres that critics such as Adorno and Dahlhaus have suggested 
accompanied the rise of modernism in music. 
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Writing in 2013, Eric Drott reframes genre exactly through this context of 
modernism, arguing that genre has not at all been abandoned. His understanding—as 
Kallberg and Samson—also relies on seeing genre as a process, to be found in audiences 
rather than composers or works. ‘As an ensemble of correlations, a genre is not so much 
a group as a grouping, the gerund ending calling attention to the fact that it is something 
that must be continually produced and reproduced.’53 His focus is much more, though, on 
the varying perceptions of genre, and the way that the identification of genre is a social 
act, and one with high stakes. the identification of genre conditions not only how we 
interpret the work but also what ‘interpretive schemata…can be legitimately mobilized to 
make sense of a given text’54. The appropriateness of these schemata will change 
depending on the community and context. Where Samson’s frames of reference were 
mostly a question of scale, Drott brings out how—especially within the scattered context 
of modernist music—such frames of reference can also overlap and coexist in a single 
moment, even in the present. 
All three of these generic theories focus on genre as a process, rather than as a 
fixed and stable set of characteristics. To different degrees and in different ways, they 
focus on the means by which this process is created and enacted, whether by interaction 
with and within titles, by comparison with other works, by opposition to other traditions, 
genres, or composers, or by validation for and within a community of listeners and actors.  
What each of these theories of genre have in common is the idea that genre is something 
to be understood. For Kallberg, ‘the choice of genre by a composer and its identification 
by the listener establish the framework for the communication of meaning’55. For 
Samson, ‘genre…is one of the most powerful codes linking the composer and his 
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audience’56. For Drott, the reconsideration of genre is ‘a point of entry for considering 
how the plural and agonistic character of the cultural field, by imprinting itself upon 
ourselves, shapes our perception and understanding of music’57. In the ‘communication of 
meaning’, ‘codes’, and ‘perception and understanding’, we are reminded that genre is a 
tool for ‘making sense’ of music. 
Each of these necessary interventions into genre ignore the role that performers 
themselves play in the creation and identification of genre. Although Kallberg refers 
extensively to reviews of performances, any specific agency the performer has in the 
identification of genre in these performances is not identified. Neither are performers’ 
opinions, observations, or encounters with genre part of any of these theories. This leads 
me to ask in what way performers—who participate in the communication of meaning 
and who may adopt any number of frames of reference—themselves ‘make sense’ of 
genre. In many ways, this seems a natural extension of the process-based theories that I 
have outlined above. After all, if genre is to be understood as an evolving phenomenon, 
understanding genre through the lens of performances studies—which has largely 
focused on understanding music through the ephemeral, processual, and evolving events 
of musical performance rather than the stasis of text-based scores—should be an obvious 
approach. Equally, if we are to follow Kallberg in expanding the ‘range of functions that 
genre performs in both the composer’s and the listener’s experience of a musical work’,58 
it is only fitting to include among those range of functions the ways in which genre 
affects the performer’s experience as well—acknowledging that the performer is also a 
listener—as well as to consider the ways that specific performers and performance 
occasions affect the experience of genre for all participants in a musical activity. Indeed, 
when Drott claims that genre is something that must be continually produced and 
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reproduced, the fact and practice of performance are implicit in that claim. It is through 
repeated performances that the production and reproduction of musical works occurs, 
prompting generic identification. 
Although the ephemerality and process-based aspects of performance are naturally 
encompassed by the concerns of genre theories described by Samson, Kallberg, and 
Drott, the addition of the performer as an agent of genre production, reproduction, and 
identification adds another concern—epistemological, rather than ontological. As the 
étude makes and remakes sense, for the performer this happens in a process that 
crucially involves practical, embodied knowledge. The final étude of this book will explore 
the ways in which genre’s sense-making happens in the body, through the genre of the 
case study. 
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Étude 6: Case Study—Chopin’s Étude Op 10 no. 3 
 
Does the étude also make sense? In many ways, its sense-making is similar to the genres 
of Ballade and Nocturne described by Kallberg and Samson. In particular, as concerns the 
way in which Chopin structured genre by ‘internal consistency’ within examples of the 
genre (Samson), the étude provides an excellent example: the études in general follow 
similar formal structures and material treatment.  Likewise, the étude offers a 
paradigmatic example of the shifting of genres that both Kallberg and Samson identify as 
crucial to the understanding of genre in general. In Jim Samson’s words, the étude has a 
‘conventional title, conventionally defined, but with a new status’,59 thus making it an 
interesting case for understanding how genres are both confirmed and displaced in the 
composition of new works, and the subtle negotiation of new and old at the heart of 
genre creation and persistence. As in the case of the Nocturne—Kallberg’s memorable 
example—certain études push at the limits of what we would normally consider 
acceptable for an étude and incorporate elements of other genres, thus helping to define 
what the étude can be. 
On the other hand, the kinds of sense that the étude genre makes are rarely to be 
found exclusively in the notes on the score. Schumann’s February 1836 article on the 
étude in the Neue Zeitscrhift für Musik offers a different understanding of what ties a 
genre together. In the article, he orders piano études according to the ‘goals’—from 
‘legato in one hand and staccato in the other hand’ to ‘velocity and lightness’.  The genre, 
therefore, shapes not the perception and understanding of its listeners, but rather the 
physical bodies of its performers. Whereas the title of Ballade connotes a ‘narrative 
listening strategy’,60 according to Jim Samson, the title of Étude offers something more 
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like ‘technical physical strategy’—one geared toward the solution of physical problems. It 
is a genre that compels Schumann to seek to identify—in the piano études he observes—
specific physical aims. His catalogue is testament to the fact that the interpretative 
strategy binding études together is inherently physical, going beyond reading notes on 
the page to the actual manifestation of these at the keyboard. Furthermore, the didactic 
and pedagogical connotations encourage the performer not only to feel certain kinds of 
sensations while playing, but also to focus on those sensations, and correspondingly, to 
develop physical strategies for performance, and goals for improvement. 
Moving from the general to the specific, I will use the example of Chopin’s Étude 
Op. 10 no. 3 to assess how genre is operating in the work, addressing the ‘range of 
functions that genre performs’ (Kallberg), the use of genre as a ‘frame of reference’ 
(Samson), and an ‘interpretive schemata’. I show, through this investigation, that a 
conceptual understanding of genre is insufficient, and that—in both generic thought, and 
thought in general—comprehension and embodiment are fundamentally entangled. 
Given that I have suggested the genre of the étude is conditioned as much by the 
solution of physical problems as it is by other interpretive strategies, my approach for this 
case study will be to demonstrate some of the ways that technical and physical problems 
are resolved in the practice of Chopin’s Op. 10 no. 3, and the way that a technical, 
physical strategy interacts with the assessment of genre. One of the most interesting 
records of pedagogical practice in the Chopin Études is pianist Alfred Cortot’s Édition de 
Travail, published by the Éditions Maurice Senart in 1915. In the edition, each study is 
preceded by several pages of exercises designed to assist the pianist in learning each 
study—indeed, a physical strategy. In the introduction to the collection, Cortot writes 
‘The essential law of this method is to work not on the difficult passage itself, but on the 
difficulty contained within this passage in order to restore its most elementary 
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characteristics’,61 continuing to elaborate that the method ‘might be applied to all pianistic 
works’ and ‘assures decisive progress’.62 From this introductory statement alone, we can 
already glean a sense of the relationship between the genre of the etude and Cortot’s 
approach to the works. Taking seriously Chopin’s deliberate classification of these works 
as Études, Cortot—a student of Émile Descombes, who had himself studied with 
Chopin—responds to and reinforces the suggestion of that title by suggesting that the 
pieces be practiced not only as works in themselves but as exemplars. 
This pedagogical orientation is prefigured in the editions of Chopin student Karl 
Mikuli, as well. In his own introduction to Chopin’s Opus 10 Études, originally published 
by Kistner in 1879, Mikuli describes Chopin the pedagogue by listing the various 
exercises that Chopin gave his students—beginning with scales, then onward to the 
studies of composers such as Clementi, Cramer, and Moscheles. After discussing the 
methods that Chopin would use for these somewhat, Mikuli finally arrives at Chopin’s 
own studies, which were reserved for ‘only far-advanced pupils’.63 
A peculiar feature of the Étude Opus 10 no. 3 is its lively, disruptive middle section, 
a chaotic interlude that is much longer than either the subtle, lyrical opening or its reprise 
at the end. As John Rink has pointed out, the fast middle section not only seems 
structurally like an anomaly, it also often sounds incongruous in many pianists’ recordings 
of the piece, and poses particular problems for the performer. He writes: 
 
61La loi essentielle de cette méthod est de travailler, non pas le passage difficile, mais la difficulté contenue 
dans ce passage en lui restituant son caractère élémentaire. Chopin, ed. Cortot (1915), 5. 
62‘Elle peut être appliquée à l’étude de toutes les oeuvres pianistiques, elle supprime le travail machinal qui 
déshonore l’exercise d’un Art fait de sensibilité et d’intelligence et sous un aspect lent et stationnaire, elle 
assure de progrès décisifs.’ Chopin, ed. Cortot (1915), 5. 
63Chopin, ed. Mikuli (1916), ii. 
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Pianists tend to let loose in the middle, playing with increasing intensity as the music 
becomes more chromatic, and reaching fever pitch at the tortuous, jagged descent…. 
The fact that one regularly hears the middle at extreme levels of intensity and 
velocity only perpetuates a widespread misconception about the piece.64 
In order to correct this misconception, Rink reframes the piece using a monadic approach. 
By his performative and theoretical analysis, the structure of the whole is reflected in its 
smallest unit: the syncopated bass line that runs throughout the piece. By this analysis, 
the lyrical opening and closing sections are the light first and last notes of the rhythm, 
where the middle section—marked poco piu animato, it is a much more dance-like section, 
with a ‘double-stop’ melody in the right hand and jumping line in the bass—is the 
emphasised middle note, which Jim Samson notes is exactly double the length of the 
outer sections.65 This analysis, in its attempt to unify the two sections, is suggestive of 
the problems that the piece poses in its seemingly disjunct nature. 
Alfred Cortot’s physical suggestions for the piece also offer a way of integrating the 
two sections, and a suggestion that ‘a sound performance conception’66 and sound 
analytical conception are inherently linked. Cortot’s opening exercise suggests isolating 
the top line from the middle line. The exercise helps the pianist to distinguish the top 
line—which is clearly melodic—from the rhyzthmic ostinato in the middle outlining the 
harmony. The two lines are already very different from each other in terms of rhythm 
and functional purpose; using an exercise to separate them responds to an obvious 
feature of the piece’s construction. To further exaggerate the difference between the 
two lines, Cortot specifies that the melodic line is to be played ‘sonorously, expressively, 
and perfectly smooth’ while the lower ostinato line is marked pp with staccatos (see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
64Rink (2015), 134. 
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66Rink (2015), 135. 
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Figure 6.1. ‘Exercice No. 9; for Étude Opus 10 no. 3.67 
 
Figure 6.2. Étude Opus 10 no. 3, bars 1-2.68 
  
However, the technical and formal concerns of the middle section are quite different. 
Rather than containing a separate melodic and harmonic line, instead, the passage is 
homophonic, as the right hand plays a melody in sixths (see Figure 6.3). However, the 
exercises that Cortot offers for this section continue to separate the top line from the 
middle line, despite there being no separation between them in the score (see Figure 6.4). 
Indeed, not only are the lines rhythmically and melody homophonic, they are also treated 
as chords in the autograph and subsequent editions, in comparison with the clear visual 
separation of the two lines in the opening bars of the piece (see Figures 6.5 and 6.6). 
 
67Chopin, 12 Études op 10, Edition de Travail par Alfred Cortot (1915). 
68Chopin, 12 Études op 10, Edition de Travail par Alfred Cortot (1915). 
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Figure 6.3. Étude Opus 10 no. 3, bars 21-23.69 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Exercises no. 10 (A) and (B) for Étude Opus 10. No 3.70 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Chopin, Etude, op. 10, no. 3. Autograph Stichvorlage for French first edition, bars 1–5.71 
 
 
69Chopin, 12 Études op 10, Edition de Travail par Alfred Cortot (1915). 
70Chopin, 12 Études op 10, Edition de Travail par Alfred Cortot (1915). 
71Narodowy Instytut Fryderyka Chopina, M/192. <en.chopin.nifc.pl> 
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Figure 6.6. Chopin, Etude, op. 10, no. 3. Autograph Stichvorlage for French first edition, bars 22–29.72 
 
What alternative exercises might Cortot have chosen for the passage beginning in 
bar 20? A clue might be found in his exercises for the Étude Op 10 no. 7 (Figure 6.7). 
This étude also features moving two-note chords in the right hand. Rather than 
separating the lines, Cortot’s exercise identifies the ‘fundamental technique’ as 
connecting the motion between two simultaneous notes in the same hand. Physically, 
this exercise creates a rotation of the wrist upwards and downwards—upwards as the 
pianist plays the smaller interval and downwards for the octave. By comparison, the 
exercise for the middle section of Op 10 no. 3 pronates the hand toward the outside, and 
creates a rotation of the wrist left and right. 
 
Figure 6.7. Exercise No. 1 for Étude Op 10 no. 7.73 
 
A similar exercise could have been constructed for the Étude Op 10 no. 3 (Figure 
6.8).  However, the physical gesture used for Cortot’s exercise for the Étude Op 10 no. 3 
does not in any way approximate that used for Cortot’s exercise for the Étude Op 10 no. 
 
72Narodowy Instytut Fryderyka Chopina, M/192. <en.chopin.nifc.pl> 
73 Chopin, 12 Études op 10, Edition de Travail par Alfred Cortot (1915), 45. 
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7. Cortot’s choice to create similar exercises for the two sections of Op 10 no. 3 suggest 
that Cortot is creating a specific kind of reading of the piece based on physical 
integration, in which the piece makes sense—not logically, but physically. This reading 
serves to physically understand the piece as a unified whole, from the perspective of 
Cortot himself as a performer. 
 
Figure 6.8. Exercise for Étude Op 10 no. 3 bars 21-22, based on Exercise 1 for Op 10 no 7. 
 
Both Cortot’s and Rink’s depictions here constitute forms of physical, performance-
based analysis, which rely on the performing body to make sense of the piece, not only as 
a coherent work but also as an étude. Their interpretations of in what way the piece is an 
étude differ. However, for both interpreters the making of sense (integration of the piece 
as a coherent whole) and the process of sense-making (experience of the piece in 
performance) are connected. In the case of Rink, the coherent interpretation of the piece 
treats it as an ‘étude in syncopation’, whereas for Cortot, it is interpreted as an étude in 
the separation of layers. According to both interpretations and performance conceptions, 
the performer herself plays a crucial role in the understanding of the piece as an étude. It 
is not just the piece ‘itself’ or Chopin’s notation that transparently reveals these 
properties. Instead, the performer—in treating the piece as an étude—shapes both our 
reading of its étude properties and our identification of its genre. 
Of course, the realm of the individual work is by no means our only frame of 
reference. Indeed, the genre of the étude suggests this with particular urgency, given the 
étude’s particularly complex interaction with piano music as a whole. As Simon Finlow 
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suggests, these Études were already composed to ‘embody the quintessential idioms and 
performance techniques of the piano’74. This already places them in relationship to those 
idioms and techniques that had at the time been deemed, and would eventually become, 
essential in other repertoires. As Chopin’s Études became canonic parts of the piano 
repertoire, on the one hand, these very technical and figural difficulties became less 
exceptional: concert pianists are now more or less expected to be able to play any of the 
Chopin Études. On the other hand, their development into canonical status also resulted 
in later composers incorporating the kinds of techniques they offered—which were, we 
recall, already quintessential—into the canon, further solidifying their generic status as 
fundamental training pieces for performers. As such, the étude as a genre exemplifies a 
particular kind of dynamic relationship between agents and works in history—in which the 
fact of being called and identified as an étude confirms and strengthens a generic 
relationship from many directions. 
On the other hand, like other genre categories, the étude remains slippery. It is 
determined in dynamic processes and relationships, through actions and discourse, rather 
than ontological divisions. Given the étude’s special relationship to ongoing practice and 
performance, perhaps this slipperiness is even more pronounced. In Mikuli’s introduction 
to the Opus 10 Études—which I have already mentioned briefly—he also lists amongst his 
catalogue of Chopin’s pedagogical tools several pieces that do not, in fact, have the title 
‘étude’: ‘Field’s and his own nocturnes also figured to a certain extent as studies, for 
through them…the pupil was taught to recognize, love, and produce the legato and the 
beautiful connected singing tone’.75  This passage indicates exactly the problem and 
potential of genre: that a performer, listener, or other interpreter may treat any work as 
an ‘étude’, if it is used for a pedagogical purpose, and with the aim of gaining physical 
skills and solving technical problems. Rethinking the potential of genre to encompass 
 
74Finlow (2011), 54. 
75Chopin, ed. Mikuli (1916), ii. 
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physical modes of understanding is thus revelatory. On the one hand, it opens new 
realms of thinking about musical ontologies and epistemologies, taking into account the 
ways in which knowledge is gained through the body. On the other hand, the manner in 
which ‘étude-thinking’ is clearly an ephemeral, evolving process—indeed, a process of 
practising—rather than a neat category, helps to make clearer the ways in which these 
processes of definition might take place in other genres. 
Both Cortot’s and Rink’s physical understandings of the piece are the 
interpretations of single performers, each set in particular historical and performance 
contexts. Nonetheless, they reveal an essentially embodied understanding of what the 
genre of the étude is and how genre in general operates. In combination with my own 
physical observations, they also offer a case study of genre across time. Rather than 
being an ahistorical glimpse at isolated moments, distanced from Chopin’s own context, 
instead this cross-section reflects the nature of genre itself—a process, rather than a 
category, that is made and remade by participants over time. 
It has been fruitful to address questions of genre with the specific case of Chopin 
not only because of his crucial role in the early development of the keyboard étude, but 
also because the works of Chopin have played a key role in the development of musical 
genre studies, having served as the inspiration for foundational texts on genre by Jim 
Samson and Jeffrey Kahlberg. Additionally, the immense literature on Chopin and 
performance, written from the perspective of both academics and performers (and 
sometimes, writers who span both of those categories) already suggests the usefulness 
and importance of using performance to understand his works. This unification of these 
three closely related concepts—étude, genre, and performance—finds a natural home in 
Chopin. 
Perhaps the intertwined relationship between genre, étude, and the body is indeed 
among the reasons the genre of the étude has persisted with surprising tenacity: why 
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there are still études composed today that we might visit and revisit from the perspective 
of the body, and use to understand the nature of genre. Despite Eric Drott’s insistence 
that genre is not over, the abandonment of traditional genre titles identified by Adorno 
and Dahlhaus (and against which Drott responds) is indisputable. There are few pieces 
composed today that are called or generically identified as sonatas, nocturnes, or 
preludes. Concertos and String Quartets are two other genres that might stand up to the 
Étude in terms of persistence, but neither of these have the same kind of internal 
consistency and prolific abundance within an individual composer’s oeuvre that the Étude 
continues to offer—including the 32 études of John Cage, 18 of Ligeti, and 49 of 
Nancarrow, as well as others: from Unsuk Chin (6 and more), to Philip Glass (20), to—over 
course—Marc-André Hamelin’s playfully Chopinesque 12 Études in Minor Keys. 
As we have already described, the étude works in multiple directions. Discursively, 
the étude reinforces the concept of the work, privileging internal consistency 
(demonstrated by Cortot’s physical reading and John Rink’s analysis). On the other hand, 
the essential physicality of the étude also materially disrupts these concepts, by 
emphasizing the capacity of performers to exceed and adapt and make possible the 
framework laid out by the score. As material-discursive agents, though, the body, the 
instrument, and the work also operate together: the physical identification of a piece as 
being of the genre of an étude already places it in relationship to other repertoire. Even 
in pieces that stand alone, as the Chopin Études inevitably do, the étude genre label also 
places a piece in the service of other works, and encourages others to treat it as 
containing fundamental components for composition (in Cortot’s words, caractère 
élementaire). It places the burden of interpretation on bodies rather than ideas, bodies 
which are fallible, changeable, and—importantly—different from one another. 
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Étude 7: Hoping for the Impossible—John Cage’s 
Etudes Australes 
If it could not be disappointed, then it would not be hope1.  
John Cage’s Etudes Australes and the language of (im)possibility 
Although the 1970s are often described as a period in which John Cage moved from 
strict musical composition to more radical experiments in text and poetry, his output in 
the 1970s also included three sets of seemingly-traditional compositions framed under 
the genre of the concert étude. His first set of études, the 36 Etudes Australes for piano, 
was written in 1974 for the pianist Grete Sultan. Considering that Cage’s engagements 
with genre tended to be more disruptive—such as in scoring the unconventionally titled 
Sonatas and Interludes for prepared piano in the 1940s, or in coining new ‘genres’ such as 
the Imaginary Landscapes—Cage’s études are comparatively conventional. They explore 
new kinds of virtuosic display, are written for acoustic, unprepared instruments, and 
notated using noteheads on grand staves. Over the course of the following six years, 
Cage composed sets of études for piano, violin, and cello and/or piano, following the 
Etudes Australes with the Freeman Etudes (1977-80), commissioned by Betty Freeman for 
the violinist Paul Zukovsky, and the Etudes Boréales (1978) for cello and/or piano for 
Jeanne and Jack Kirstein. 
Even after he stopped composing études in 1980, the idea of the ‘étude’ continued 
to occupy Cage’s discourse. In an 1982 interview with Tom Darter, Cage claimed: 
We are living in an étude period of history, in which, if we don’t learn how to do 
what we have to do, we may very well destroy ourselves. What we have to do 
 
1 Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank 
Mecklenburg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), 16. 
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appears to many to be the impossible…. People often object to my work as not being 
political, and I’m not interested in power politics. I’m interested in the use of 
intelligence and the solution of impossible problems. And that’s what these Etudes 
[Australes] are all about, and that’s what our lives are all about right now.2 
Cage’s political scope here is typically vast and recalls the range of utopian, futurist, and 
anarchist thought with which he commonly engaged (he goes on to espouse, for example, 
a vision of a nationless global society). Given our investigation of the étude genre, it is 
particularly telling that he invokes the étude as a political or historical mode, alongside its 
generic musical connotations. 
This quotation emphasises that for Cage, the genre of the étude is in some way 
political, which is perhaps a surprising use of a genre that originates as a seemingly 
apolitical pedagogical exercise. In describing the ‘étude period of history’, Cage also 
emphasises that it is pedagogical—‘if we don’t learn how…’—and is involved in 
‘intelligence’ and ‘solution’.  It is not theoretical, but practical, concerned not purely with 
ideas but with ‘[doing] what we have to do’ and ‘solution[s]’. There is an element of peril: 
‘if we [do not]… [then] we may very well destroy ourselves’.  But overarching and 
combining all of these is an interest in possibility and impossibility. ‘The solution of 
impossible problems’ is what these pieces are ‘all about’. 
‘The Practicality of the Impossible’ 
Before discussing the Etudes Australes themselves, it is worth understanding how and 
when Cage used the term ‘impossible’ to describe the works. Immediately after 
completing the piece, Cage was keen to recognize the demands placed on the body of 
the performer, and the sheer physicality of performance technique: ‘Grete Sultan, for 
whom I wrote these pieces, has had to learn to sit differently than she ever sat before, so 
 
2Cage and Kostelanetz (1987), 296. 
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that she can quickly and without seeming to, shift her weight, so that she will be in a 
situation where she will be able to do what there is to do.’3 He tells his interviewers here 
that Sultan has ‘had to learn’ new things in order to play his pieces. It is a learning that 
happens not only because of the pieces, but also through them. Sultan (presumably) did 
not consult a separate technical guide for tips on seating positions, but rather developed 
a new sense of balance in the process of practice and performance. Through this music, 
Sultan’s body was shaped and sculpted at the instrument. 
Despite recognising the difficulty of the works, and using directly politicised 
language of needing to ‘do what there is to do’ to describe these works, Cage did not 
immediately understand them as ‘impossible’ or discuss them in political terms. Even 
when asked explicitly about extreme difficulty by Jeff Goldberg in a 1976 interview, Cage 
simply avoids the question: ‘as far as I know, all of my pieces have been performed’.4 In 
1979, in an interview with Roger Reynolds, Cage limits himself to saying: ‘Partly what is 
meant in the Etudes Australes is that we must work very hard in order to play this music, 
and we must also work very hard in order to preserve our environment. There are certain 
correlations between those things.’5  It is not until 1982, in an interview with Laura 
Fletcher and Thomas Moore, that Cage uses much stronger wording: 
These are intentionally as difficult as I can make them, because I think we’re now 
surrounded by very serious problems in the society, and we think that the situation is 
hopeless and that it’s just impossible to do something that will make everything turn 
out properly. So I think that this music, which is almost impossible, gives an instance 
of the practicality of the impossible.6 
 
3Interview with Cole Gagne and Tracy Caras (1975) in Cage and Kostelanetz (1988), 38. 
4Cage and Goldberg (1976), 105. 
5Cage and Reynolds (1979), 570. 
6The latter part of this quotation frequently shows up slightly misquoted or without attribution, perhaps 
because it is often passed on and copied third-hand. The original interview was published in 1983 in 
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It is likely that Cage’s relationship with Paul Zukovsky was part of his changing opinion of 
the étude genre and its relationship to possibility. Between 1977 and 1980, Cage was 
working on the Freeman Etudes for Zukovsky,7 and this seemed to have an impact on his 
understanding of virtuosity and the limits of the body. Zukovsky pushed back against his 
demands, identifying passages and aspects that were difficult, seemingly to Cage’s 
surprise: 
He suggested—and I agreed—to go back over the string indications to find out again 
what string should be used when it was at all physically possible. Then I go over it 
with him again, and where it’s literally too difficult, just impossible, then he refuses 
the chance operation. He accepts some and refuses others.8 
Before working with Zukovsky, Cage claimed to have felt that ‘music is free of the 
problem of physicality that dance is involved in deeply’.9 It was only through this 
compositional process that he came to realize more clearly that ‘the very act of holding 
the violin is somewhat unnatural, like standing on one’s toes…. the action of playing the 
violin is as baffling as dancing’.10 It is during this time that he began to refer to the Etudes 
Australes as ‘impossible’, to see impossible action on the part of the instrumentalist as 
political, and to connect the étude genre with the notion of striving for a better world. 
Perhaps it is telling that Cage himself came to this understanding of what the étude 
 
Pozzi Escot’s contemporary music journal, Sonus, but more widely redistributed in Kostelanetz’s 
compilation of interviews with Cage, published in Perspectives of New Music in 1988. Cage and 
Kostelanetz (1988), 40.  For the original interview, see Fletcher and Moore, (1983), 16–23. 
7In 1978, in fact, he had not named them separately, and simply referred to them as Etudes Australes for 
piano solo (1974) and for violin solo (1978). See letter to Heinz-Klaus Metzger of Feb 2, 1978 in Cage 
(2016), 471. 
8Interview with Maureen Furman (1979), cited in John Cage and Richard Kostelanetz, ‘His Own Music: Part 
Two’, Perspectives of New Music, 26 (1988), 42. 
9Cage and Reynolds (1969), 591. 
10Cage and Reynolds (1979), 592. 
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might mean in and through practice, in a process of learning and discovering. In this 
respect, he is not unlike the students and performers of études: altered by a 
confrontation with the human body (even if not his own) and forced to adapt, change, 
and grow. Just as Grete Sultan came to adjust her way of sitting at the piano, and 
Zukovsky gained ‘notions of things that could be done that he didn’t know about’,11 so 
too was Cage transformed by his own etudes. This is in keeping with many aspects of 
Cage’s artistic philosophy. He was fond of quoting a line that he attributed to Thoreau: 
‘it’s not important what form the sculptor gives the stone. It’s important what sculpting 
does to the sculptor’. He was also continually interested in collaborative artistic 
endeavours, and increasingly so throughout the 1970s, writing to Christian Wolff in 1974 
that ‘the more urgent “good” is that we all work together’.12 
‘Then I Noticed Her Hands…’ 
Indeed, Cage’s process of composition for the Etudes Australes certainly followed these 
ideals of a collaborative physically-oriented process. As Cage writes, after he spent a 
month ‘failing to find a new music for piano having characteristics that would interest 
Grete Sultan’, it was by visiting her in person that he was struck with the inspiration for 
the work. ‘The room she lives, works, and teaches in has two pianos…. Then I noticed her 
hands, conceived a duet for two hands, each alone, then catalogued all of the intervals, 
triads, and aggregates a single hand can play, unassisted by the other. Soon finished the 
first of thirty-two études, each having two pages. Showed it to Grete. She was 
delighted.’13 Cage’s description of the encounter with Sultan’s body—‘then I noticed her 
hands’—as the compositional catalyst, whether or not it is true, reveals an orientation to 
the body that is palpable in the piece. 
 
11 Interview with Cole Gagne and Tracy Caras (1980) from Cage and Kostelanetz (1988), 39. 
12Cage (2016), 442. 
13Composition in Retrospect (1982), cited Cage (1997), 438. 
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The set consists of 32 pieces, arranged in four books of eight. Each musical system 
contains four staves, with the right and left hands occupying their own traditional great 
stave, complete with a treble clef and bass clef. Thus, both hands span (most of) the 
range of the keyboard, frequently crossing and overlapping. As Cage describes, the pitch 
material for the piece came from a catalogue of every possible chord that each hand 
could play: an eventual database of 1125 two-, three-, and four-note chords. Placement 
of these pitches, in turn, was taken from the Atlas Australis, a chart of the Southern 
hemisphere, drawn by Czech astronomer Antonín Bečvář, and in these places, chords 
were chosen using methods from the I-Ching. In addition to framing the piece as a duet 
for two hands, Cage also was concerned with its ‘metamorphosis’14 over the course of 
the 32 études. As the piece progresses, more and more multiple-note chords are used, 
giving the 32 études a sense of progression from simple to complex. 
 In addition to using the indeterminate processes of the I-Ching in 
composition, Cage also leaves many aspects of the piece unspecified in the score. While 
the relative placement of notes is determined spatially, absolute tempo is entirely at the 
performer’s discretion. Furthermore, Cage acknowledges that even the attempt at 
relative duration may not always succeed. In the introduction to the work, he suggests 
that ‘circumstances sometimes arise when it is necessary to “shift gears” and go, as the 
case may be, faster or slower’.15 He offers similarly optional accommodations for 
performers struggling to cope with the extreme range of the hands. ‘Notes written for 
the left hand above the C two ledger lines above the treble clef may be omitted in a 
performance. Likewise, any notes written for the right hand below the A on the lowest 
space of the bass clef may be omitted.’16 No dynamic markings, articulations, or 
expressive indications are given: these are to be contributed by the performer. 
 
14Cage (2016), 133. 
15Cage (1975), i. 
16ibid. 
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Only a quick glance at the score is necessary to determine that these Etudes are 
remarkably difficult to read and play. Figure 7.1, which shows the first line of Etude I, and 
Figure 7.2, which shows the first line of Etude XVI, offer a few examples: these 
demonstrate the visual complexity of both the two great staves, the spatial organization 
of the music, and the increasing density as more multiple-note chords are added. 
 
Figure 7.1 Etude Australe I, first system.17 
 
 
Figure 7.2  Etude Australe XVI, first system.18 
 
 
17Cage (1975), 1. 
18Cage (1975), 32. 
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The complete separation of the two hands is perhaps the most explicit problem, 
and one that Cage described as a key innovation of the piece.19 In a 1975 interview with 
Ellworth Snyder, for example, Cage claimed: ‘the idea of writing études for the two 
hands, each hand separate from the other, was original to this piece. I don’t think anyone 
has thought of doing that before’.20 From a psychological perspective, there is the 
discipline involved in isolating the hands as they rapidly move from one side of the 
keyboard to the other and avoiding the temptation to relate their movements (or play 
them simultaneously). The fact that both hands occupy the same ranges of the keyboard 
also makes the crossing of hands and negotiation of space physically awkward. 
Within a single hand, leaps between notes and between chords often create 
problems, especially in denser passages. These challenges seem to be made all the more 
frustrating by the fact that the individual chords themselves are designed specifically to 
fit comfortably under the hand. The problem arises when the comfortable hand position 
for one chord is quite different from the comfortable position for the next. 
Even a single note can cause awkward shifts and uncomfortable positions. The 
open note heads, Cage tells us, should be held as long as possible, often during several 
other closed notes. As such, these usually involve striking the note with a particular 
finger, and then switching fingers in order to reach notes on either side. Finally, the use 
of any non-standard notational system is disorienting for the performer. Physical 
challenges notwithstanding, there is a psychological discomfort involved in adjusting to a 
new way of reading the score and of translating text to body. 
All of these are familiar technical challenges that one might expect to see explored 
in an étude, and none are unique to these pieces in particular. However, the difficulties 
 
19Despite Cage’s claims for the innovativeness of this technique, it is one that he had in fact explored in 
previous works, such as the Solo for Piano (1957-8). 
20Kostelanetz (2003), 91. 
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are exaggerated here because of the construction and presentation of the piece, and 
because they were—as études—written expressly to be ‘as difficult as [he] could make 
them’. In particular, the idea of mapping star charts onto a score and translating these to 
the body seems almost absurd—as if the body is improbably and impossibly reaching for 
the stars. 
To Infinity, and Beyond  
Even though the pieces are embodied and physically contingent, the fact that they are 
drawn from star charts makes their difficulty—the way that they stretch the body beyond 
its limits—especially obvious. Cage had begun using star charts in his work about ten 
years earlier, first with the Atlas Elipticalis in 1962. In William Brooks’ chapter in the 
Cambridge Companion to John Cage, he attributes this interest in the stars in part to Cage’s 
re-discovery of the writings of Henry David Thoreau in the 1960s: 
Certainly Thoreau’s presence is felt in the extent to which nature is a source for 
many of the materials; and the art which Cage married to nature is direct and 
essential…. ‘I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately,’ wrote 
Thoreau; and in many of these compositions Cage seems to be recapitulating 
Thoreau’s journey (recorded above all in his journal) into the art of life by way of 
nature.21 
Thoreau was indeed an extremely important figure in Cage’s compositional process at 
this time. Cage was also in the planning process for his multimedia piece Lecture on the 
Weather, which included—among other things—recitations of text from Thoreau’s Walden. 
However, Cage’s interest in the stars may also have a place outside of nature. 
Unlike Thoreau’s woods, trees, and mountains, the stars are above us, intangibly distant. 
The stars are the home of the spiritual, of the heavens, of Angels and of gods. We may 
 
21Brooks (2005), 135. 
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attempt to understand and interact with the stars through cartography, or let them 
predict and imagine our future through astrology, but this keeps them ever at a distance.  
For Blake, another poet for whom nature was an overwhelming concern, the integration 
of stars and nature could only happen in utopian imagination, in a world not unlike Cage’s 
imagined ideals of a nationless world. In Northrop Frye’s words: 
There would no longer be any difference, except one of perspective, between the 
group and the individual, as all individuals would be members of one human body. 
Everything in the world, including the sun, moon, and stars, would be part of the 
human body, and everything would be identical with everything else.22 
Jameson describes this kind of sentiment as ‘Northrop Frye’s Blakean myths of eternal 
bodies projected against the sky’⁠3 and I wonder whether we might read Cage similarly: as 
the sky projected against the body perhaps, but nonetheless as an instance of astral 
utopian projection.23 
 It is not irrelevant that imaginations of the stars, and travel towards them, was 
a central concern within the popular and literary culture surrounding Cage in the 1970s, 
specifically in the realm of science fiction.  The genre was undergoing a number of 
important developments in the 1960s and 1970s, most notably in terms of formal 
experimentation and increasing preoccupation with political and social concerns. Perhaps 
even more importantly, the academy was also beginning to take note of science fiction 
during this period. Marshall McLuhan, the Canadian media theorist who was a friend of 
John Cage, found in science fiction examples of the imagined technological futures of his 
work, and academic journals such as Foundation (1972—) and Science-Fiction Studies 
(1973—) began to appear alongside the already popular zines, anthologies, and 
 
22Frye (2005), 235. 
23Jameson (2007), 7. 
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magazines.24 
Cage’s writings in the 1960s and 1970s even embody much of the ethos and 
experimental aesthetic that overtook the genre of science fiction in that era. Particularly 
notable is Cage’s essay, ‘The Future of Music’, published in Empty Words in 1979. Even 
the title betrays a kind of science-fictional interest in possible futures. The text itself is 
speculative (rather than a didactic set of instructions directed at future composers, for 
example) and he emphasizes the limitlessness of possibility for art and society. Much like 
the attempts of utopian science fiction to think beyond what we already take for granted, 
Cage suggests that ‘were a limit to be set, a process outside that limit would surely be 
discovered’.25 Elsewhere, he makes explicit his suggestion that music—as a means of 
changing the future—should not be part of explicit critique. Rather, it must be the kind of 
political statement that approaches obliquely in order to effect any real change. ‘Instead, 
protest is all too often absorbed into the flow of power, because it limits itself to reaching 
for the same old mechanisms of power, which is the worst way to challenge authority!  
We’ll never get away from it that way!’26 Rather, as he emphasizes in Empty Words, 
‘revolution remains our proper concern, but instead of planning it…. we are at all times in 
it’.27 
In this context, then, we might also understand these études as part of a larger 
movement of utopian politics. The paradox of ‘the practicality of the impossible’ 
resonates with the concerns of utopian thinkers and writers of the 1960s and 1970s, 
who were increasingly exploring experimental modes of expression in the service of 
imagining other, better worlds. 
 
24See Broderick (2003) and Wolfe (2003). 
25Cage (1979), 178. 
26Cage (1981), 236. 
27Cage (1979), 182. 
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A Utopian Leap: Etudes Australes as Science Fiction 
 
Oh, you can prove anything using the Analogy, and you know it.28 
 
The most explicit connection between Cage and the world of literary science fiction is a 
letter he wrote to Lou Harrison in 1951. ‘Playing poker on 14th Street with a lot of 
science fiction writers these days’,29 he recounts, referring to gatherings hosted by H.L. 
Gold, founder and editor of Galaxy Magazine (which launched in 1950), who was widely 
credited with shaping the development of the genre and ushering in a ‘New Wave’.30 
While admittedly quite a loose association, the productive correspondences between 
Cage’s concerns—in writing and within the Etudes Australes themselves—make it worth 
examining literary critical studies of utopia as we seek to understand Cage’s music. 
According to Fredric Jameson, one of the foremost scholars of utopian thought in 
literature, a preoccupation of utopia is the articulation of a utopian break that ‘forces us 
precisely to concentrate on the break itself: a meditation on the impossible, on the 
unrealisable in its own right.’31  The idea of ‘meditating on the impossible’ seems to be 
almost an obsession of Cage’s after the composition of these études. He writes about 
this yet again in ‘The Future of Music’, this time with an explicitly future-oriented 
modality.  ‘A necessary aspect of the immediate future, not just in the field of 
environmental recovery is work, hard work, and no end to it. Much of my music since 
1974 is extremely difficult to play (the Etudes Australes for Grete Sultan, the Freeman 
 
28Le Guin (1999) 
29Cage (2016), 156. 
30Broderick (2003). 
31Jameson (2005), 232. 
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Etudes for Zukofsky). The overcoming of difficulties. Doing the impossible.’32 
Another important goal of the utopian more broadly is the oft-repeated mantra of 
‘making the familiar strange’.33 Jameson articulates this goal most clearly as an alternative 
to interpretations that see utopian literature as attempting to ‘represent’ the future. 
Instead, he writes, science fiction’s aim is ‘to defamiliarise and restructure our experience 
of our own present’ (emphasis his).34  This defamiliarisation not only ‘[transforms] our own 
present into the determinate past of something yet to come’,35 but also thereby presents 
us with a way of re-thinking our present possibilities, or—as Cage suggests of music—
‘extending our realization of what can happen’.36 
In this light, the social and political impulses of the Etudes Australes can be 
understood in the various familiar strangenesses of the score. When a performer is 
confronted with the new ways of thinking that the Etudes Australes provoke—complete 
separation of the hands, utter control over the expressive components of the piece, 
temporality that is fixed in space rather than in notation—this destabilises her sense of 
what is normal. This effect is pronounced because of how close to ‘normal’ the score 
itself is, especially in comparison with Cage’s more ‘experimental’ works (including silent 
pieces and graphic scores). After all, the pitches are fully notated.  The score is written for 
an acoustic and un-modified piano. Meanwhile, the chords themselves all sit comfortably 
under the hand. This proximity to the norm is in fact what makes the piece so 
destabilising. The superficial similarities to more conventional pieces of piano music 
means that the pianist constantly forgets those elements that are deeply unusual, and is 
 
32Cage (1979), 184. 
33Often used by writers to describe utopian science fiction, though importantly also related to Viktor 
Shklovsky’s ‘Art as Technique’ (1989). 
34Jameson (2005), 288. 
35Jameson (2005), 288. 
36ibid., 178. 
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disconcertingly reminded of them at every turn. 
The destabilising effect of utopian science fiction often operates with similar 
proximity. Many canonical imaginations of utopia present worlds that are superficially 
close to our own, so that those aspects that deviate are all the more palpable. This is 
certainly true of Ursula LeGuin’s The Dispossessed, which was coincidentally also written 
in 1974 in New York City. The Dispossessed tells the story of Shevek—a scientist from an 
‘anarchist’ satellite planet called Anarres, settled generations ago by the exile Odo—
travelling for the first time to the capitalist planet from which Odo came. Shevek’s 
anarchist planet is not only eerily close to our own, but was also colonised by former 
residents of a capitalist planet that is clearly modelled after contemporary society. Both 
for Shevek and for the capitalist readers of the novel, things can never be the same after 
taking such a journey. These travels reframe Shevek’s anarchist upbringing and unsettle 
our own sense of what is taken for granted in contemporary capitalist culture. 
Literary theorist Simon Stow makes much of the fact that the novel relies on travel, 
which indeed has been a central component of utopian fiction since the invention of the 
term, with Thomas More’s travel narrative to the island of Utopos in his 1516 Utopia. 
Stow writes: 
For the Greeks, Theoria, the root of the modern word theory, was primarily 
connected to the noun theoros, meaning an “observer” or “spectator.” As such it was 
inextricably associated with the theatre: an alternative space in which, as many 
studies have shown, the Greeks addressed their most pressing social and political 
issues in comedic or tragic form. Additionally, however, theoros had the implication of 
someone who travels to see other cities and places: an ambassador or official envoy 
sent by the city to other places to witness and testify on their actions.37 
He calls on the fact that Shevek, the traveller, is a theorist, to suggest that by prioritising 
 
37Stow (2005), 39. 
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travel as a mode of theory, Le Guin offers us a way of theorising her own novel. For 
Stow, then, the act of reading can constitute such a journey between the text and the 
world. The reader travels into the ‘written world’ of the text, returning to understand it 
amidst her own ‘unwritten worlds’ (terms that Stow takes from anarchist theorist Paul 
Goodman). This task of comparison between ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ is, for Stow, the 
project of theory. That Cage’s Etudes are based on star charts seems even more striking 
in this light. The score itself, one might say, has travelled to the stars and then back. Its 
engagement with the spatialised written worlds of star maps and note heads, is grounded 
in the material, unwritten integration with the shape of the hand and the operations of 
the I-Ching. 
In thinking about theory as travel between written and unwritten words, we might 
also reflect on the relationship between the body of the performer and the score.  When 
Stow relates Theoria to the theatre, it is important to remember that theory is thus closely 
related to performance. For pianists of the Etudes Australes—or musicians performing any 
work—the act of performance involves travel and negotiation between scores, which are 
written, and bodies, which are not. The transfer between score and body is never 
straightforward and simple, in the way that, as Stow writes, ‘the reduction of texts to 
simple lessons, be they about Empire, empathy, or anarchism, though easily done, is not 
the way to generate meaningful critical thought’.38  Just as the relationship between 
performance and score is difficult to pin down, Stow observes that ‘we cannot give a 
scientific or even a discursively stable account of the relationship between written and 
unwritten worlds’.39 Indeed, this travel is equally between the written and unwritten 
worlds of score and body as it is between the multiple unwritten words of many bodies 
and performances, scattered across time and space. This does not mean that we cannot 
learn anything at all from utopian science fiction or from Cage’s Etudes, however.  
 
38Stow (2005), 47. 
39Ibid., 46. 
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Instead, as Stow comments, ‘Le Guin illustrates that insight comes not from simply 
applying the lessons of literature to the world in which we live, but by using both worlds 
to reflect upon and consider the other.’40 
In other words, utopian thought provides not a blueprint for how the world should 
be, but ‘a replicable critical method’41 through which we can understand and seek to 
change it. This is a common refrain and persistent thread in the work of utopian scholars 
from Fredric Jameson to Ruth Levitas. Levitas’ books The Concept of Utopia and Utopia as 
Method, for example, have been predicated on the idea that utopia is ‘the expression of 
desire for a better way of being or living’, and in this respect is ‘analytic rather than 
descriptive’.42 As David M. Bell claims, the ‘method’ theory of utopia is such that ‘utopian 
texts … do not help us to imagine the future, but they might help us to imagine imagining 
the future’.43 In the same way, we might understand the performance of the Etudes 
Australes as offering a method that might be used to understand and critically reflect on 
the world, just as—by necessity—the contingencies of the world affect and impact any act 
of performance. 
In his recent study of utopian thought, Rethinking Utopia: Place, Power, Affect, Bell 
suggests that the ‘method’ approach to utopia—what he calls, at times, the ‘function-
based approach to utopia’—is insufficient.44 This is not so much because it is inaccurate, 
but rather because the conflation of utopia with process means that we cannot explore 
the content or ‘place’ of utopia itself. Performance, I suggest, offers an approach to 
utopia that allows it to be both a ‘method’ and ‘place’. The performative act is indeed one 
of travel, offering a relationship between bodies and texts, which exists in process and 
 
40Ibid., 47. 
41Ibid., 48. 
42Levitas, Utopia as Method (2013), xii-xiii. 
43Bell (2017), 81. 
44Ibid., 84. 
 72 
might functionally demonstrate ways of understanding. At the same time, it is also a site 
within which we can locate the utopian imagination itself. 
The Spirit of Hope: A Theory for Utopian Performativity 
In the previous section, I used an analogy to The Dispossessed and utopian science fiction 
in general, proposing that by theorising across the two—in the journey between their 
respective written and unwritten worlds—we might better understand the impossible as it 
is articulated in Cage’s Etudes Australes. In particular, I suggested that the comparison 
highlights the importance of performance in understanding the impossible, by construing 
performance as akin to the relationship between a critical reader and The Dispossessed. In 
such a relationship, ‘meaning’ comes not from the text itself, but from the relationship 
between the written world of the text and the unwritten world of the reader, which is to 
say, the ‘journey’ between the two. 
I now offer a stronger theoretical grounding for such a reading of performance and 
performance of reading by turning to the German critical thinker Ernst Bloch (1885-
1977), whose Spirit of Utopia45 and The Principle of Hope46 offer expansive theories of the 
relationship between art and utopia. Until 1985, Bloch was not widely translated into 
English. Since then, he has become a foundational thinker for anglophone Utopian 
studies, in particular through the writings of Fredric Jameson. However, scholars of 
science fiction have been employing Bloch since the early days of science fiction 
scholarship. Darko Suvin and R. D. Mullen’s neo-Marxist Science-Fiction Studies, founded 
in 1973, was among the first journals to accept science fiction as a serious object of 
literary study, and Suvin drew heavily on Bloch’s concept of the ‘novum’: the kernel of 
the future that bursts into the present through art. 
 
45Published as Geist der Utopie in 1918. 
46Originally Das Prinzip Hoffnung, written 1954-1959. 
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In addition to his utopian thought, Bloch was also a prolific and incisive writer on 
music. The chapter of Spirit of Utopia called ‘Philosophy of Music’ is very much the most 
significant section of the work, both in terms of length (it forms 160 out of 247 pages in 
the 1923 version) and content (it lays out, via music, the view of history upon which his 
other claims about utopia are predicated). His later work, The Principle of Hope, features 
many important references to music, including an entire chapter called ‘Venturing beyond 
and the most intense world of man in music’.47 These two chapters, along with several 
other separate essays on the subject, are now collected in Essays on the Philosophy of 
Music, which was assembled in German in 1974 as Zur Philosophie der Musik and 
published in an English translation by Peter Palmer in 1985 with an introduction by David 
Drew. 
Since his translation into English, some writers from music studies have begun 
exploring Bloch’s ideas and their potential relevance to contemporary musical thought. Of 
particular note is Benjamin Korstvedt’s 2010 book, Listening for Utopia in Ernst Bloch’s 
Musical Philosophy, the only book-length study in English to critically explore Bloch’s 
musical aesthetics. That said, there is a relative lack of writing on Bloch in music 
scholarship, in particular in comparison with his contemporaries in the Frankfurt School 
and other Marxist thinkers with which he was associated, such as György Lukács, Walter 
Benjamin, and—of course—Theodor Adorno. Other substantial contributions on the 
subject of Bloch’s utopian aesthetics have come from Michael Gallope, who explores 
Bloch’s concept of musical materiality in ‘Ernst Bloch’s Utopian Ton of Hope’ and several 
publications by Ruth Levitas.48 
 
47Überschreitung und intensitätsreichste Menschwelt in der Musik. 
48Ruth Levitas provides a helpful introduction to the main texts that deal with music and Ernst Bloch in 
‘Singing Summons the Existence of the Fountain’, primarily in the second paragraph of her essay, and in 
footnote 3 on page 241. In addition to the texts she mentions, a few should be added: political theorist 
Christopher Norris’ essay, ‘Utopian Deconstruction: Ernst Bloch, Paul de Man, and the Politics of Music’ 
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Within this scholarship, however, a particular gap is relevant: the omission of 
performance. Only Levitas has discussed the performative orientation of Bloch’s musical 
aesthetics and the relevance Bloch’s utopian thought might have to musical performance. 
In ‘Singing Summons the Existence of the Fountain’, for example, she draws on the 
writings of Daniel Barenboim, whose understanding of music is deeply embedded in his 
career as a pianist. Barenboim writes, with overtones of Bloch, that ‘through music it is 
possible to imagine an alternative social model, where Utopia and practicality join forces, 
allowing us to express ourselves freely and hear each other’s preoccupations’.49  Notably, 
the utopian prefiguring of the future that he identifies comes not from music itself, but 
specifically from the nature of ‘orchestral playing’ and from ‘relations between players 
[that] prefigure those of a better world’.50 Thus, it is performance that ‘sings’ utopian 
 
from 1989, Gary Zabel’s ‘Ernst Bloch and the Utopian Dimension of Music’ from 1990, geographer Ben 
Anderson’s more recent studies of utopian listening practices in the age of technology, and finally 
Michael Gallope’s chapter on Bloch in the 2015 collection Music in Contemporary Philosophy and more 
recent book Deep Refrains: Music, Philosophy, and the Ineffable (2017). Nonetheless, the number of 
significant texts on Bloch that avoid or gloss over the topic of music altogether is striking, and it is 
altogether a relatively unexplored question. 
Ruth Levitas, ‘Singing Summons the Existence of the Fountain’, in The Privatization of Hope: Ernst Bloch and the 
Future of Utopia, ed. by Peter Thompson and Slavoj Zizek (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 221 
& p. 241; Christopher Norris, ‘Utopian Deconstruction: Ernst Bloch, Paul de Man, and the Politics of 
Music’ In Music and the Politis of Culture. Ed. Christopher Norris. New York, 1989, pp. 305-47. ; Gary 
Zabel, ‘Ernst Bloch and the Utopian Dimension of Music’, Musical Times 131 (1990): 82-84.; Ben 
Anderson, ‘A Principle of Hope: Recorded Musicch, Listening Practices and the Immanence of Utopia’, 
Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 84 (2002): 211–27. ;  Ben Anderson, ‘Recorded Music 
and Practices of Remembering’, Social & Cultural Geography, 5 (2004), pp. 3–20.; Michael Gallope, ‘Ernst 
Bloch’s Utopian Ton of Hope’, Music in Contemporary Philosophy. Ed. Martin Scherzinger (New York: 
Routledge, 2015); Michael Gallope, Deep Refrains: Music, Philosophy, and the Ineffable (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2017). 
49Barenboim, cited in Levitas, ‘Singing Summons the Existence of the Fountain’ (2013), 240. 
50Levitas, ‘Singing Summons the Existence of the Fountain’ (2013), 240. 
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possibility into being. In her recent book, Utopia as Method, Levitas suggests that for 
Bloch, the sensuousness of sound is related to specific performers—‘what it contains of 
the actual person singing, and thus what quality the singer or player “puts into” the note, 
is more important than what his song contains purely in terms of note-values’.51 In a brief 
section with the heading ‘Music as performance’, she connects the inevitable 
evanescence of musical performance with Bloch’s notion of the ‘Not-Yet’ (noch nicht) and 
calls on utopian metaphors used to describe specific performers and musical events. 
Aptly, she notes Bloch’s own engagement with and understanding of live performance: 
Bloch himself was involved with the Kroll Opera in Berlin and ‘wrote the introductory 
programme article for the Kroll’s opening production of Fidelio in 1927’.52  Fidelio features 
heavily in Bloch’s writings about music in the Principle of Hope, and it seems unlikely that 
his understanding of the work did not draw on this specific performance. 
It is evident from Levitas’ brief observations, and many other aspects of Bloch’s 
thinking, that Bloch’s is a musical aesthetics closely connected with performance. His 
material orientation understands music as sensual, acoustic, and embodied, all priorities 
that privilege the experience of music in time over musical texts and scores. His interest 
in the aesthetic properties of the temporal ‘Not-Yet’ align with the way in which music-
as-performance is perpetually coming-into-being, rather than emerging fully formed. 
Bloch himself explicitly alludes to the centrality of performance in his musical philosophy, 
claiming that ‘there might still be music if there were no listeners, but certainly there 
would be none without the musicians to supply the musical movement and its psychical 
energy, its pounding energy, in the first place’.53 
This makes his theories of music an ideal approach for studying the impossible, 
Cage’s Etudes Australes, and utopian performativity in general. The impossible, as we have 
 
51Bloch (1995), 1059. 
52Levitas, Utopia as Method (2013), 53. 
53Bloch (1986), 200. 
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discovered, is process-based and emergent. Cage’s Etudes Australes rely on physicality as 
their main mode of articulation, a fact that will be elaborated upon in the next section of 
this dissertation. And for utopian musical thought in general, performance is an important 
space of theory that has been largely unexamined. If Korstvedt attempts to show ‘how’ 
music enacts utopia with the tools of theory, and Levitas explains ‘why’ music (rather than 
any other art form) is the bringer of utopia, I suspect that performance studies might 
provide an approach for showing ‘what’ musical utopias might entail.54 
It is worth stepping back for a minute to understand where a performance-based 
reading of Bloch might fit amongst the contemporary landscape of music studies by 
turning to Theodor Adorno. Adorno was deeply influenced by Bloch’s musical 
metaphysics and in particular by the potential that Bloch saw for political meaning to be 
situated in musical tones. Ultimately, however, Adorno would seek an approach that was 
more grounded in the text of the music and in its formal construction. In a commentary 
on Bloch that ranges from scathing to reverential, Adorno criticises Bloch’s inability to 
speak in specifics: ‘even though Bloch’s philosophy abounds in materials and colours, it 
does not succeed in escaping from abstraction.’55 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Adorno was taken up as inspiration for the ‘New 
Musicology’, which would attempt to find the social in music, and to consider music as a 
way of expressing social relations. In the decades since, both the methods of the 
movement and their invocation of Adorno have been subject to a range of debates—even 
as the figure of Adorno himself continues to loom large over the discipline. For one, 
Adorno’s own Marxist underpinnings are used both to bolster and to dismiss his utility, 
even as his relationship to traditional Marxism is largely left unexplored in the context of 
 
54In keeping with the ‘place’ of utopia that Bell suggests is under-theorised. 
55Adorno (1980), 60. 
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music studies.56 Furthermore, his attempts to find the social in musical works are ‘indirect, 
complex, unconscious, undocumented, and mysterious.’57 With respect to this particular 
flaw, Nicholas Cook suggests that ‘the problem disappears if instead of seeing musical 
works as texts within which social structures are encoded we see them as scripts in 
response to which social relationships are enacted: the object of analysis is now present 
and self-evident in the interactions between performers, and in the acoustic trace that 
they leave.’58 
One of the alternative approaches to understanding the sociality of music has been 
in the ‘ethnographic turn’ of musicology. In his discussion of sociality in musical 
performance in Beyond the Score, Cook points to ethnography as a discipline that—despite 
seeming similarities with the ‘New’ musicology—avoids the traps of thinking about ‘music 
as writing, not music as performance’.59  He acknowledges, for example, that ‘by the time 
the “New” musicologists were drawing on Adorno in order to bring their discipline up to 
date, sociologists saw his approach as hopelessly old-fashioned’.60 I wonder, however, 
whether Bloch’s aesthetics might also offer a theory that can help us understand social 
relationships in both the works and in ‘the acoustic trace they leave’ (to quote Cook). 
Bloch thus offers a reframing of the Adornian approach in new performative terms, and 
also provides a critical theoretical background which can be applied and combined with 
other methods, such as ethnography (as I will do in the Étude no. 1, in which I use auto-
ethnographic methods to read Bloch in John Cage’s Etude Australe VIII). 
 
56Adam Krims, for example, suggests that Adorno has often falsely been treated as a ‘stand-in’ for Marxism in 
general in popular music studies, while Parkhurst and Hammel argue that music scholars engage in 
‘passing dalliances or long-term liaisons with Adorno’ without engaging with ‘novel Marxist [theorising]’. 
Krims (2003), 131-133, Parkhurst and Hammel (2017), 33-34. 
57Subotnik, cited in Cook (2001), par. 31. 
58Cook, (2001), par. 31. 
59Cook (2016), 254. 
60Ibid., 255. 
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It might seem difficult to redeem Adorno’s obscurity in a thinker whom Adorno 
himself found too abstract. However, the turn away from the vagaries of Bloch is 
precisely what led Adorno to seek refuge in what he saw as more objective analysis in the 
‘formal laws’ and ‘innermost cells of technique’ of the music.61 This fear of abstraction 
and search for clarity is precisely, then, what made Adorno’s understanding of social 
meaning as encoded in scores so obscure indeed. Meanwhile, Bloch’s musical aesthetics 
is so abstract precisely because he claims that musical meaning does not lie in structure 
and form but instead in its material and physical presence. In fact, for Bloch it is indeed 
because of this materiality that music has any claims to social understanding at all: ‘Only 
the musical note, that enigma of sensuousness, is sufficiently unencumbered by the 
world yet phenomenal enough to last to return—like the metaphysical world—as a final 
material factor in the fulfilment of mystical self-perception’.62  Ultimately, Bloch is 
interested in corporeal experience, perhaps as a result of his overwhelming commitment 
to Marxist materialism combined with a generally humanistic approach.63 This theoretical 
grounding paves the way for finding social meaning in the sensuousness of the 
performing body and in the phenomenology of the performer. 
Travelling back to the Etudes Australes 
Bloch’s musical project—which is invested not only in the relationship between music and 
society but also specifically in how that social content is found in sensuousness and 
materiality—thus offers a useful way of reconsidering ‘the impossible’ in Cage’s Etudes 
Australes. In particular, Bloch’s aesthetics place the focus on how impossibility is oriented 
temporally—as a futuristic, utopian mode—and how it manifests in performance. As such, 
 
61Adorno (2002), 393. 
62Bloch (1985), 120. 
63Perhaps unsurprisingly, feminist Marxist scholarship—which generally shares Bloch’s humanist perspective—
tends also to be interested in bodily experience. 
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I will discuss the Etudes Australes not so much with reference to the written score, but 
instead by examining how they are performed, and by investigating the experience of the 
performer. For the moment, I will focus on two aspects of performance that allow me to 
reflect back on Bloch’s impossible utopian promise: the arrangement of the hands at the 
keyboard and the temporality of performance. 
The arrangement of the hands on the score and the keyboard is one aspect of the 
Études Australes that is frequently described in relationship to its utopian politics. 
Conceived as a ‘duet’, the two hands are fully independent, and both cover the range of 
the keyboard. In practice, this means they are perpetually crossing and overlapping. 
Borrowing Cage’s term ‘interpenetration’, which he used frequently to describe his social 
vision and artistic practice,64 Rob Haskins has suggested that in the Etudes Australes, an 
‘interpenetration of melodies …transformed the solitary nature of solo music into a social 
one.’65 However, Haskins’ suggestion that this is the result of an ‘interpenetration of 
melodies’ somewhat misses the point. ‘Melodies’ suggests that interconnecting phrases 
are in the work and the text themselves. While patterns and shapes certainly emerge, to 
refer to the sequences of chord formations as melodic seems something of a stretch. 
Without watching the performance or being aware of the performer, there is no 
indication of which notes belong together or how these supposed melodies would be 
constructed. To the extent that melodies are present, these are conveyed solely through 
the performer’s decisions. After all, Cage deliberately left no indications of articulation, 
expression, or dynamic in the score, choosing to leave these entirely at the discretion of 
the pianist. More fundamentally, it is not in fact melodic crossings, but rather the physical 
crossover of the hands, that creates the impression of ‘interpenetration’. While the 
division of the hands is certainly visible from simply looking at the staff, it is in 
 
64‘Interpenetration’, for example, is one of the fifteen key words that Cage used to structure the Charles Eliot 
Norton lectures that he delivered at Harvard in 1988-89 (Cage, 1997). 
65Haskins (2012), 111. 
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performance that the performer fully realises this social act. 
It is possible to connect this integration and crossing with something like Cage’s 
imagination of a borderless society. However, Bloch would not be very interested in such 
a direct reading of the political message of the work.66 His interest in music as a source of 
political power comes not from its content, but from something more fundamental about 
the medium of music itself—its means, techniques, and sonic existence: ‘It is clear that the 
means and techniques of so companionable an art are largely determined by the given 
social conditions, and that society will extend far into the sound-material.’67 Furthermore, 
the utopias that Bloch thinks are anticipated by music are perhaps not even legible from 
the perspective of the present, seeing as they rupture the progress of time by creating a 
‘future-in-the-present’. 
But perhaps they may be understood physically: ‘Little may be achieved, therefore, 
without our doing creative violence to the note and its related vibrations. To become 
music it is absolutely dependent on the flesh and blood of the person who takes it and 
performs it.’68 The separation of the hands need not be understood as a phenomenon 
that simplistically mirrors an ideal social world. However, it certainly does pose distinct 
challenges and phenomenological experiences for the performer. Regardless of its 
relationship to broader social goals, it creates a sensation in the performer that I would 
argue accesses the impossible and the utopian. It would be truly impossible for 
performers to separate their hands completely, and on this level the act is a constant 
striving. The performer must thus attempt both to divide the body in two—isolating the 
left and right hands—and to let the body act as a unified social organism, allowing the 
hands to act together and to occupy the same physical and temporal space. As Cage has 
 
66In particular, it is important to account for his methodological Marxism, in which the form of appearance is 
more likely to disguise the internal workings than to reveal them. 
67Bloch (1985), 40. 
68Bloch, (1985), 117. 
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described, this very phenomenon changed Sultan’s physicality and approach to the 
instrument, as she ‘had to learn to sit differently than she ever sat before’.69 This paradox 
makes present a tension of performance, which pushes the performer to imagine other 
ways of being and doing, and adapt his body accordingly: a tension which is made 
especially present in the pedagogical, virtuosic genre of the étude. 
It would not be possible to articulate any account of the experience of performance 
without referring to temporality. All performance, of course, operates across multiple 
registers of temporality, from the time of composition of the work, to the repetitive 
temporality of the practice or rehearsal room, to the temporal experiences of performers 
and audiences together.70  Bloch, with his account of the Ungleichzeitigkeit (non-
synchronicity) of music, was deeply concerned with the utopian potential contained in 
the conflicting temporalities of the musical work. His understanding of utopia relied 
particularly on the notion of the ‘future-in-the-present’, and the potential of music to 
anticipate future forms of social organisation.71 Bloch is also interested in the 
ephemerality of music, and the fact that its temporality is unfinished and constantly 
developing: 
Hence musical expression, too, is still cementing and has not emerged yet in a 
finished, definable form. This objective-indeterminate element in the expressed, 
represented, musical content is the (temporary) defect of its qualities. Accordingly it 
 
69Interview with Cole Gagne and Tracy Caras (1975) in Cage and Kostelanetz (1988), 38. 
70Phenomenological accounts of performance that take into account multiple temporalities of musical 
experience include Anthony Gritten’s theories of ‘distraction’ in performance, and descriptions of 
performance that are interested in ‘flow’, for example. 
71Michael Gallope helpfully reminds readers of Bloch that his notion of anticipating the future should not be 
taken literally. ‘Drawing concrete correlations between musical passages and their political 
transformations can yield inconclusive (or at least non-causal) results. This is something Bloch recognizes, 
which is precisely why he shifts his attention away from concrete or utilitarian indicators of politics 
towards unconscious indicators and obscure cyphers.’ Gallope (2012), 376. 
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is the art of pre-semblance which is related to the flowing existential core (instant) of 
that-which-is-in-being most intensively, and to the horizon of the latter more 
expansively.72 
This aspect of musical aesthetics is also fundamentally performance-oriented. Musical 
performance is indeed ‘that-which-is-in-being most intensively’ and is constantly 
developing. Performances are not definitive or conclusive renditions of musical works, 
but examples that are un-finished by nature. 
In the Etudes Australes, one of the key features of temporal confusion is the timing 
instruction that Cage offers performers in the introduction: ‘In a performance the 
correspondence between space and time should be such that the music “sounds” as it 
“looks”. However, as in traveling through space, circumstances sometimes arise when it is 
necessary to “shift gears” and go, as the case may be, faster or slower.’73 Cage’s 
ambiguous instruction poses distinct temporal problems for the performer. How often 
can the performer ‘shift gears’? How great a deviation from the given time proportions is 
too great? The performer is constantly operating in simultaneous, but non-synchronous 
(ungleichzeitig), modes, in which he is both striving towards a strict adherence and aware 
of an allowance for flexibility. Ultimately, it is an aspect of impossibility in the work that is 
brought into being by the performer. The score permits and opens up a space for this 
experience of temporality—even as it remains temporality fixed on the page—which in 
performance is taken up and made present in non-synchronous time. 
Both of these two examples—the physicality of crossing the hands and the relativity 
of time—find artistic meaning in what Bloch would call the ‘cultural surplus’ or ‘utopian 
surplus’ of the work. This is a term he adapts from Marxist discourse. In Kapital, surplus 
refers to both the excess of capital necessary to sustain the system of capitalist 
 
72Bloch (1985), 250. 
73Cage (1975), 1. 
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production, and the unemployed labourers that must exist in society both after 
developments in technology result in cuts to the labour force and in order to enact the 
inevitable further growth of capitalist production.74 For Bloch, cultural surplus is the art 
that transcends its own time to anticipate and prefigure future means of societal 
organization, expressing the ‘not-yet-conscious’. Like capitalist surplus, Bloch’s cultural 
surplus is an inevitable product of the materialist structure, rather than a goal or an end in 
itself. Cultural surplus is also rooted simultaneously in the past and the future—a product 
of that which is past, and an indication of things to come—in keeping with Bloch’s 
insistence on the ‘future-in-the-past.’  
The excessiveness of these virtuosic and performative gestures as ‘surplus’ echoes 
Bloch’s own words about utopian art in the visual sphere, in his description of ‘the Gothic 
Line’, which, as Michael Gallope describes, refers to the ‘excesses of baroque design’. In 
Gallope’s words, ‘the ornaments of the “Gothic Line” are functionless and wild. They are a 
surplus; the pedagogy and practice of such ornamentation is excessive and poetic’.75 For 
Bloch, it is this very quality that allows this art access to the utopian imagination, to what 
is essential about nature, spirituality, and the world. ‘Gothic line… contains all this 
agitation within itself; this line is restless and uncanny like its forms…only the Gothic has 
this fire at the centre, over which the deepest organic and the deeper spiritual essences 
bring themselves to fruition’.76 
But Bloch is willing to attribute more agency to consciousness and artistic activity 
than much 20th-century Marxist scholarship, and as Korstvedt notes, he ‘had little use for 
the so-called base-superstructure model, in which a determining material foundation, 
 
74In keeping with Marxist dialectical reasoning, each concept necessarily has two sides; nothing can be either 
cause or effect, but must simultaneously be both; seeming causes and effects actually produce each 
other. 
75Gallope (2017), 92.  
76Bloch (2000), 24.  
 84 
based primarily on the relations of production, is reflected in the cultural superstructure 
that derives from it’.77 With a deeply humanist emphasis that is not always found in 
Marxist scholarship, Bloch writes: ‘human beings, not things, and not their powerful 
progression, which is outside us and wrongly turned over onto us, make history’.78 These 
human beings are not only the composers of art, but particularly the performers and 
listeners, who make history with the sensation of music in their bodies. 
Of course, these performative concerns are not unique to John Cage’s poetics or to 
the Etudes Australes themselves. However, the fact that the pieces are called études 
makes the physicality of their concerns and the presentness of practice all the more 
striking. The étude dramatises a particular relationship between score and body, in which 
the score acts as a guide for training the body to go well beyond the confines of the text, 
just as it seeks to surpass its own physical limits. In their efforts to reach beyond and 
project towards the future, these études also make clear the very limits of the human 
body that prevent them from doing just that.  As Jameson writes of utopian science 
fiction: 
Its deepest vocation is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize our 
incapacity to imagine the future, to body forth, through apparently full 
representations which prove on closer inspection to be structurally and constitutively 
impoverished… to succeed by failure, and to serve as unwitting and even unwilling 
vehicles for a mediation, which, setting forth for the unknown, finds itself irrevocably 
tried in the all-too-familiar, and thereby becomes unexpectedly transformed into a 
contemplation of our own absolute limits.79 
 
77Korstvedt (2010), 24. 
78Bloch (1995), 1358. 
79Jameson (2007), 287. 
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This paradoxical interplay between the hopeful attempt to exceed one’s limits and the 
repeated reminder of the attempt’s futility is at the heart of utopian thought and of the 
experience of performing the Etudes Australes. 
In general, I have attempted to read Cage’s Etudes Australes by taking into account 
the experience of the performer.  In doing so, I seek a musical meaning that is both 
materially grounded and ultimately constantly renewing and changing. It is meaning 
through experience, created anew with each act of performance. Ernst Bloch’s musical 
philosophy, which combines a truly passionate humanism with Marxist materialism, serves 
as inspiration for this investigation. His aesthetic philosophy sees music as the most 
powerful form of social articulation through the arts, but rather than searching for easy 
clues in musical content, instead understands such social meaning as taking place in 
music’s ‘sensuousness’—thus, in and through performance. This account will be 
expanded, drawing more explicitly on the methods of phenomenology and auto-
ethnography, in the case study, in which I explore Blochian traces in my own experience 
performing Cage’s Etude Australe VIII. 
‘Studied Map. Should have taken road not on it.’ 
Ultimately, we have perhaps not found impossibility in Cage’s Etudes Australes. However, I 
suggest that the performance concerns of these works offer a ‘replicable critical method’ 
(to borrow Stow’s words) for understanding and performing impossibility. Part of this 
replicability and method-character comes from the way that performance is essential to 
understanding. It is a method, too, that is heavily contingent on the genre of the étude. 
Cage is both operating within an established genre and attempting to reframe its 
conventions and purposes. The Etudes Australes and Freeman Etudes are by no means the 
kinds of technical exercises that improve our facility with other works of music. Instead, 
they expand our possibilities as performers and humans, and change what we take for 
granted. 
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In a mesostic80 from 1972, Cage writes—‘Studied Map. Should have taken road not 
on it’.81 This is very much the approach that Cage takes to the Etudes Australes, in which 
‘studying’ the ‘study’ is very much not the right approach. He removes the aspect of 
disciplined ‘study’ from the étude (which itself, it turns out, is based on a map of the 
stars), and instead, the étude becomes a journey in itself. In general, this reframing of the 
étude genre is very much in keeping with other aspects of his thinking.  In Diary: How to 
Improve the World (You Will Only Make Things Worse) his suspicion of formal education is 
palpable: ‘Teen-ager imagines that by spending time in a building marked Music he’ll 
become a musician.’82 Spending time in the Etudes Australes will not make you a musician 
either—but it will show you new ways of being, of studying, (of étuding), and thus of 
thinking about and being in the world. 
 
 
 
 
80Cage’s invented genre of poem, in which a letter from each line forms a word. 
81Cage, M: Writings, ’67-’72 (1973), 80. 
82Cage, Diary (1973), 199. 
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Étude 8: Case Study—John Cage’s Etude Australe 
VIII 
 
As I have described, Bloch’s aesthetic and musical philosophy lends itself especially to 
thinking through performance. As someone whose primary experience of music was not 
through the score but as a listener, Bloch’s writings about music are, indeed, primarily in 
response to particular performances. His general aesthetic philosophy is one that 
understands art and culture as—at their best—unfinished, making the evolving and 
ephemeral nature of performance a natural site for exploring his ideas. Finally, the 
importance that he assigns to sensuousness and embodiment in understanding sound 
makes the listening and feeling performer the most resonant interpreter of music, and the 
one best poised to experience music’s ‘sensation of the future’.1 
In this case study, I take on Cage’s étude ‘way of thinking’ as a way to further 
understand the impossible-utopian horizon of musical performance, and to approach the 
eighth piece in the Etudes Australes. By documenting my experience as a performer of the 
Etude VIII, I uncover traces of Bloch: both traces of the sensuous identity that he 
identifies in music and traces of meaning that he believes persist in that very sensuous 
identity. I have chosen not to separate my observations according to category, with a list 
or catalogue of performance concerns classified according to their particular utopian 
manifestation. Instead, I have attempted an approach that weaves its way around the 
issues rather than neatly pinning them down. 
I am attempting a method of criticism akin to that which Jameson promotes in his 
applications of Ernst Bloch to literary science fiction in the landmark text Archaeologies of 
 
1Bloch (2000), 236. 
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the Future. Jameson emphasises that the project is not one of identifying the utopian 
content of the works, but rather of examining how form and representation are tools of 
utopian articulation.  It is through form and representation, he suggests, that the texts of 
utopian science fiction are political, and that ‘texts designed to overcome the needs of 
the body can remain materialistic’.2 The goal, then, is to demonstrate the materialism of 
Cage’s own texts, which elude and overcome the needs of the body in even more overt 
ways than the science fiction to which Jameson refers. As such, I will argue that through 
performance, the Etudes Australes engage in a utopian political project. My research 
method both uses performances as a critical approach to the Etude Australe VIII, and 
shows that the critical potential of the Etude Australe VIII lies within performance itself. 
My study takes the form of a chronology of practice. In reality, it is not a transcript 
of sequential sessions of practice, but rather a compilation of many stages of learning, 
including notes taken from my private practice and consultations with other musicians,3 
all woven into a single narrative. Recognising the non-linear nature of musical 
performance and practice, a direct chronology of my experiences as a performer would 
not only be impossible, but would also inaccurately reflect the reality of experience. In 
performance, the progression of time is scattered and nonlinear, rather than a coherent 
series of sequential events. As such, I have tried to account for and be honest about the 
repetitions and confusions of practice and progress. In this respect, I draw on Bloch’s 
introduction to The Principle of Hope: 
An encyclopaedia of hopes often contains repetitions, but never overlappings, and so 
far as the former is concerned, Voltaire’s statement is valid here that he would repeat 
 
2Jameson (2007), xv. 
3Including private lessons with London-based contemporary music specialist Mark Knoop in May 2016, and a 
Research Masterclass at the Guildhall School of Music and Drama given by Dr. Paulo de Assis of the 
Orpheus Institute and hosted by the Institute for Musical Research and the Cambridge Centre for 
Musical Performance Studies in November 2016. 
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himself as often as was necessary until he was understood. The statement is even 
more valid since the repetitions of the book ideally always occur on a new level, have 
therefore both learnt something in the meantime and may allow the identical thing 
they are aiming at to be learned anew.4 
The very form of practice and performance itself echoes this aspect of utopian 
articulation. Repeated gestures or phrases are never merely identical to their previous 
instantiations, but indeed having ‘learnt something in the meantime…may allow the 
identical thing they are aiming at to be learnt anew.’5   
This is something that violinist and scholar Mieko Kanno has convincingly argued in 
her research on effectiveness in practice. In ‘Order Matters: A Thought on How to 
Practise’, she acknowledges that the act of practising proceeds ‘not only through 
repeated practice but also by changing an approach—that is, by reordering priorities and 
tasks’.6  Although she focuses primarily on the effect that ordering of different tasks has 
on learning and practice, implicit in her argument is the notion that ordering changes how 
the same tasks are perceived when re-ordered and how these tasks contribute to the 
overall learning process. Her examples primarily involve isolating exercises for the left 
hand and the right hand, and the effect that different orders of practice have on how fast 
a piece is grasped, using the metaphor of the recipe (in which the order of inclusion of 
ingredients in baking changes the product) and the logic of algorithm (by which 
mathematical orderings change the result). By this algorithmic logic, the same tasks, when 
placed in different parts of the practice session, take on different roles, meanings, and 
effects. 
 
4Bloch (1995), 10. 
5Ibid., 10. 
6Kanno, (2014), 143-144. 
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This is not to suggest, however, that all subsequent learning and progress is 
perceptible or conscious. David Foster Wallace’s description of practice in the realm of 
tennis is relevant: 
Hitting thousands of strokes, day after day, develops the ability to do by “feel” what 
cannot be done by regular conscious thought. Repetitive practice like this often looks 
tedious or even cruel to an outsider, but the outsider can’t feel what’s going on inside 
the player — tiny adjustments, over and over, and a sense of each change’s effects 
that gets more and more acute even as it recedes from normal consciousness.7 
Taking Bloch’s Encyclopaedia of Hope as inspiration, I draw out these adjustments in my 
own practice: commenting on their relationships to the practice of utopia, and the 
physical manifestation of utopian desire that emerges in process of practising this piece. 
However, this has not always been possible, nor would that be desirable: the fact that 
these ‘recede from consciousness’ is part of their political impact and import as well.8 
The Etude Australe VIII in Practice 
My approach to any new piece of music is commonly to play it through a few times, 
without much regard for tempo or character or accuracy, but simply to get a sense of 
how it feels. It is a kind of sight-reading, though a sight-reading that is much more 
disengaged than it would be if anyone were watching. More accurately, I am feeling my 
way around the piece, trying to familiarise myself with its contours and its 
idiosyncrasies—much like glancing at a map before arriving in a new place to situate 
important landmarks and cardinal directions. When playing through the Etude Australe 
VIII, however, the experience is more like being given a map without a legend—not 
 
7Wallace (2006). 
8For more on the ‘political unconscious’, see Fredric Jameson’s eponymous 1982 work. Jameson is referring 
to the unconscious of authors and artists, not the ‘interpreters’ and performers of artistic work, but the 
sentiment is equally relevant. 
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knowing which lines are rivers, which are roads, and which are trails. 
In general, even with extremely dense pieces of music, it is possible to get a quick 
sense of contour and shape. However, because of the separation of the hands into two 
great staves, even the usual correspondence between position on the score and 
geography at the keyboard is disturbed in the Etude Australe VIII. Often, I find myself 
instinctively reaching towards the bottom of the keyboard before realising that a note is 
in fact in the third stave—the treble clef in the left hand—and jumping back up in a tangle. 
In many instances, the order of pitches is sheer guesswork; when several notes are close 
together across all four staves, their vertical alignment is difficult to discern at a glance. 
Many of the pitches are ledger lines well above or below the stave, far from any nearby 
points of reference—like a map insert without an indication of where in the larger 
landscape it belongs. The last four pitches in the passage shown in Figure 8.1 
demonstrate each of these problems: the A in the top staff of the left hand looks as if it 
might be a C in the bass clef, the pitches are so close together it is hard to determine 
their order, and the low E in the bottom staff of the left hand is difficult to find without 
any nearby notes. 
 
Figure 8.1. Etude Australe VIII, second system.9 
 
 
9Cage (1975), 16. 
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 Indeed, it quickly became evident that before proceeding with the piece, I would 
need to annotate the score with the names of all notes above and below the stave, and 
to spell out many of the chords. These were not necessarily unusual chords, but 
presented out of context, they did not intuitively become legible to the mind or fall under 
the hand. Just as it takes longer to process a string of seven disconnected words than a 
seven-word sentence, so too did these isolated pitches and chords elude quick 
comprehension.   
 Once I could easily identify all of the notes, I then set about the task of trying 
to make them coherent under the hand. At first, I sought to do this by separating the 
hands, playing each hand several times very slowly. Very slow tempos are often a staple 
of my practice, especially in the early stages of learning. In this piece, however, the 
method was different, as it also involved only minimally taking into account the 
distribution of time proportions. In the opening stages of learning, exaggerated by slow 
tempos, I had already taken to the extreme Cage’s direction that ‘circumstances 
sometimes arise when it is necessary to “shift gears” and go, as the case may be, faster or 
slower’.10 A strong sense of relative and simultaneous temporalities was emerging: how 
‘necessary’ must it be in order for such shifting of gears to take place? 
 While it would be easy to frame the next stages of practice as a progression, the 
reality is much more complicated. It is not as if I developed an optimal sequential order 
for practising the technical challenges that remained: instead, I combatted them 
somewhat arbitrarily. In my slow, single-handed plodding, I would arrive at a moment that 
made manifest a particular problem—say, chords, or leaps, or open notes—and then 
would attempt to tackle other similar problems throughout the piece. On occasion, I 
would arrive at a particular moment, unaware of what made it difficult, and I would 
simply seek to resolve it, realising only after more extensive practice that the moment 
 
10Cage (1975), 1. 
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shared characteristics with others, such that it might be identified as a unique technical 
challenge, and thus more easily understood in context. 
 In order to demonstrate this process, and several of the concerns that emerged, I 
have identified several (though by no means all) of the technical challenges I uncovered 
by practising the piece. I have listed, and will describe them, in no particular order—not 
because order is irrelevant, but rather because these instances are so ‘interpenetrated’ (to 
borrow Cage’s terminology) that it would be impossible to recreate their sequence. 
 
 
CHORDS.  Each of the chords in the piece is derived from a ‘possible’ arrangement of 
notes, one of an ‘encyclopaedia’ of 1125 possible chords that Cage had catalogued. As 
they are often spelled in non-traditional ways, and without the contextual grounding of a 
key signature or a physical context, it can be hard to play them accurately. Notably, while 
they are all possible to play, there is no guarantee that subsequent chords will employ 
similar hand positions. 
I practise first the individual chords themselves, repeating them several times with 
different fingerings and different distributions of weight in order to determine the most 
comfortable position. Knowing that the chords were written in response to Sultan’s hand, 
I find myself often wondering whether, and in what ways, my hand is similar to hers. I 
struggle to sound all the notes in a five-note chord in the left hand and wonder: is this a 
failure of my imaginative capacities to find new hand positions, or simply a physical 
defect?  Is my relatively short pinky finger not suited to, or not able to, bend and stretch 
in the ways that Sultan’s could?   
It is in this way that I form a kind of virtual relationship with Sultan, though she has 
been dead for over a decade. Her hands—those same hands that Cage ‘noticed’ when he 
was inspired to write the piece—reach out to mine across space and time.  Sultan’s hands 
guide and inspire me to seek out new patterns and configurations. Equally, they make me 
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aware of our differences. The encounter with another’s body sheds light on the 
limitations of my own, even as it pushes past those same limits. 
With the positions of the chords established more comfortably, I then place these 
chords in context. For each chord, I add the notes immediately before and after, while 
keeping my preferred hand position in mind. Occasionally, an adjustment is necessary. A 
position that earlier seemed comfortable is more difficult to balance when coming down 
from the top of the keyboard or when springing off immediately to strike a note in an 
awkward location. This example from the sixth system of the piece in the right hand 
demonstrates the problem, a score of which is found in Figure 8.2. 
 
Figure 8.2. Etude Australe VIII, two chords from the sixth system.11 
 
In order to execute the first chord, my thumb is comfortably resting on the B, while 
the top three notes are played by fingers 3, 4, and 5 close together. The resulting hand 
position is comfortable, but results in a wide angle between my thumb and the rest of my 
fingers. However, after jumping down to a lower B (which I execute with finger 2), I then 
return to the higher register to play a semitone between F double-sharp and G sharp. 
Again, the interval in itself is straightforward enough. However, in order to successfully 
hold the interval through the next note, I must play it with fingers one and two close 
together, completely changing the position of my hand from before. Images of my hand 
 
11Cage (1975), 17. 
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in both positions are shown in Figure 8.3. With all these various chords and positions, 
littered across the keyboard in both hands, my body feels curiously multiple. My own 
right hand has become not one but many hands,12 each with its own life, purpose, and 
position. The hand is filled with possibility, even as it is struck by the impossibility of its 
simultaneity. 
 
Figure 8.3. Images of my Hand playing the two chords from Figure 8.2. 
 
LEAPS. The first big leap occurs after only three notes in the piece: the right hand jumps 
over four octaves from a C to an E-flat, from one side of the torso to the other (see 
Figure 8.4). 
 
12Szendy (2015) 
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Figure 8.4. Etude Australe VIII, first five notes in the right hand.13 
 
It is not so hard to get used to this jump. After all, both notes are single notes, rather than 
chords, so the question of chord positions discussed above is not relevant. More 
importantly, the interval of a minor third makes sense to my ear and body. Though I may 
never have played this precise jump in a piece before, the ear guides my muscle memory 
to the place of an E-flat. Executing the leap attaches the two notes together, with the C 
coming to feel like a grace note on the way up. 
However smooth this first leap may be, this is not the case for all subsequent leaps.  
Between any two, I could likely find a harmonic explanation for their pairing, which would 
offer me a way of moving guided by my mind and ear. However, as with the comfortable 
positions for the chords, there is no guarantee that the next pair of notes will be able to 
abide by what David Sudnow would call ‘soundful ways of moving’.14 Helpfully, the first 
six notes of the right hand are all within a C minor triad, but the piece does not continue 
with such neat harmonic predictability. 
Given how infrequently the hand has places to find its bearing, moments in which 
the hand does understand correspondences between notes on the score become all the 
 
13Cage (1975), 16. 
14Sudnow (1978), 70. 
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more striking and comforting. These moments of grounding at times occur because of 
harmonic coincidences—like the first six notes of the piece—which the hand can 
understand using the ear, but at other times they may come about because of a 
comfortable feeling which may not even be audibly perceptible at first, but which 
becomes audible only because of a feeling within the hand.15 
 
OPEN NOTES. Cage specifies that ‘an open note is to remain held as long as possible 
beyond the succeeding closed note, the leap to the next note (whether open or closed) 
being made at the last possible moment. Where more than one closed note follows an 
open note, a pedal-like notation is given. The open note is then to be sustained as long as 
the pedal continues.’16 In principle, the direction is straightforward enough, but the pedal 
markings on the score, especially at the early stages of learning, are not sufficient to 
induce the muscular instinct to hold the note for its stated duration, even in cases where 
it would be natural to do so physically. Furthermore, in many cases, holding the open 
note for its full duration requires significant shifts in hand position over the course of the 
note. 
For example, the B-sharp in the right hand in the fourth system of the piece (the 
first note in Figure 8.5 below) cannot be played in such a way that the chord at the 
beginning of the next page and the B-sharp above two notes later can be struck without 
changing hand position. My solution is to strike the note initially with the third finger, 
before switching to thumb. Each of the open notes on the score requires similar 
negotiation and consideration. I am struck by the degree of choreography necessary here, 
and in particular, by the way in which the gesture does not correspond with the 
appearance on the page. After all, the moment of shifting from finger 3 to the thumb 
 
15I am grateful to Paulo de Assis for pointing out some moments of harmonic correspondence in the piece. 
16Cage (1975), 1. 
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does not line up with any marking on the score, but rather happens in the gap between 
two notated pitches.  As Bloch persistently emphasises throughout ‘The Philosophy of 
Music’, ‘only in us can [the note] blossom and awaken…. We alone are the ones who raise 
it up, even more: who make it define and animate itself with our life.’17 Even in small 
details, I am aware of how much the content of the piece emerges only through the 
body. 
 
Figure 8.5. Etude Australe VIII, fouth and fifth systems [right hand only]18 
 
HANDS TOGETHER. When I begin trying to play right and left hands at the same time, it 
feels almost as if I have never before seen the score. The attempt to combine two wholly 
separated hands is disconcerting and, indeed, disembodying, effecting an uncanny split 
between the two halves of my body. It turns out that the mind (at least my mind) cannot 
keep track simultaneously of the motions of my two hands. Instead, especially at first, my 
eyes flit back and forth—looking first at the top staves, then at the bottom staves—hoping 
not to miss anything on the way. 
As this progresses, however, my two hands begin relating to each other more and 
more. Despite their isolation, I develop patterns and choreographies between the hands. I 
first become aware of the order in which the notes are struck, learning in which order to 
 
17Bloch (2000), 120. 
18Cage (1975), 16. 
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pass between the hands.  The ‘flitting’ of my attention back and forth between the two 
becomes practiced and continuous, and begins to occur seamlessly.  I also develop 
collaborative strategies for hand crossings. In the opening, the middle C in the right hand 
is initially struck with the hand quite high, after a leap down two octaves from E-flat. In 
order to sustain the C while striking the G, however, the right hand flattens and the left 
hand rises, so that the right-hand thumb can reach under the B-flat and A-flat struck by 
the left-hand thumb right before. The right hand then stays quite low, with the left hand 
above as the arm crosses over to reach the notes in the treble clef (see Figure 8.6). 
Throughout, these negotiations take place, sometimes with the left hand above and 
sometimes with the right, always switching and negotiating positions. 
 
Figure 8.6. Etude Australe VIII, first system.19 
 
These collaborative but still independent physical processes recall Cage’s repeated 
invocations of the importance of working together to solve problems. In a similar way, 
Ellie Hisama describes the crossing of hands in Marion Bauer’s Toccata as a ‘musical 
 
19Cage (1975), 16. 
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manifestation’ of ‘the exchange of power’, suggesting that ‘power is not wielded by only 
one party as a means to control a weaker party, but flows in both directions’.20  
Moreover, as soon as I have begun practising with the hands together, such collaborative 
understanding begins to emerge, unbidden. Despite Cage’s instruction that ‘each hand 
plays its own part and is not to be assisted by the other’21 the hands cannot help but 
communicate and subtly help each other—lest they get caught bumping into each other 
mid-air. I do not seek to connect my hands, but it simply comes about, as if guided by the 
hands themselves. Once I have begun to understand the hands together and to 
determine in which moments one hand leaves room for the other to cross above, I can 
never return to the state in which they were independent. 
 
ADJUSTMENTS. In this way, the development of a collaborative understanding of the two 
hands makes my earlier experiences of total separation disappear. Such adjustments and 
disappearances happen throughout the process of practising the piece. On a basic level, I 
occasionally discover a few ledger lines that I had miscounted in my initial note-naming 
(e.g. page 17, third staff, RH, top line, second note—an E, rather than a C); the eraser 
rears its head and reveals the erasure of the past, the constant presentness of practice. 
This action is emblematic of a larger point about the repetition of practice: the way in 
which the past is simultaneously part of the present moment of practice and yet 
irrelevant and disconnected. In this example, the fact that I have repeatedly practised this 
line with the note C rather than E is part of the muscle memory of my hands.  In 
performance or practice, the error may well slip into the present if I am distracted. 
Meanwhile, all of this repetition projects into the future in which the piece is 
performed. The practice of performance thus inevitably brings together multiple points in 
 
20Hisama (2001), 106. 
21Cage (1975), 1. 
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time. Any moment of practice both incorporates past engagements with the piece and 
imagines future performances. Paradoxically, it does so precisely because such moments 
of practice and performance are fundamentally present, occurring inextricably in a single 
moment in time. Such temporal blending recalls Bloch’s language about the multiple 
temporalities of utopian desire, in which both past and future perforate the present. As I 
have alluded to, Bloch was committed to the concept of the ‘novum’, the phenomenon 
by which a present moment can anticipate the future. His writings insist on recognising 
the potential of the ‘not-yet’ existing to permeate into the present. In this respect, he 
describes this very phenomenon of temporal unification in practice, in which past and 
future meet in the essentially present moment: ‘that-which-is-in-being most intensively’ 
of music.22 
The adjustments required whilst practising the piece also highlight the element of 
loss and absence in musical performance. Now that I am aware how my past experiences 
have been erased by later realisations, I begin to wonder which of my current 
experiences will be replaced by future, more complete understandings. There was no way 
to know, when I was practising the hands separately, that such an experience was wholly 
incomplete. Indeed, it would not have been possible to put the hands together and 
develop the collaborative understanding without first being so secure in the individual 
positions of the hands. As such, surely there are aspects of my present experience that 
are similarly inadequate and will come to make sense in the future. 
I am struck by the sense that ‘something is missing’—that famous line of Brecht that 
so inspired Bloch, who claimed it was ‘the most profound thing Brecht ever penned’.23 
According to Bloch’s aesthetics, the essentially human hope is only possible if there also 
exists a void in the present—a gap of something missing—within which hope can appear. 
 
22Bloch (1985), 250. 
23Bloch (1988), 12. 
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Utopian consciousness, though it looks into the distance and accesses the future, is also 
in intimate contact with the ‘nearest nearness’ (elsewhere: ‘the most immediate 
immediacy’) and ‘ferments entirely in the darkness of the lived moment as the real world-
knot, world-riddle’.24 It is an example of the constant emergence that I have identified as 
a repeated concern in Bloch’s musical philosophy. The fact that there is ‘something 
missing’ is precisely what gives art, and musical performance in particular, its utopian 
potential, projecting as it does into the ‘not-yet-conscious’ of a more perfect future. 
 
TEMPORALITY. Temporal concerns are not limited to future projection, though, and 
eventually I begin to take more rigorous account of the relationship between physical 
spacing and the passage of time. I decide to use a ruler to draw vertical lines 1 cm apart, 
to give a clearer sense of relative temporality. I was reluctant to take this approach, which 
struck me as overly prescriptive: a chronological orientation of time in a piece in which 
durée seems more appropriate. However, I thought it would be useful at least to see the 
demarcations (even if I eventually attempted to ignore or erase them) in order to take 
Cage’s temporal directives seriously. 
 What I realized in the process is that the sense of regularity paradoxically helps to 
convey the timelessness of the work.  Much as Messiaen’s Louange à l’éternité de Jésus 
relies on strictly notated rhythms to convey its sense of eternity, strictly measuring time 
helped me to make my playing less regular. As an experiment, I recorded the first line 
twice, initially with a clean copy of the score in an attempt to roughly approximate the 
relative durations, and later trying to adhere strictly to the demarcations. Upon listening 
back to the recordings, the second version sounded no less flexible than the first.  This is 
yet another moment of temporal disjuncture between multiple temporal modes.25 
 
24Bloch (1995), 12. 
25My observation that a different temporal mode exists for listening than for performing is echoed by other 
 103 
Incorporating this new temporal rigour into my practice, rather than making my 
practice more abstract and conceptual, actually made me all the more present in the 
physical aspects of practising the piece. In particular, the attempt to take strict account of 
the space between the notes made me aware of places in which my sense of timing had 
previously been relying on my physical gestures, and it made me think about the essential 
physicality and sensuousness of playing the piece. Taking account of time thus forces me 
to confront my body and its instincts, indeed, making me acutely aware of the fact that I 
have a body with capabilities and constraints. It has also made me feel much more aware 
of the relationship between my body and the spatialised score. Accustomed as I am to 
reading time values symbolically (represented by note values) rather than spatially, I am 
struck by a new correspondence between space and time. In quite a different way, Bloch 
is also concerned with the ‘passage of music’s time into its space, and as such a 
conversion of its specific temporal form into its specific spatial form’.26 Bloch is 
interested, in this passage, with the correspondence between temporality and 
counterpoint in the fugue as a utopian ideal. Nonetheless, he suggests that the fugue’s 
‘transcendent counterpoint’ is only one among many ways that such ‘migration into a 
spiritual dwelling’27 can take place musically. This correspondence between score and 
body, the translation between a spatialised score and points in time, is very much the 
travel between written and unwritten worlds of Chapter 1. This is language that Bloch 
 
writings about the piece, too. Haskins suggests that ‘each sonority is best savoured one after the other, 
appreciated if they suggest something (or not) and forgotten as soon as the next sound occurs’, whereas 
the pianist Sabine Liebner, in the liner notes of her recording as well as in an interview with the Neue 
Zeitschrift für Musik, suggests that observing the spaces between the notes was of great importance to 
her. Rob Haskins, John Cage (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012), 113. Wolf Loeckle and Sabine Liebner, 
‘Zeitproportionalnotation trifft Overtonresonanzen: Wolf Loeckle im Gespräch mit Sabine Liebner über 
John Cages «Etudes Australe»’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik (1991-), 173 (2012), 8–11. 
26Bloch (2000), 130. 
27Ibid. 
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uses as well: ‘We are the wanderers; it is our coming and going that occurs within things. 
Or rather, the trip has already begun materially, and we live within this time, physically 
and organically, and either we just barely keep up or as creative beings we overtake time, 
leading, plunging into what has not yet really occurred.’28 
Observations 
Throughout this process, the body is present not only as a constraint against temporal 
rigour and accuracy, but also as an underlying principle of the étude. While practising this 
piece, I am also studying works by Ravel (the Jeux d’eau) and Prokofiev (the Second Piano 
Concerto). In both of these, one of the solutions I frequently employ for working on 
difficult passages is redistributing notes between the hands, especially when practising 
the Ravel.29 I am struck by how different it is to practise a piece in which the division 
between the hands is taken as fixed. While practising the Ravel, I let my ideal for the 
sound, and my concept of the music, determine its physical manifestation (at least as far 
as the division between the hands is concerned); with the hands fixed, the direction is 
reversed. In practising this piece, the prescribed physicality explicitly determines this 
sense-making, rather than vice versa. 
 In a manner that seems to diverge from conventional practice, the tools that I 
am employing to learn this piece, and the orders in which I place such tools, continually 
seem to elude my grasp and fail to proceed clearly towards a goal.  Repeated practice 
seems to introduce more possibilities and to pose more questions than it forecloses.  As 
Mieko Kanno describes in an essay about the Freeman Etudes for violin, the ‘note-events 
 
28Bloch (2000), 129. 
29Pianists, as well as editors of piano works by Ravel frequently comment on the necessity to redistribute 
notes between the hands (see Richard Dowling’s 2003 edition of the Sonatine published by Boosey and 
Hawkes, Maurice Hinson’s edition of the Valses nobles et sentimentales for Alfred and Nancy Bricard’s 
1990 edition of Gaspard de la nuit for Alfred Masterworks). 
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are visible but unpredictable’.30 This unpredictability is not eliminated by practice but 
continues, especially given the number of parameters that remain unspecified and left to 
the performer in the Etudes Australes score (unlike the Freeman Etudes, in which the 
notation indicates not only pitch but also highly specified expressive parameters for every 
note). 
 This ambiguity or unpredictability, indeed, seems directly proportional to the 
difficulty of the passage at hand. Mieko Kanno writes in her study of the Freeman Etudes 
that ‘performance is necessarily an open-ended act, and virtuosity typifies it’.31 As I have 
already described, Cage’s allowance for temporal flexibility poses unusual problems for 
the performer. Ironically, the more prescriptive the score—in terms of the sheer number 
of notes—the more necessary such flexibility is in the act of practice and performance.  
Kanno identifies similar problems, calling this ambiguity the ‘powers of contingency’. As 
the Etude Australe gets harder, the pianist must improvise more and adjust the timing 
away from the visual layout. As Kanno acknowledges: ‘in derogatory words they might be 
called powers of faking’.32   
Indeed, it often feels as if I am faking as a performer of this piece. My markings on 
the score, and thus my determinations of rhythm, are already approximate, dependent as 
they are on my ruler, my eye, and my penmanship. Although of course I could make 
attempts to divide the score into smaller and smaller increments to more closely ascertain 
the relationships between note values, these would never be conclusive.  Even if they 
could be, I would never be able to execute them with complete precision. In the matter 
of dynamics, articulation, shaping, and so on, all decisions have been left to the 
performer. Much as I can try new options and choose versions that I like best, ultimately 
these are always somewhat spontaneous. Beyond this, with respect to the temporal 
 
30Kanno, (2009), 54. 
31Kanno (2009), 60. 
32Kanno (2009), 54. 
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arrangement of the notes, Cage’s directive that ‘circumstances sometimes arise when it is 
necessary to “shift gears” and go, as the case may be, faster or slower’33 adds an 
additional level of built-in sprezzatura. Is this all just fakery?   
However, Kanno reminds us that such ‘powers of contingency are constructive’.34 
The constructiveness that emerges from the excesses of the score and improvisations of 
the performer reminds me of Bloch’s notion of cultural surplus. For Bloch, surplus refers 
to art that is able to exceed the demands and constraints of capitalism. This surplus—like 
the surplus of capital in Marxist theory from which he takes the terminology—is a 
necessary product of the system from which it emerges, not necessarily its own end. 
However, it functions, in Bloch’s view, to prefigure future aesthetics, occurrences, and 
forms of social organisation.  The contingency that goes along with excess—of notes, of 
difficulty, of constraints—then can be seen as reflective of the noch nicht, in the way that 
it forces the performer to acknowledge their constant striving. Furthermore, resigning 
myself to the fact of occasional ‘circumstances’ of temporal fluctuation means that my 
relationship to the stakes and goals of speed and perfection is different than it would be 
in a piece without such a direction. It is a surplus in this way, too: an avoidance of the 
traditional goals of progress associated with the flow of capitalism and an 
acknowledgement of a world outside of such linearity. 
These observations are not necessarily unique to this particular piece, but are true 
of artistic research more generally.  As Henk Borgdorff writes, artistic research ‘reinforces 
the contingent perspectives and world disclosures which art imparts… Its primary 
importance lies not in explicating the implicit or non-implicit knowledge enclosed in art. It 
is more directed at a not-knowing, or a not-yet-knowing. It creates room for that which is 
 
33Cage (1975), 1. 
34Kanno (2009), 54. 
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unthought, that which is unexpected — the idea that all things could be different’.35  This 
observation strikes me not as a disqualification of the validity of my conclusions, 
however, but as justification. For, indeed, it emphasizes the importance of analysing such 
pieces using a performance-oriented—rather than a score-oriented—mode.  Additionally, 
this parallel draws a strong link between Bloch’s conceptual framework and the goals, 
possibilities, and openings of artistic research. Yet again,we are confronted with how the 
theories of Ernst Bloch might best be applied to music through application in practice and 
as part of a contemporary performance paradigm. 
Conclusions 
Although I could focus on many more aspects of the experience of performing this étude 
at the piano, the chronology that I have traced follows Bloch in finding the social and 
political content of music in its embodied presence. I have focused on the way in which 
Bloch’s utopian ideas manifest through the body—as things that cannot ‘occur to 
someone’ but are rather ‘given through the senses’.36 Many of these are found in the 
embodied sociality of even a solo work: the physical relationship that I develop with 
Grete Sultan, for example, or the sociality of how my two hands interact with each other. 
Others are more ambiguous, subtly located in the ‘clairaudience’ with which my ear 
shapes my body, the relationship between body and score.  In general, we might 
understand all of these as part of the ‘utopian surplus’ in which Bloch situates art’s 
potential. Meaning is excessive, found in gaps and breaks of experience, creating its own 
gaps by rupturing the passage of time. 
 
35Henk Borgdorff (2010), 61. 
36Bloch (2000), 204. 
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Étude 9: Failing towards the Impossible—György 
Ligeti’s Études pour piano 
	
Hope is surrounded by dangers, and it is the consciousness of danger and at the 
same time the determined negation of that which continually makes the opposite of 
the hope-for object possible. 
--Ernst Bloch1 
Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better. 
--Samuel Beckett, Worstward ho2 
 
In this Étude, I turn to more performance-oriented theory to study failure in musical 
performance, focusing on the methodology of queer theory and theatre studies in the 
writings of Judith (Jack) Halberstam, eldritch Priest, and Sara Jane Bailes.3 In particular, I 
place theories of failure in conversation with collections of piano études by György Ligeti, 
to demonstrate that failure is another mode of challenging the limits of the body. 
What does it mean to fail? 
eldritch Priest’s Boring Formless Nonsense: Experimental Music and the Aesthetics of Failure 
offers the only comprehensive study of failure in music. Priest relies heavily on the 
 
1Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank 
Mecklenburg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), 17. 
2Beckett (1983), 1. 
3Priest’s first name is stylised with no uppercase letter.  
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slipperiness of the concept of failure: the chapter titles are sets of heavily embedded 
parentheses, and Priest performatively acknowledges the impossibility of direct 
discussion. Indeed, the penultimate chapter turns into what is later described as an 
elaborate ‘hoax’, employing the multiple-use name ‘Karen Eliot’ to describe a composer 
and body of repertoire that may or may not exist. The work is altogether extremely 
impressive, in the breadth of repertoire that it discusses, the complex web of theory that 
it uses, and the truly daring methodological experiments that it employs. But its omission 
of failure in performance seems like an oversight. Many of the issues that Priest’s work 
brings up—such as the ambivalent state of boredom and the paradoxes of formless and 
disappearing works—are always concerns of performance. Any work can (and 
occasionally will) engender a state of boredom or distraction in its performer.4 The 
ontology of performance is, as Peggy Phelan writes, one of disappearance.5 
As such, in addition to Priest, I am inspired by performance-oriented writing on 
failure from theatre studies and queer theory. For example, I use both Sara Jane Bailes 
and Judith (Jack) Halberstam’s excellent studies of failure. Halberstam’s book, The Queer 
Art of Failure, takes a broader scope, examining artistic and literary representations of 
failure, from animated film to novels and experimental performance. The book uses a kind 
of ‘low theory’ in which it is not uncommon to see references, on the same page, to 
Disney animated films such as Finding Nemo and the theory of Antonio Gramsci.6   
Meanwhile, Bailes’ Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure focuses more narrowly 
on the stage, and is a study of three theatre troupes operating in an experimental genre 
of ‘performance theatre’ in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
4For more on distraction in performance, see recent work by Anthony Gritten, including ‘Distraction in 
Polyphonic Gesture’ in New Perspectives on Music and Gesture, ed. Anthony Gritten and Elaine King 
(London : Ashgate, 2006). 
5Phelan (1993). 
6Halberstam (2011), 2. 
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All three of these theoretical texts take quite similar approaches to the topic. For 
example, they all focus on experimental genres, in which formal and structural deviation is 
an important aesthetic tool. Many of the pieces studied by Priest—in their embrace of 
boredom, formlessness, and nonsense—are contingent on a lack of formal rigour and 
sometimes a lack of genuine existence. Bailes focuses exclusively on theatre groups in 
which the work is produced in a scattered, collaborative way, and Priest writes about 
pieces published by individual composers under a multitude of names, or multiple (and 
unknown) authors under collective, anonymous names. 
These concerns—formal experimentation and scattered subjectivity—may appear 
quite distant from the études that are the subject of my investigations. However, by 
suggesting that the idea of breakdown is a crucial part of Györgi Ligeti’s Études pour 
piano, I discover surprising similarities between the étude and more experimental genres. 
In this section, I seek to understand these études in performance, and demonstrate how 
ruptures that occur in and through the performing body are related to aspects of failure 
discussed by Bailes, Halberstam, and Priest. I will first discuss three theoretical ways in 
which failure might occur in performance—repair, pain, and slapstick—and relate these 
specifically to the étude genre. Then, I will use examples from Ligeti’s études to show 
how these ideas are manifested musically at the limits of the body. 
Repair 
In my Case Study on John Cage’s Etude Australe VIII, I began to explore ways that 
possibilities multiply in the performance of extremely difficult works of music. Although it 
might seem that the effort to pursue something beyond reach would stifle the 
performer’s creative expression, the opposite is generally true. Mieko Kanno explains this 
seeming tension in her description of performing John Cage’s Freeman Etudes, identifying 
the ‘powers of contingency’ at work in the struggle of performance: ‘in derogatory terms 
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they might be called powers of faking’.7 The piece thus highlights the proliferation of 
unexpected possibilities that emerges with any act of practice or performance, and the 
sense of multiplicity that this creates for both the performer and for the audience. 
This quality of fakery or chance occurs precisely as a result of the gap between 
what is imagined and what actually occurs. Sara Jane Bailes describes a similar 
phenomenon in her study of the Chicago-based performance collective Goat Island, 
which was active from 1987 to 2009. The interaction between impossibility and failure is 
something that the group identifies as integral to their work. In the words of Goat Island 
performer Karen Christopher: ‘The key thing about both failure and impossibility is the 
dynamic of constantly moving towards but never arriving. Process rather than goal is 
emphasized.’8 
In her research, Bailes focuses in particular on what she identifies as a tension 
between ‘difficulty and accommodation, or, inflected differently, between damage and 
repair’.9 A paradigmatic example of this tension is the exercise known as The Impossible 
Task that the collective uses as a preliminary activity in their summer workshops: 
The exercise instructs each participant to write down an impossible task on a piece of 
paper, then pass it to a neighbour whose instruction is to interpret and transform the 
brief directive into a repeatable, performative action. Each individual therefore takes 
on the impossible task instruction of a fellow participant. In this preliminary activity … 
participants learn several things quickly: how to challenge their own perceptions of 
the condition of impossibility and to reflect upon what that term might connote; how 
to begin to collaborate; and how to animate an idea through practical exploration 
within a brief, determined timeframe. Participants also learn to let go of what they 
 
7Kanno (2009), 60. 
8Cited in Bailes (2011), 112. 
9Bailes, (2011), 126. 
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might already have become attached to – in this case a written instruction – and 
instead accommodate an unknown directive.10 
In particular, this final pedagogical intent— learning to ‘accommodate an unknown’—
suggests a practice in which failure is recognisable not because of the supposed ‘absence 
of success’ but rather because of the methods of coping and accommodation that 
emerge in its wake. 
 Indeed, in performance, a failed moment includes not only its own failure but 
also the alternative that is done in response.  In much the same terms as Bloch’s utopian 
not-yet, ‘something not yet realised arises from the conditions of past and present’.11 And 
as Shoshana Felman writes, with respect to J. L. Austin’s notion of the ‘misfire’, ‘the act of 
failing thus opens up the space of referentiality—not because something is missing, but 
because something else is done, or because something else is said’.12 
 Crucially, these accommodations are not static. Rather, repair is multiple, 
iterative, and continuous. For example, Bailes emphasizes how long and drawn out the 
rehearsal processes of Goat Island are for any of their individual works. This feature is par 
for the course in the processes that pianists undergo when learning complex 20th-century 
concert études. One would be hard-pressed to find a pianist of György Ligeti’s or Unsuk 
Chin’s books of études who does not acknowledge the sheer effort and time that must 
be invested into learning these works.  Jeremy Denk, describing his process of learning 
several études by Ligeti over the course of a summer, claims that he became a caffeine-
fuelled ‘Practising Maniac’ and ‘did nothing else’: ‘the amount of fingering, the amount of 
mental focus — Ligeti's deliberately written things that are going to screw with your mind 
 
10Ibid., 110. 
11Ibid., 125. 
12Felman (2002), 57.  
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in one way or another.’13 These mental tricks are not eliminated with practice, but must 
be constantly accommodated. 
Another feature that the practice of accommodation in Goat Island has in common 
with étude is pedagogy. According to Bailes, the presence of teaching and learning is 
central to Goat Island’s practice. For one, their summer workshops (from which the 
example above is taken) were as important in their research and development process as 
were rehearsals. Furthermore, they frequently incorporated processes of learning into 
the structure of their performed works and ‘the material of the shows effectively seems 
to demonstrate learning’:14 
The practical demonstration of pedagogy is indexed by the inclusion in the 
performance of a movement that appears as if it is being recalled or still learned, or in 
the discovery of how to accommodate an impediment or weakness…; learning how 
to deal with damage and the restoration it might call for; or by seeking ways to 
perform the efforts required to imagine and push the body to work beyond its given 
limits. The learning that each performance shares with its audience offers an 
inquisitive way to examine material…. Devotion to the demonstration of disciplined 
attention applied to an activity shifts emphasis in these performances away from an 
outcome, and instead roots us (performers and spectators) firmly in the practice of 
learning as an inconclusive end in itself.15 
In one particularly explicit instance of this practice, the ensemble drew inspiration for the 
show September roses… from Robert Walser’s novel Jakob von Gunten, in which a group of 
servants is suspended in a remote institute where they are, in fact, training to become 
servants. 
 
13Fresh Air (2013) 
14Bailes (2011), 120. 
15Ibid. (2011), 119. 
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In the same manner, the performance of a concert étude encompasses an 
orientation to pedagogy that is present in performance. This is especially true because 
Ligeti’s études are not only extremely difficult, but also common to the point of having 
entered the piano performance canon. The genre of étude encourages performer and 
audience alike to contemplate the physical tasks that have been and are being learned, 
transformed, adapted, and challenged on stage. The pedagogical orientation in turn 
reminds us of the presence of failure and possibility, for we are called to understand the 
piece as a manifestation of learning in action and thus as a space in which future options 
are multiple, rather than fixed and prescribed. 
Even leaving aside the genre, the fact that Ligeti’s Études are so difficult also makes 
present ‘the demonstration of disciplined attention applied to an activity’ that Bailes 
describes above. No pianist of the Étude no. 1: Désordre could ever be accused of being 
or seeming complacent; it simply wouldn’t be possible to execute the work without 
extreme discipline and effort. Extreme expressive markings such as feroce, con tutta la 
forza further emphasise the effort that is part of their practice. Furthermore, the way that 
such pieces ‘push the body to work beyond its given limits’ reminds us not only of the 
physical discipline and exertion of the moment, but also of the difficulty of the learning 
process through which the étude was brought into being. Études, even designed for the 
stage, still retain remnants of their origins as pedagogical tools. Ligeti’s own Études, 
composed after much of his other piano music, often isolate small technical problems that 
would help to prepare the pianist for performing, say, his Piano Concerto (1985-1988).16 
Additionally, the necessity of practice is another reminder of the ever-presence of 
failure as repair. Practising has as its very goal to ‘[learn] how to deal with damage and 
the restoration it might call for’. As such, it embodies the multiplicities that attempt and 
 
16Of course, this is equally related to the function of études as exercises in composition, in which Ligeti’s 
études could be seen as ‘a kind of compendium of Ligeti’s more recent compositional techniques’. Floros 
(2014), 157. 
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repair suggest. Practice does not end when the piece has been ‘achieved’ or played in the 
‘right’ way; instead, it emphasises an ontology of music in which there is no ideal work 
outside of the attempts and processes through which it is brought into being.  No matter 
how skilled the pianist or how far along in the process, by nature, practising is never 
complete. 
Pain 
As I have hinted above, in order to understand failure, we need not only to examine 
works ‘themselves’, but also to focus on how études come to be, in the act of learning 
and practising. In general, phenomenological accounts of music-making focus on those 
aspects of practice that are pleasurable, or—at worst—neutral. It is equally valuable, 
however, to be explicit about the difficulty—indeed, pain—that is often involved in 
practising, in particular with pieces as physically and mentally challenging as the virtuosic 
études of Ligeti. 
The mental discipline required to improve—the task explicitly demanded by the 
étude—involves practice that consistently goes beyond what previously was possible. In 
an extreme depiction of this phenomenon, the character of Andrew Neiman in Damien 
Chazelle’s film Whiplash (2014), a drummer, practises until his fingers bleed, only to 
plunge them in a bucket of ice before picking up the drumsticks and returning to the 
same repeated passage. The scene conveys not just the excessiveness of the gesture, but 
also its banality. The sequence suggests that this is not an unusual moment for Neiman, 
but rather a normal, everyday occurrence, part of the expected routine of the practice 
room. 
Similarly in Ligeti’s Étude no. 13: L’Escalier du Diable, a ffffffff forces the performer to 
confront the violence of the instrument. Pianist Jeremy Denk, again, describes the 
aggression involved in practising the piece in his blog: 
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I think maybe I should hurl my whole body at the piano as violently as possible and 
hope for the best. They would find my bloody corpse weeks later amid the moldy 
coffee cups, odiferous testament to my devotion to the composer's intent.17  
Despite his humorous tone, the Ligeti études are undoubtedly physically strenuous, in 
ways that provoke an orientation to the instrument that almost inevitably causes pain. 
Elaine Scarry, in The Body in Pain, explores the relationship between pain and 
creation. In particular, she is interested in the closeness of pain and the imagination.  
While pain, she says, is pure sensation without object, imagination is its opposite: it is 
object only, in the absence of sensation. In order to understand this relationship, she 
deploys the concept of ‘work’, which encompasses both of these poles. The term work 
suggests painful labour; it is no coincidence, in her reading, that labour is often used as a 
form of torture. As I have discussed in Book I, in its nominal form, ‘work’ also refers to an 
object of (often artistic) creation: 
Far more than any other intentional state, work approximates the framing events of 
pain and the imagination, for it consists of both an extremely embodied physical act 
(an act which, even in nonphysical labour, engages the whole psyche) and of an 
object that was not previously in the world, a fishing net or piece of lace where there 
had been none, or a mended net or repaired lace curtain where there had been only 
a torn approximation, or a sentence or a paragraph or a poem where there had been 
silence.18 
According to Scarry, the process of making—‘work’—that emerges from pain entails the 
creation of artefacts (works) that are fragments—‘artifices’—of the imagination on which 
they are based. 
Furthermore, the creation of such artefacts uses tools, which have a close 
 
17Fresh Air (NPR, 2013), www.npr.org. 
18Scarry, (1987), 170. 
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relationship to weapons, the instruments of pain. Like weapons, tools are objects that are 
used by a given body to provoke a reaction in another body: ‘The weapon and the tool 
seem at moments indistinguishable, for they may each reside in a single physical object 
(even the clenched fist of a human hand may be either a weapon or a tool), and may be 
quickly transformed back and forth, now into the one, now into the other’.19 However, 
according to Scarry, when used as a weapon, the object acts on a body and produces an 
immediate physical sensation (of pain), whereas when it is used as a tool, the object 
produces physical sensations that are deferred in time and that take the form of aesthetic 
(or other) judgments. 
The piano is one such weapon and tool. A pianist’s use of this tool can provoke 
delayed reaction in other bodies, as Scarry describes: in this case, a reaction of aesthetic 
judgement in the body of a listener. However, the piano may also be employed as a 
weapon, with a more complex relationship between the agent and the victim of violence. 
When interacting with the piano through, for example, the Ligeti étude described above, 
the pianist uses the piano in such a way that provokes an immediate, and sometimes 
painful, reaction on his or her very own body. Thus, the étude weaponises the piano at 
the hands of the pianist. The composer, too, is among the agents putting the instrument 
(as tool and weapon) to use upon both the audience and the pianist.  Likewise, the 
pedagogue offers instructions, exercises, and techniques for the performer’s own self-
improvement and self-harm. 
Thus, I suggest that practising these extremely difficult concert études at the piano 
exhibits a very subtle kind of masochism. Queer theory has suggested that masochism in 
art can be a critical tool, used to disrupt supposedly stable notions of self, time, and 
normativity.20 Theorist Judith (Jack) Halberstam refers, for example, to self-destructive 
 
19Scarry (1987), 173. 
20See Muñoz (2009) and Halberstam (2011). 
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performance art such as Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece (1964)—in which audience members cut, 
sometimes violently, at the artist’s clothing—and Marina Abramovic’s Rhythm 0 (1974)—in 
which the audience was invited, for six hours, to do whatever they wished to the artist’s 
body using a collection of 72 objects provided, ranging from a feather to a loaded gun. 
Drawing on Saidiya Hartman’s idea of passivity, Halberstam suggests that such ‘passive 
masochism’ offers a form of resistance and subversion. Rather than accepting either the 
liberal idea of freedom or the alternative (death)—which we might frame in this context 
more subtly as the opposing alternatives of success and failure—‘passive masochism’ 
offers a way out of the system ‘that does not speak in the language of action and 
moment but instead articulates itself in terms of evacuation [and] refusal’.21 Accordingly, 
artworks such as Cut Piece and Rhythm 0 ‘presented extreme forms of self-punishment, 
discipline, and evacuation in order to dramatize new relations between body, self, and 
power’.22 
In comparing these works to the self-violence of the pianist of concert études, it is 
important to acknowledge how these practices differ. One such difference is the 
relationship between creator and performer. Ono and Abramovic both imagine and 
create their own works, whereas the pianist’s pain is dictated by the demands of the 
composer. At the same time, the pianist willingly chooses to be subjected to the practice, 
so while the pianist subjects themselves to pain as they choose, Ono and Abramovic 
leave the harmful acts up to the whims of others. The parallels here are certainly not 
precise. 
Nonetheless, these concert études possess a similar spectacle, calling attention as 
they do to the body (in pain) of the performer and its limits. Abramovic, after all, 
explained the experience of performing the work as one of pushing ‘[her] body to the 
 
21Halberstam (2011), 129. 
22Halberstam (2011), 135. 
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limits’ and exploring ‘how far you can push the energy of the human body’,23 descriptions 
that draw immediate comparison to the études at the piano. It is no coincidence that 
performers of Ligeti will sometimes bring their physicality and exertion to the fore. In 
pianist Greg Anderson’s filmed performance of Ligeti’s Étude no. 13: L’Escalier du diable, 
he wears an explicitly athletic outfit; the tension and strain of his muscles is apparent 
under his tank top. Aesthetically, he uses cuts between shots that emphasize the 
discomfort and unease of both music and performance.24 
The juxtaposition of masochistic artwork and the Ligeti études thus offers a way of 
thinking about the ‘new relations between body, self, and power’ that these études might 
produce. As a genre, the étude is deeply embedded in structures of power that have 
dominated Western music performance since the origins of the music conservatory.  
Even in its form as a concert étude for performance, studies are pedagogical tools against 
which students are measured and evaluated.25 In Foucauldian terms, the étude is a force 
of discipline, whereby the hierarchically organised society maintains power and 
knowledge by using rigour, practice, and structure to enforce norms.26 
Deleuze suggests that the 20th-century inheritance of Foucault’s society of 
discipline replaces discipline with control. In the ‘Postscript on Societies of Control’, he 
tells us that control societies have the illusion of being much freer, not contained within 
the centralisation of the prison but rather dispersed. Instead, control is enforced through 
 
23Marina Abramovic and Milica Zec (dir.), Marina Abramovic on Rhythm 0 (1974) [VIDEO] (Marina Abramovic 
Institute, 2013). 
24Anderson (2006). www.youtube.com/1ZTaiDHqs5s 
25In major competitions, pianists are often required to perform an étude, but this will not be the ‘make-or-
break’ piece for the result; rather, a flawless étude performance is merely a minimum standard after 
which the other pieces form the basis of the evaluation. Both the International Chopin Piano 
Competition and the International Tchaikovsky Competition, for example, require études only in the first 
of three rounds, in which most competitors are eliminated, but the winner is not yet decided. 
26Foucault (1977). 
 120 
digital means, and thus is much more fluid. Unlike the organised and discrete 
examinations of disciplinary society, control societies have continuous examination (in the 
form, Deleuze suggests, of continuing education classes and perpetual self-improvement). 
On the surface, this phenomenon of control seems quite similar to the 
continuousness of repair found in the étude. Due to the necessity of constant practice 
and strife, perhaps pianists are complicit in the present-day exertion of control over their 
bodies, seeking (as Deleuze describes it) constant improvement without questioning their 
origins or ‘what they’re being made to serve’.27 Indeed, they (we) undoubtedly are. It is 
equally possible, however, to understand the embeddedness of failure—in this case, 
manifested as pain and destruction—within these pieces as offering the possibility of 
critique. As Halberstam writes, ‘masochism, finally, represents a deep disruption of time 
itself’.28 While the willingness to subject oneself to pain may be the sign of ultimate 
control, it may also be a ‘passive masochism’ that paradoxically offers freedom through 
escape.  
Slapstick and Punk 
It is possible to distinguish between different kinds of breakdown in the context of 
musical works. On the one hand, there are gaps of practice, in which the performer’s 
realization emphasizes a break between ideal and instantiation. Both repair and pain, the 
two modes of failure discussed above, are primarily related to practice. It is performers 
who must repair and correct errors, and find accommodations to cope with 
impossibilities. Equally, violent physicality and strenuous discipline—even when evoked by 
expressive markings on the score—become masochistic only in the act of rehearsal and 
performance. 
 
27Deleuze (1992), 7. 
28Halberstam (2011), 144. 
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On the other hand, it is possible for failure to occur in the form or content of the 
work, regardless of whether it is echoed in practice. A novel might describe experiences 
of pain, without physically inflicting pain on the reader or writer, as is the case in Jamaica 
Kincaid’s Autobiography of my Mother, one of Halberstam’s examples of ‘passive 
masochism’.29 A work of theatre might imitate the process of learning from one’s 
mistakes, even if the performers are not literally fixing the situation as they go along, such 
as in Goat Island’s use of the themes from Jakob von Gunten. The boredom and nonsense 
of experimental music described by eldritch Priest are also examples of formal 
breakdown, in which incoherence and inadequacy are related to, but independent from, 
practice. Such formal and substantive failures might be called ‘aesthetic’, seeing as they 
are concerned with characteristics of the work. 
Of course, the boundary between aesthetic failures and practical failures is 
porous—for is not practice a part of the emergence of form and content itself?—but such 
a distinction remains a useful way of clarifying how these different modes operate. In 
contrast with repair and pain, I move now to formal flops and content catastrophes, 
focusing on the examples of punk and slapstick. 
Failure in art and performance cannot be discussed without reference to the 
aesthetic and legacy of punk. Drawing on the theory of Greil Marcus, Bailes uses punk as 
an example of ‘bad form…as a disruptive tactic’.30 Punk stages failure and ‘relies on being 
understood as bad’ but in so doing, it asks us to consider ‘according to what criteria 
already prescribed as normative [...] performances of different kinds fail?’31 This aesthetic 
potential of punk as a genre opens a variety of paradoxes.  On the one hand, punk 
‘invented a new, resistant economy of listening by aiming to create a sound that defeated 
 
29Halberstam (2011), 129. 
30Bailes (2011), 54. 
31Bailes (2011), 49. 
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that very purpose: it invented, or attempted to invent, music that was unlistenable’.32 It 
was not so much that punk didn’t ‘care if you listen’33 (to quote Milton Babbitt’s famous 
proclamation) but rather that it compelled you to listen to the unlistenable—do the 
impossible—through its failure to conform. 
Furthermore, the aggressive negativity of punk, a distinctive feature of the genre, 
also bears its internal contradictions. ‘As it announced that all possibilities were closed, 
opened up possibilities of negation and affirmation that…before had not existed even as 
fantasies.’34 It is in this respect that Muñoz, whose virtuosic theory of futurity in queer of 
colour communities—and whose approach to queer theory is emphatically directed 
against negativity—can also deploy punk’s failure as a tool in service of the impossible. He 
observes, in particular, the placenessness of punk: ‘for the punks, geographic location was 
not relevant as long as there was a stage, a soundman, and an audience’.35  The radical 
possibility of this placelessness therefore allowed punk to be a form of identification for 
other kinds of minoritarian communities: in this case, queer communities of colour. For 
Muñoz and others like him, the ‘mosh pit [was a] utopian subcultural rehearsal space’.36 
Bailes offers a succinct summary of the ways in which failure operates as a critical tool in 
punk aesthetic: 
As a movement, punk offers a challenging contribution to a consideration of the 
poetics of failure and performance, for it sets a spin on oppositional notions of 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ in relation to the performed event just as it meddles with the 
 
32Bailes (2011), 53. 
33Babbitt (1958). 
34Marcus (1979). 
35Muñoz (2009), 105. 
36Muñoz (2009), 111. 
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perception of skilled practice and the performance of socially acceptable behaviours 
in everyday life.37 
The deliberate valourisation of ‘bad’ form and negative content makes punk a 
useful example of the critical potential of failure. 
A contrasting example with similar aesthetic manifestations is the genre of slapstick 
comedy on stage and in film, exemplified by performers such as Charlie Chaplin and 
Buster Keaton. As Bailes writes, ‘the dynamic of failure in slapstick is usually indexed by 
the incorporation of the mistake or the accident as a newly determining factor within a 
narrative structure but which nevertheless resists assimilation, thus altering the status of 
the event and the narrative itself’.38 In slapstick, failure is usually present in relatively 
simple tasks, and seems to come about by way of an accident, laziness, or just bad luck. 
The moment of failure creates a disruption that dramatically alters the narrative. 
However, the mechanism of slapstick is not just about the mishap itself, but also about 
the accommodations that emerge after it, usually marked by repeated—and repeatedly 
fruitless—attempts to keep trying. The more the attempts fail, the more alternative 
possibilities emerge, and the viewer is paradoxically aware of both the absurdity and the 
humour.  ‘Its effect on the spectator is both frustrating and satisfying’,39 writes Bailes. 
Although the dynamics of punk and slapstick may not map onto all études or the 
étude genre as a whole, Ligeti’s Étude 3: Touches bloquées uses techniques that bear many 
similarities to both genres of failure. For example, the pianist simulates errors by 
repeatedly playing octaves that contain an extraneous major seventh. In the technique to 
which the title of the étude refers, the pianist ‘blocks’ certain keys by holding them down 
with one hand, so that when the other hands strikes those notes, it is as if the piano is 
broken or the pianist’s coordination uneven. Such effects veer between the critical 
 
37Bailes (2011), 49. 
38Bailes (2011), 40. 
39Bailes (2011), 41. 
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negativity of punk and the satisfying and frustrating comedy of slapstick; both 
respectively emphasise the impossible paradoxes and hopeful alternatives that musical 
failures can offer.   
Failure in Ligeti’s Études pour piano 
Ligeti’s three books of Études pour piano were published between 1985 and 2001. Book 
1 (1985) consisted of six études, following by eight in Book 2 (1994) and four in Book 3 
(2001). At one point, Ligeti supposedly had in mind a collection of twelve, a clear 
reference to the étude collections of Chopin (whose Études Op. 10 and Op. 25 are both 
sets of twelve) and Debussy (who published twelve études in two Books of six), but with 
a legacy that stretches back to the tonally all-encompassing impulse that any multiple of 
twelve suggests.40 
Such allusions to traditional genres are common in Ligeti’s aesthetic style, and 
particularly so in his later works. Floros’ biography claims that ‘Ligeti’s relation to tradition 
changed after 1978, became closer, more direct and transparent. This is manifest most 
overtly in pieces like the Ciaconna and the Passacaglia ungherese for harpsichord; works like 
the Horn Trio, the Piano Études and the Violin Concerto would have been unthinkable fifty 
years earlier’.41 Like many of Ligeti’s other works, the études also draw on a range of 
other source materials, from loose allusions to Indonesian and Hungarian folk musics, to 
extra-musical sources like Benoit Mandelbrot’s fractal mathematics. But, as I have tried to 
suggest, invoking the étude as a genre and tradition is a very particular move. It is 
situating oneself in a tradition not only of composition, but also of performance, 
pedagogy, and practice. It locates the place of that tradition not only on the stage or in 
music history textbooks, but also in the conservatoire and the practice room. Equally, its 
 
40Steinitz (2003), 277. 
41Floros (2014), 56. 
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relationship to practice offers the potential for tradition to be subverted, in particular 
through the dynamics of failure that I have described so far in this chapter. 
Ligeti describes his process of composing the Études as very physical: 
I lay my ten fingers on the keyboard and imagine music. My fingers copy this mental 
image as I press the keys, but this copy is very inexact: a feedback emerges between 
ideas and tactile/motor execution. This feedback loop repeats itself many times, 
enriched by provisional sketches: a mill wheel turns between my inner ear, my 
fingers, and the marks on the paper. The result sounds completely different from my 
initial conceptions: the anatomical reality of my hands and the configuration of the 
piano keyboard have transformed my imaginary constructs…. The criteria are only 
partly determined in my imagination; to some extent they also lie in the nature of the 
piano — I have to feel them out with my hand.42 
The image of the ‘feedback loop’ between mind and hands is particularly evocative. 
Ligeti’s fingers, mind, and keyboard are in three-way conversation with one another, 
connected in an ‘information network’. As with any conversation, the ideas may be lost or 
changed with the process of transmission. But so, too, are the participants changed. The 
hand learns and adapts based on what it has discovered, and in turn what it has 
communicated back. Our own hands and bodies, as performers of the Études, are also 
linked in this way.  They, too, are changed by the Études of Ligeti, just as we change them 
through performance. 
Despite being no more than 30 years old, the Études have become essential pieces 
of the piano repertoire. Numerous recordings now exist of the complete Ligeti Études, 
along with many more of individual Études from the collection. Several pianists have even 
recorded the Étude no. 14A Coloana fara sfarsit, which was recomposed as the current 
Étude 14 Coloana infinita (The Infinite Column), after Pierre-Laurent Aimard complained 
 
42Ligeti (1996), 8-9. 
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that it was too difficult, indeed impossible. In this light, can the Études even be properly 
thought of as ‘failing’?  Where is the ‘gap’ when words such as ‘flawless’ appear on 
reviews of these performances?43   
We may locate failure first in the gap between mind and body in the process of 
development and composition. No mental image can be perfectly replicated by the 
contingencies of anatomy and instrumentality; equally, no physical reality can be perfectly 
understood by the mind. Neither mental image nor anatomical contingency can be 
captured in the score, nor can performance ever approach an abstract ideal of the work, 
precisely because such an ideal does not exist. In Ligeti’s words, ‘this copy is very inexact’. 
Equally, failure emerges in practice. The piece does not exist simply as a polished 
recording: the sheer amount of time and failed attempts that are indexed into these 
pieces and required in their preparation are just as much part of the performance and the 
piece. Whether in rehearsal or performance, overcoming the extreme difficulty of these 
Études requires a kind of re-negotiation that always feels like failure, even if it is not 
perceived as such. Furthermore, while many skilful performances of the Ligeti études aim 
to obscure the learning process, it can never be fully covered up. Even the fact that these 
pieces are called études already calls their pedagogy to mind. 
As Bailes describes of Goat Island, ‘the practical demonstration of pedagogy is 
indexed by the inclusion in the performance of a movement that appears as if it is being 
recalled or still learned’.44 This practical pedagogy will be present to varying degrees in 
performances of Ligeti Études, to be sure, but in any performance of an étude, there will 
always be an element of continual learning. Having called the piece an étude already 
encourages both performer and listener to speculate on and engage with the technical 
 
43See, for example, a review in The Guardian of the CD by the pianist Jeremy Denk, whose performance 
observations have been included in this chapter (Maddocks, 2012). 
44Bailes (2011), 119. 
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features that are being studied and explored. I recall here, too, Mieko Kanno’s 
observation that ‘performance is necessarily an open-ended act, and virtuosity typifies 
it’.45 This observation emphasises the fact that it is the most spectacular and difficult 
works that in fact require greater degrees of fluctuations, negotiations, and 
improvisations in practice and in the moment of performance. These deviations are 
themselves failures and gaps. 
In general, a performance-oriented approach to the Ligeti Études—which 
emphasises not only the performance itself but also the processes of pedagogy and 
rehearsal—reveals the primacy of breakdown in these works. It is a kind of failure that 
exists on its own terms, outside of a dichotomy with success; by ‘failing’, I do not mean 
that the practice does not succeed, but rather that recontextualises performance such 
that success is not the goal. 
Examples of failure—both practical and aesthetic—abound throughout Ligeti’s 
Études. The moto perpetuum style frequently used in Ligeti’s études often makes them 
feel as if they have ended suddenly and too soon.46 It is as if they might have continued 
indefinitely, were it not for the contingencies of the body, the piano, the world, and time. 
As we have discussed, the études foreground their own technical challenges, and thus 
require—and call to mind—repetitive practice. This is a kind of practice that pushes bodies 
and minds to their limits. As with any form of repetitive practice, each iteration—whether 
in rehearsal or performance—is always envisioning possible improvement. In any of the 
études, we might discuss some of the specific technical challenges (as we have done for 
the touches bloquées) and understand the ways that failure emerges in their 
practice/practising. 
 
45Kanno (2009), 60. 
46See, for example, Étude 1: Désordre, Études 4: Fanfares, Étude 6: Automne à Varsovie, Étude 9: Vertige, Étude 
10: Der Zauberlehrling, and Études 14 and 14a: Coloana infinita and Coloana fara sfarsit. 
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We might also note, for example, the way that titles refer to failure. Études 14 and 
14a (Columna Infinita and Coloana fara sfarsit) are two obvious examples, whose titles 
refer to an ‘infinite column’ and a ‘column without end’, both physical structures that are 
impossible to realise. Other études refer to the failures of the body. Au bout du souffle 
(Out of Breath) and Vertige (dizziness), for example, both describe symptoms of the 
body’s inability to behave as it should. Dizziness, for example, occurs when the body 
inaccurately believes the world is spinning. And the feeling of being out of breath is 
perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the body being pushed to its limits, unable to 
go beyond. At the point of being out of breath, the body is depleted and no longer able 
to continue—on the verge of failure. 
Based on the modes of failure that I have discussed so far in this chapter, I offer a 
more in-depth analysis of Ligeti’s Étude 3: Touches bloquées. In this analysis, I describe 
aesthetic and practical gaps that emerge in the pieces, bearing in mind the theoretical 
apparatuses offered by Bailes, Priest, and Halberstam in particular.   
 
Étude 3: Touches bloquées (Blocked keys), 1985 
The title of Touches bloquées refers quite literally to the technique that it is 
designed to study, to explore, and to improve. In this technique, certain notes are 
depressed with one hand—either silently or sounding—and then held, while the other 
hand plays on those same keys. As such, the moving hand repeatedly strikes notes that 
are already held (hence, ‘blocked’), creating silently struck notes.  Ligeti notates those 
keys which are to be depressed silently and held with diamond-shaped note heads, and 
those keys which ‘[do] not sound since the same key has already been depressed and 
held by the other hand’ with small note heads (see Figure 9.5). 
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Figure 9.1. Étude 3: Touches bloquées, bars 1-5.47 
 
 It is a technique that Ligeti had used in an earlier piece, the Monument-
Selbstportrait-Bewegung, but apparently had not himself invented. Rather, in the 
introduction to the piece, Ligeti cites the technique as originating from an essay by 
Henning Siedentopf, in which he proposes ‘blockierten Tasten’ among other ideas for 
‘New Directions for Keyboard Technique’.48 The tone of Siedentopf’s article is one of 
possibility and expansion. The blocked key technique is proposed as having the potential 
to expand what pianists are capable of doing, and change how the body and technics of 
the piano and its performers develop. Siedentopf, in proposing such new keyboard 
techniques, envisions the pianists of the future. 
Ligeti’s attempt to explore the technique in an étude is very much in this same 
spirit. The piece is designed to familiarize the pianist with a new way of approaching the 
piano. Indeed, any technique that can be found in the lexicon of a given work is always an 
attempt to make that technique part of the physicality of the work’s executors. The act of 
composition presumes that its performers are capable of, or could become capable of, 
executing it. This is especially true in the étude. Books of études, in particular, carry with 
 
47Ligeti (1985), 21. 
48Siedentopf (1973), 143. 
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them the suggestion of a training practice or method, and the lingering presumption that 
by learning the set of pieces, the pianist will develop the tools to better navigate the 
instrument and play other works. Thus, while one might understand these études as 
compositional studies—attempts to explore the aesthetic possibilities of a particular 
physical idea—it is also important to recognise their role in shaping broader questions of 
performance training and practice. By composing an étude based on blocked keys, 
however compositionally-oriented, Ligeti ensures that pianists who approach the piece 
will treat the blocked-key technique as something to be practised, learned, and mastered. 
It may seem arbitrary to speak of the touches bloquées as a distinct technique. After 
all, executing the blocked keys could be separated into a number of different challenges. 
One of these involves the coordination of the hands. When the left hand is blocking the 
notes, the right hand must be aware of its position so as not to bump into it. Both arms 
shift at the elbows to create more space for the other. This technique is not dissimilar to 
the difficulties posed by hand-crossing in Cage’s Etudes Australes, for example (or, of 
course, any number of other pieces). Another crucial challenge is simply adjusting to the 
requirements of a new notation: there is a constant repair required in understanding and 
applying the demands of an unfamiliar notational system. Furthermore, there is simply the 
disconcerting sense of cognitive dissonance caused by the act of playing a piece that 
does not sound as it looks or as it feels. With the blocked notes, the pianist activates the 
finger and presses the key in response to the written note—and yet, no sound is heard. 
The task of responding to these moments of mismatch is not trivial. Again, one might say 
that it is, technically, not different from the cognitive dissonance created by the extra 
staves in the Études Australes case study, in which descent and ascent reverse. 
 However, any technique can be broken down into component parts.  A scale 
requires sets of running notes, combined with the technique of adjusting the hand to 
accommodate a thumb tucked under or a finger tucked over. A chord requires the 
technique of placing multiple fingers on the keyboard at once, combined with the 
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balancing act of weighting the hand such that the respective volume of the keys is as 
intended. The building blocks that we choose as our fundamental techniques are the 
product of a combination of tradition and training, rather than an objective set of 
fundamental techniques that exist for pianists to exploit.  The title of the study—arbitrary 
as it may be—and the fact that Ligeti clearly describes the technique and explains its 
source at the outset of the piece both participate and assist in the creation of the 
technique itself. Ultimately, though, the technique comes into being in and through the 
practice of discipline and accommodation that the performer faces when confronted with 
these new challenges and defeats. The fact that the piece is an étude makes the practice 
of learning, growing, and adjusting even more striking. 
 As a pedagogical genre, in which the performer has learned a genuinely novel 
technique, the Touches bloquées étude epitomises the ‘practical demonstration of 
pedagogy’49 to which Bailes refers in her study of Goat Island. The way that the étude 
crystallises a specific technical problem focuses the experience of performing the piece 
on the practice of learning. It is an orientation that is focused on the process of learning 
rather than an objective goal, and thus, on a performative rather than textual 
understanding of music. 
Indeed, this is true for the listener as well. At the beginning of the piece, the 
listener is necessarily not immediately aware of the technical exploration. As the blocked 
keys become more and more frequent, they become more audibly perceptible. As a 
listener, one begins, slowly, to understand the process that is at work. As the piece 
unfolds, the touches bloquées pervade more and more, until finally, the pianist is simply 
playing on held notes, and we are left with the unpitched sound of repeated pattering on 
the keys (see Figure 9.6).  At this point, the fact that the pianist is striking held notes 
 
49Bailes (2011), 119. 
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becomes obvious, and the listener has been guided to a point of understanding a new 
relationship between sound and movement. 
	
 
Figure 9.2. Étude 3: Touches bloquées, final bars.50 
	
On top of the practical pedagogy of incorporating a new technique, the specific effect of 
the touches bloquées also simulates breakdown, and Ligeti is clearly exploring such 
compositional and aesthetic possibilities. His expressive marking for the étude—‘stuttering 
/ stotterned’—is telling in this respect. The technique of the blocked notes naturally 
creates the effect of disjointedness. Though the pianist plays even quavers, the presence 
of blocked notes amidst these keys causes the sonic effect of a punctuated and precise 
irregularity. In specifying that the piece should sound ‘stuttering’, Ligeti makes clear that 
he is further exploiting this technique’s expressive potential. 
Indeed, in the B section of the Étude (bars 72-91) the blocked-key technique itself 
is abandoned.  Instead, it is replaced by another imitation of stumbling. The pianist plays a 
series of rushing octaves, separated by commas. These begin timidly, pp, and each is 
marred with a ‘wrong note’: a major-seventh alongside the octave, as if caused by the slip 
of a finger (see Figure 9.7). These become more and more insistent—frustrated—as the 
 
50Ligeti (1985), 25. 
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‘errors’ continue.  The dynamic and intensity build to feroce, strepitoso, before the blocked 
keys return. In this middle section, it is as if the blocked-key ‘idea’—an idea that 
encompasses a distance between intention and execution, expectation and reality, 
success and failure—is translated into another technical mode.  These features suggest 
that the concept and its effect—how it sounds and what it conveys—are as important in 
the piece as the physicality of the technique itself. 
 
Figure 9.3. Étude 3: Touches bloquées, bars 76-87, B Section.51 
	
Richard Steinitz, in his biography of Ligeti, suggests that ‘perhaps the whole study is 
a joke’.52 Understanding it in terms of humour, then, we might compare the failure of this 
piece to the paradoxes of slapstick, in which well-executed and perfectly-timed failures 
are employed. As I have described, part of the comedy of slapstick comes from the 
paradoxical combination of satisfaction and frustration that emerges from watching a 
performer consistently repeat the same, exaggerated mistakes. This is an effect that 
 
51Ligeti (1985), 24. 
52Steinitz (2003), 287. 
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translates very clearly to the experience of playing and listening to the Touches bloquées 
étude. As listeners become aware of the failures incorporated into the technique of the 
work, they start to realise that this failure is ‘the point’, a realisation that leads to 
increasing satisfaction. Even still, the failures come at unpredictable moments, and no 
matter how expected, continue to provoke a slight sense of discomfort, as they do in the 
performer, who cannot rely on muscle memory to execute well-practised octaves but 
must be intentional about what sounds and feels like an unintentional slip. 
In these effects, it seems as if the relationship between success and failure is 
reversed. The task at which the performer sets out to succeed is one that calls failure to 
mind. Even though the ‘errors’ are intentional, the audience is compelled by what sounds 
like ‘bad playing’—and indeed, what sounds like repeatedly frustrated practising. Just as 
punk make the ‘unlistenable’ its acoustic object, so does this piece ask us to listen to an 
acoustic object that sounds like it should be ignored or obscured. 
It is perhaps ironic that such ‘errors’—which sound as if they are the product of a 
lack of skill—are indeed extremely difficult to execute. While the blocked-key technique 
itself eliminates the challenges that a truly regular-irregular scale would pose, it still poses 
a distinct combination of physical difficulties. Even when executed well, it looks awkward, 
with the hands collapsing over each other, a maladroitness that is its own kind of failure. 
The flawed octaves also take a significant amount of effort to perfect. While an 
accidental slip of the fifth finger can happen quite easily when not intended, there is an 
art to mastering the timing and execution of making it deliberate. Furthermore, it lacks 
the clear-cut satisfaction, for either the listener or the performer, of success. The piece 
looks, sounds, and feels—in a variety of ways—a little bit ‘off’. 
Finally, the use of a novel technique speaks to the way in which the étude both is 
influenced by and shapes tradition. Incorporating the technique into an étude is a way of 
expanding what it is possible for pianists to do. It is a prediction or premonition that these 
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things will not only be possible, but will be useful—that pianists will be able to do and will 
do them. Of course, the blocked key technique has not taken off wildly since 1985, in 
spite of Siedentopf’s manifesto and Ligeti’s étude. In this respect, it is failed, too—an 
attempt to canonise a technical formation that has not taken hold. It has, of course, 
informed the bodies of the pianists who have played the piece, become a part of what I 
am capable of doing and what resources my body will have to draw on in the future. 
As I have emphasised, the kinds of failures explored in Ligeti’s études offer escape 
from a world in which success and failure are the only options. In this respect, they also 
investigate the impossible, by placing success out of reach and instead making process, 
pedagogy, and physicality—each, in their own way, infinitely evolving and ephemerally 
temporal—the goal. Such an understanding allows us to frame them, even, within the 
utopian terms explored in Études 7 and 8, as hopeful alternatives to the present. It is not 
surprising, indeed, that much of the theoretical work on failure is proximate to utopian 
thought. Both Halberstam and Bailes, for example, draw heavily on queer theorist Jose 
Esteban Muñoz, whose Cruising Utopia sought a future-oriented queerness amidst a 
landscape of pragmatic or negative queer theory. 
Conclusion 
In general, I have suggested that failure and the impossible are complementary modes, 
and have focused on applying theoretical models of failure to études of György Ligeti. 
Although I have explored many modes of breakdown, what I suggest all of these have in 
common is a ‘refusal to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline’.53 Bailes 
tells us that in Goat Island’s practice, the tension between accommodation and difficulty 
is not merely an aesthetic trait of the company’s practice, but also an important 
 
53Halberstam (2011), 88. 
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component of the ‘larger socio-political issues it engages with’.54 
In particular, I am interested in the way that the presence of failure can be 
subversive. In the context of canonical études for expert piano performers, failure may 
seem to be strictly conformational, holding performers to an impossibly high standard 
(but a standard nonetheless) and controlling their bodies with the desire for constant 
improvement. However, I argue that the extreme precision of these works does not fix 
their outcomes, but rather emphasises contingency and possibility in performance, due to 
the accommodations that emerge in the wake of a misstep or error.  Furthermore, I 
suggest that the presence of practising as painful labour also contributes to the 
subversion of these works, which re-cast the pain and discipline of the performer. Finally, 
I identify traces of slapstick and punk in the content of the études, arguing that they 
reframe traditional notions of failure and success by making inaccuracy an aesthetic 
object in its own right. 
 
 
 
54Bailes (2011), 126. 
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Étude 10: Case Study—György Ligeti’s L’Escalier 
du diable 
 
We are committed to the idea that study is something we do together… talking and 
walking around with other people, working, dancing, suffering, some irreducible 
convergence of all three, held under the name of speculative practice. 
Fred Moten and Stefano Harney1 
 
In 2014, the Ruhr piano festival (Klavierfestival Ruhr) dedicated its activities to the 
composer György Ligeti. This included a project with primary school pupils in Duisburg, a 
collaboration with student and young professional dancers and musicians, and an 
impressive website featuring Pierre-Laurent Aimard, www.explorethescore.org. The 
website’s primary feature is ‘Inside the Score’, featuring video recordings of several of 
Ligeti’s works (including four of Ligeti’s Études pour piano and three of his other works 
from the Musica Ricercata) alongside ‘interactive scores’. The scores contain annotations 
of comments that Ligeti himself made about the score and links to other articles and 
videos discussing various aspect of the pieces. Particularly interesting is the inclusion 
within the interactive score of segments of a masterclasses given by Pierre-Laurent 
Aimard to piano students performing these pieces. 
The project is relevant because of the way it treats Ligeti’s études as works to be 
investigated and explored in an ongoing process. As I have discussed, a pedagogical and 
process-based orientation to the Ligeti’s Études pour piano is inherent from a performer’s 
 
1Moten and Harney (2013), 110. 
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perspective, both because they are études and because they are extremely difficult. The 
various projects undertaken by the Ruhr festival in 2014 extended this idea of the étude 
as a pedagogical tool beyond pianists to listeners, dancers, schoolchildren, and anyone 
who chooses to visit the website thereafter. What is the effect when an approach 
focused on the process of learning is also offered to listeners, dancers, and other 
participants? The website is ‘nerdily marvellous if you happen to be preparing a 
performance of L’escalier du Diable’2 but is equally designed for average listeners, and 
the performance activities were projects for non-musician students. 
In this case study, I will treat both the Ligeti in schools project and Aimard’s ‘Inside 
the Score’ website as an example of using the étude as an embodied, pedagogical genre. I 
focus on the two aspects of the project that used Ligeti’s Étude no. 13: L’Escalier du diable: 
one of the school projects, listed on the website as ‘Teilprojekt 3’ and the annotated 
score for the piece on ‘Inside the Score’. In this étude, Ligeti dramatises the idea of 
constant struggle. Its title refers to a never-ending ‘devil’s staircase’, and the notion of an 
infinite climb is also present in its formal, aesthetic, and performative content. In 
particular, the project reflects both an aesthetics of failure and a practice of failure similar 
to that which I described in Étude 9. As such, this Case Study will also serve as a way of 
demonstrating some of these theoretical ideas in practice. First, I will analyse L’Escalier du 
diable from the perspective of failure. Then, I will briefly describe and discuss the 
Teilprojekt 3 undertaken at the Klavier Festival Ruhr. Finally, I will study the themes of 
failure in Aimard’s commentary in the ‘Inside the Score’ project, focusing on his 
masterclasses. 
Étude no. 13: L’Escalier du diable 
Though most of Ligeti’s titles were given after the pieces were composed, changed 
 
2Service (2015), theguardian.com. 
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throughout the process, and probably slightly haphazardly assigned, it is hard not to feel 
as if the pairing of title and number is quite deliberate in this piece. The number 
thirteen—a traditionally unlucky number in Western civilization—is also a symbol of the 
devil. At the same time, in the musical context it is a representation of excess: 13 extends 
beyond the closed 12 of the completed chromatic scale, and indeed beyond the initially 
envisioned 12 études for the set. The devil is implicitly at work here, in a dangerous 
striving to go beyond the realm of the possible: the piece itself features a series of rising 
patterns that each reach a breaking point (an extreme volume at the top of the keyboard) 
and then restart from the bottom. 
Although loosely notated in 12/8, the piece consists of running quavers that are 
split into irregular small divisions within larger groups of 36. The primary structural 
feature of the Étude is a layering of multiple patterns that gradually accumulate density 
and rise from the bottom to the top of the keyboard, reaching several points of climax 
that are articulated by register as well as by dynamic. This continuum is punctuated by a 
contrasting choral texture, which occurs twice throughout the piece, first in bars 26-34 
(B) and then in bars 38-43 (B’).  Whereas the primary texture is horizontal and ascending 
(even if its horizontality is densely layered), the contrasting sections are vertical, and 
employ the entire range of the piano at once. Dividing the piece according to textural 
features leads to the following structure: 
Section Bar Number 
A Bars 1-26 
B Bars 26-34 
A’ Bars 35-38 
B’ Bars 38-32 
A’’ Bars 43-46 
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 In keeping with the cyclical nature of the piece, we might understand it in a roughly 
rotational structure. Within the A section (bars 1-26), there are four internal rotations. 
Each of these culminates in a breaking point beyond which the pattern cannot ascend, 
and then the next rotation returns to a lower register, from which it begins its ascent 
anew. In the A section, each subsequent breaking point increases in intensity. The first 
two climb in both register and volume. The climax at bar 6 arrives on D7 at fff; the 
second climax, at bar 10, arrives on B8 at ffff (see Figures 10.1 and 10.2). 
 The third rotation introduces a new feature. Alongside the rising pattern—in this 
instance given only in the left hand—the right hand introduces a simultaneous melodic 
line. As the left hand reaches its ‘breaking point’ (partway through bar 17, on C#7 at ffff) 
and begins to restart from the bottom, the right hand melody continues with a series of 
rising chords, that this time reach up to ffffff. The fourth rotation, finally, extends to the 
very top of the keyboard, remaining ffffff (and sempre tutta la forza, estremo) for an entire 
page, until it is interrupted by the B section. 
 
 
Figure 10.1. Étude 13: L’Escalier du diable, Section A, first climax, bar 6.3 
 
 
3Ligeti (1998) 49. 
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Figure 10.2. Étude 13: L’Escalier du diable, Section A, second climax, bar 10.4 
 
During the chorale B interlude, ringing open chords imitate wildes Glockengeläute 
(wild ringing of bells) and the entire range of the keyboard is used.  The B section begins 
by building, before hushing to a subito ppp at bar 33 and remaining in muted ranges 
(between pppp and p), subtly bleeding into the return of section A. The A’ section is 
texturally similar to the opening, but this time begins in the middle of the keyboard. 
Rather than featuring a series of internal rotations, it ascends much more quickly, 
reaching the top of the keyboard within a few bars. The second rotation of the B section 
is similarly condensed. Instead of building to a climax and then calming down, B’ simply 
builds, reaching a climactic chord at an outrageous ffffffff. The end of B’ articulates a 
crucial climax, after which the A’’ rotation leads directly into the coda and concludes. 
Before A’’, there is the only moment of silence in the piece until the end, a crotchet + 
quaver rest in which the resonance of ffffffff clears before the rising can begin again, this 
time doubled in both hands at the octave. A’’ does not reach a breaking point, but instead 
the left-hand pattern drops off, replaced by the ringing gongs of section B, which this 
time descend. Finally, the left hand reaches the lowest notes of the piano and the right 
 
4Ligeti (1998), 50. 
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hand reaches the top, an open chord sustained while gradually releasing the pedal until 
the piece ends with silenzio assoluto. 
This formal structure simulates a failed attempt to achieve something impossible: 
impossibly climbing a ‘devil’s staircase’. The sections consist of perpetually rising cycles, 
simulating the sonic effect of a Shepard tone: an auditory illusion that sounds like an 
infinitely rising set of pitches.5 It is only in the last moments of the piece when both 
hands reach the edges of the keyboard that the illusion of infinite rising and falling must 
come to an end. The form itself comes to terms with the fact that instrument does 
indeed have wooden limits (see Figure 10.3). The piece suddenly halts on this final 
extreme chord as if to both to acknowledge the impossibility of continuing further, but 
gesture towards the possibility that the piece might have continued. 
 
 
Figure 10.3. Étude 13: L'Escalier du diable, bars 51-52. Final chord on the highest and lowest notes.6 
Ligeti in Duisburg 
In a project incorporating more than 40 students from the Elly-Heuss-Knapp Gymnasium 
and the Buchholzer Waldschule, choreographers Yasha Wang and her assistant Judith 
 
5Bazaras (2019). 
6 Ligeti (1998), 61. 
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Nussler collaboratively created choreography to five of Ligeti’s études with the 
participating students.7 As Wang describes, ‘The starting point for the choreography of 
"L'escalier du diable"...was an emotional and content-related examination of the image of 
the "Devil's Stairway". So the students dealt with the themes of eternity, power 
apparatus, struggle and repression and related emotions such as anger, fear, despair, 
hopelessness or depression. Based on the collected impressions, a choreography was 
developed which tries to discover how the body behaves in such situations and 
emotional states.’8 The themes that Wang describes are very much related to those of 
failure that I have discussed in Étude 9. The theme of eternity, for example, is always 
connected with failure, as to demonstrate or comprehend the infinite is also to recognise 
our own finitude—failure—by comparison. Likewise, struggle is a way of ‘[performing] the 
efforts required to imagine and push the body to work beyond its given limit’,9 as Bailes 
describes. 
A video of the project shows the students experimenting with movement while 
listening to ‘L’escalier du diable’. In this video, students walk in time with the music in 
random directions. Each time the music changes, they turn to face a new direction, as if 
recognising an error and seeking a new path. Crucially, the choreography also involves 
assistance. The students do not walk alone, but rather in pairs; one stands behind, holding 
the other by the shoulders. On the one hand, the student in front seems to be the guide, 
 
7‘Teilprojekt 3 – Ligeti in Duisburg’ www.klavierfestival.de. 
8‘Der Ausgangspunkt für die Choreographie von „L’escalier du diable“ hingegen war eine emotional-inhaltliche 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bild der „Teufelstreppe“. So beschäftigten sich die Schüler mit den Themen 
Ewigkeit, Machtapparat, Kampf und Verdrängung sowie damit verbundenen Emotionen wie Wut, Angst, 
Verzweiflung, Ausweglosigkeit oder Depression. Ausgehend von den gesammelten Eindrücken wurde 
gemeinsam eine Choreographie entwickelt, die zu entdecken versucht, wie sich der Körper in solchen 
Situationen und emotionalen Zuständen verhält.’ translation mine. ‘Teilprojekt 3 – Ligeti in Duisburg’ 
www.klavierfestival.de. 
9Bailes (2011), 119. 
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walking in front of the other and choosing directions. On the other hand, the gesture of 
holding by the shoulders—rather than, say, by the hand—conjures the impression that the 
student behind is helping and holding the one in front. As a result, the choreography 
demonstrates not only the struggle of the piece, but also the assistance, repair, and 
collaborative reparation that goes along with failure. For Bailes, the demonstration of 
failure is also ‘the discovery of how to accommodate an impediment or weakness…; 
learning how to deal with damage and the restoration it might call for’.10 Here, this is 
shown beautifully in the image of students assisting each other in a constant 
accommodation of new directions. 
The project on the whole also emphasises the collaborative nature of pedagogy, as 
well as of failure. As Moten and Harney say, ‘study is something we do together… talking 
and walking around with other people, working, dancing, suffering, some irreducible 
convergence of all three’.11 I was struck by the choreographer’s emphasis that the 
choreography was developed first by the students’ improvisation, and then through a 
collaborative process of creation.12 The use of improvised movement to determine ‘how 
the body moves in such situations and emotional states’—as Wang describes—is also an 
extreme manifestation of the étude as a practice of embodiment. In this respect, the way 
the student dancers use Ligeti’s étude is not dissimilar to what the pianist does. Both 
allow the étude to direct the movements of their body as a way of learning. 
 
10Bailes (2011), 119. 
11Moten and Harney (2013), 110. 
12‘Die tänzerischen Formen wurden dabei zunächst improvisatorisch erarbeitet. In Kleingruppen von drei bis 
vier Schülern entwickelten die Projektteilnehmer eigene Tanzbewegungen, die dann zu einer 
Choreographie zusammengefügt wurden.’ <www.klavierfestival.de> 
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Inside the Score and Aimard’s Masterclasses 
The use of the étude as a way of embodied learning is most explicit, of course, for 
performers. Aimard emphasises this by incorporating a masterclass into his ‘Inside the 
Score’ project for L’escalier du diable. On the interactive score, a symbol with the letter 
“M” signifies a masterclass excerpt for the corresponding passage (see Figure 10.4). The 
clips are from a masterclass in which Aimard gave a public lesson to pianist Simon Smith 
at the Aldeburgh Festival in 2014. 
 
Figure 10.4. Screenshot of the annotated score on the Inside the Score website13 
	
Not only does the idea of a masterclass exemplify the ‘practical demonstration of 
pedagogy’14 that a theory of failure applies, Aimard consistently emphasises themes of 
failure, impossibility, and pain in his comments to the pianist. 
For example, Aimard reminds the pianist that Ligeti’s original title for L’escalier du 
 
13 <www.explorethescore.org/györgy-ligeti-piano-works-inside-the-score-étude-13.html> 
14Bailes (2011) 
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diable was ‘Sisyphus’, to emphasise the eternal struggle that the pianist must undergo. 
The general theme of Aimard’s comments throughout the masterclass is that the pianist 
must demonstrate more effort, difficulty, and struggle throughout. He refers to Ligeti’s 
poetic title frequently in the annotated score, claiming that the pianist should ‘feel [his] 
effort climbing the staircase’. Of the opening bars, he asks the pianist: ‘how can we give 
the impression when we play of this permanent effort that leads nowhere?’15 
One example to which he returns continually is the piece’s dynamics. Aimard is 
particular interested in the masterclass in ensuring that Smith follows the sudden dynamic 
contrasts in the piece. For Aimard, returning all the way to piano volume (in bar 6, for 
example) ‘will generate the right dramaturgy’16 so that the feeling of an endless, 
impossible staircase can emerge. Likewise, he asks Smith repeatedly to play less in bar 10, 
when the rising melody begins again, this time at ppp, using ‘the minimum of élan so that 
the sound can speak’.17 
The highest dynamics are equally important for Aimard as a demonstration of 
effort. At the ‘peak’ of the first rising section, Ligeti notates ‘tutta la forza’ once the pianist 
has reached the very top of the piano (bar 24); a bar later, the pianist is reminded ‘sempre 
tutta la forza. estremo’. However, the frail piano strings at the top of the instrument, the 
thinning texture, and the very response of the instrument, make it futile to play with full 
force and impossible to be perceived as doing so. Aimard tells the pianist instead to play 
with ‘all your psychological strength’ and to use ‘quite a monstrous effort’18 The same is 
true of other expressive markings. In bar 17, successive dynamic markings are notated: 
fff, ffff, fffff, and finally, ffffff; later, in bars 42-43, the crescendo is from ff to ffff to ffffff to 
ffffffff (see Figure 10.5). While the pianist may indeed increase in decibels between each 
 
15Aimard, Masterclass, bar 1, 00:55-00:58 <www.explorethescore.org>. 
16Aimard, Masterclass, bar 6, 00:31-00:34 <www.explorethescore.org>. 
17Aimard, Masterclass, bar 10, 00:59-1:00 <www.explorethescore.org>. 
18Aimard (2017) 
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chord, subtle variations between fffff, ffffff, and ffffffff are hardly designed to be precise. 
Rather, the impression is the opposite: these dynamics convey the sense of extremes, 
and encourage the pianist not to obey them literally but to give everything she has, 
knowing that it cannot be enough. His direction that the dynamics are not to be taken 
literally but rather metaphorically also emphasises that in themselves, these dynamics are 
designed to be impossible. He calls them ‘an invitation to use a sound that will not be 
seen as beautiful in the traditional acoustic language… a sound that is almost distorted 
somewhere’.19 
 
Figure 10.5. Étude 13: L'Escalier du diable, bars 42-43. Extreme dynamics.20 	
	 One might also look to the ending of the piece to find more instructions and 
invitations to both extend the limits of the body, and acknowledge the impossibility of 
doing so. The piece ends with the pianist playing at the extreme ranges of the piano at 
ffffffff, a passage that Aimard describes as ‘an invitation to the interpreter...to go beyond 
his own borders’.21 This passage finishes with a long chord--during which the pedal is to 
be released gradually--then two bars of rest, then a final bar of rest with a pause (marked 
 
19‘Pierre-Laurent Aimard on playing L’Escalier du diable’ , 04:17-04:30, www.explorethescore.org 
20 Ligeti (1998), 59. 
21‘Pierre-Laurent Aimard on playing L’Escalier du diable’ , 04:38-04:41, www.explorethescore.org 
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silenzio assoluto). Even though the piece ends with a pause on the rest, the number of 
bars between the final strike of a chord and the ending is precisely notated: the chord is 
to be held for 9.5 bars of 12/8, though the slurs stretching into the empty bar ahead 
suggest it can still ring beyond (see Figure 10.6). If the ringing is imprecise, how 
necessary is it to count? If it is unnecessary to count, why did Ligeti not simply mark a 
long pause on the chord? Aimard suggests that the task for the performer is to ask: ‘how 
should we find the resonance impossibly long?’22 And how indeed—for of course no 
length is literally ‘impossibly long’! This is another instance in which precision paradoxically 
creates the feeling (both for the performer and the audience) of excess. 
By gesturing towards a Sisyphean infinite, L’Escalier du diable reminds us of its own 
inadequacies. As listeners and performers, we become aware of the finitude of the work, 
itself constrained by the finitude of our listening and performing bodies. As Aimard says, 
‘All the lines are blocked by the border, by the limits of the instrument—the world…. So 
they fight against the limits of the instrument quite dramatically’.23 Yet the limits of the 
étude are not, evidently, confined to pianists who can play them. By opening this analysis, 
understanding, and pedagogy up to a wider audience, Aimard and Klavierfestival Ruhr 
have also invited listeners and participants into the process of becoming aware of, 
working through, accepting, and accommodating these limits. This accommodation allows 
us to continue striving for the impossible, rather than being constrained by our inability to 
achieve it. It is this pedagogical aspect of the Étude 13, L’Escalier du diable, that allows us 
to imagine a world in which we are not so much daunted by the infinitude of our tasks, 
but rather inspired and transformed. 
 
22‘Pierre-Laurent Aimard on playing L’Escalier du diable’ , 05:40-05:48, www.explorethescore.org 
23‘Pierre-Laurent Aimard on playing L’Escalier du diable’ , 05:40-05:48, www.explorethescore.org 
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Figure 10.6. Étude 13: L'Escalier du diable, bar 50. Ending.24 
	
 
24Ligeti (1998), 61. 
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Étude 11: Technologies of the Impossible—
Conlon Nancarrow’s Studies for Player Piano 
	
Nancarrow is teeming with energy and the very stuff of human existence, 
  - Michael Finnissy1 
	
Before John Cage explored the impossibilities of translating stellar bodies onto human 
ones, and Ligeti crafted Études that at once demand and resist the failure of the 
performer, another composer—whose work was a formative influence on both Cage and 
Ligeti—had used the genre of the piano study to explore the boundaries of the human 
body in a slightly different way. The American composer Conlon Nancarrow began 
composing a series of studies for piano after he moved to Mexico City in 1940, writing 
nearly 50 studies between the late 1940s and the 1980s. Rather than being written for 
human pianists, though, the pieces were instead written for an instrument that was at the 
time already archaic: the player piano.2 Although these pieces originally emerged out of 
the compositional practice that he had begun for live instruments, Nancarrow’s Studies for 
Player Piano became inextricably linked to their medium of performance and methods of 
creation. Through these instruments, Nancarrow developed a novel language of musical 
composition, so striking and original that when Györgi Ligeti first came across his music 
he wrote that Nancarrow’s music was ‘the greatest discovery since Webern and Ives… 
 
1Whittall (2006), 2. 
2At the time of writing, a 1991 Wergo recording of most of the studies can be found on YouTube at 
www.youtube.com/GENsMqIDT0 [accessed 2 July 2019] and www.youtube.com/TDs-gh3Bt1Y 
[accessed 2 July 2019] 
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the best of any today living composer’.3 Nancarrow’s compositional output remains some 
of the most original experimentation in temporality and complexity of the past century, 
and it has had a direct impact on composers and musical movements from Ligeti and 
John Cage, to the ultra-complex YouTube genre Black Midi.   
Nancarrow remains the most prolific composer for the instrument, and it is the 
ingenuity and experimentation of his work for player piano that brought him from relative 
obscurity to winning a MacArthur Grant in 1982, which would solidify his status amongst 
the canon of American avant garde composers of his generation. Ligeti’s involvement in 
Nancarrow’s rise to fame is well-established. As the story goes, he had discovered a 
record of Nancarrow’s by accident in Paris in 1980. He wrote to Charles Amirkhanian, 
Nancarrow’s friend and promoter, ‘I listened to this music and became immediately 
enthusiastic.…. His music is so utmost original, enjoyable, constructive, and at the same 
time emotional’.4 From this point onwards, Nancarrow became well-known in European 
musical contexts, fielding—and often rejecting, due to his reclusive and shy nature—
invitations and provocations to tour, visit, and perform his works abroad. 
Much earlier, though, John Cage had also played a role in promoting Nancarrow 
outside of Mexico. It was Cage who first facilitated the ‘performance’ of the Studies for 
Player Piano. Cage had received a copy of Nancarrow’s tapes in 1960 from John Edmund, 
a librarian in New York. He and David Tudor arranged for these to be used by Merce 
Cunningham’s dance company, using excerpts from the first seven Studies in the dance 
pieces Crises and Cross-Currents. These performances took places using tapes, which 
Cage started and stopped, while David Tudor managed the tone control and amplitude 
 
3Letter from Ligeti to Charles Amirkhanian, 4 Jan 1981. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, Paul Sacher 
Foundation. 
4Letter from Ligeti to Charles Amirkhanian, 4 Jan 1981. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, Paul Sacher 
Foundation 
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live.5 Nancarrow was more sceptical about the attention he received from John Cage. In 
fact, his friend Minna Daniel was forced to apologise in 1964 for suggesting that 
Nancarrow’s music be included in a Cunningham piece.6 However, Cage, Tudor, and 
Nancarrow eventually met on a Mexican tour of the Cunningham Dance Company 
(alongside Gordon Mumma) and had cordial relations thereafter. 
In an interview Cage and Nancarrow gave together at Telluride in 1989, the pair 
each remark on their first live encounters with the others’ music. In both cases, these 
were in fairly private and intimate settings. Nancarrow claims his first experience of Cage 
was at a personal concert of Cage’s prepared piano music in New York.7 Meanwhile, 
Cage’s first live encounter with Nancarrow’s music was on his 1958 visit to Mexico with 
the Merce Cunningham Dance Company, in which he heard the Studies for Player Piano in 
Nancarrow’s own studio and on his pianos. He recounts the experience: 
Oh, good heavens. I still have that excitement hearing your work. But I think in the 
room itself, in the room in Mexico City, with the actual instruments, it is quite an 
unforgettable experience.8 
It was so unforgettable for Cage, in fact, that he would eventually include an anecdote 
about player pianos in a mesostic. In the tale, he describes a fictional account of Erik Satie 
visiting Nancarrow, in which the pianos effectively come alive: 
nancarrow turns thEm on / satie lies on the flooR / the pianos move toward hIm / 
 
5Letter from John Cage to Conlon Nancarrow, February 18 1965, ‘Conlon Nancarrow Collection’, Paul 
Sacher Foundation. 
6‘It distresses me that my quite casual remarks…about how I thought your music would fit into a Cunningham 
program (not a Cage one mind you) should so disturb you.’ Letter from Minna Daniel to Conlon 
Nancarrow,  ‘Conlon Nancarrow Collection’, Paul Sacher Foundation. 
7The pair argued about the precise date of this event during their Telluride conversation, but evidence 
suggests it likely took place in 1947. 
8Cage and Nancarrow (1989). 
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but in the nicK of time they thematically / pull themSelves up / so there's sufficient 
spAce / for Them / to roll over hIm without hurting him / in thE / lEast, satie is 
touched / but not physically i am veRy / pianIstic he says / but i have never Known / 
Such/ good behAvior / on The part / of musIcal / instrumEnts.9 
Nancarrow is often quoted as saying that ‘ever since I’d been writing music I was 
dreaming of getting rid of the performers’.10 Indeed, he crafted his pieces meticulously, 
and spent most of his composing life alone within the confines of a small studio, exerting 
careful control over all aspects of his music and its dissemination. The Studies are 
extremely complex, and surpass the bounds of human performance in terms of speed, 
temporal intricacy, and density. Influenced in particular by a desire to manipulate and 
control tempo, the studies layer multiple independent tempos at ratios that are too 
complex to either perform or understand audibly. Sometimes, these even use irrational 
tempo relationships. 
Most critical commentary on the Studies for Player Piano takes these features as a 
starting point, and assumes that the Studies are dehumanised and disembodied works, 
emerging from a desire to eliminate the contingencies, frailties, and potential failures of 
the human body. For example, the first extensive commentary on these works appeared 
in SOUNDINGS, a publication of contemporary music edited by Peter Garland, which in 
1977 dedicated its fourth volume exclusively to Nancarrow.11 The publication included 
essays by Gordon Mumma, Charles Amirkhanian, Roger Reynolds, and James Tenney, 
alongside scores of several of the pieces. The most extensive of the essays is Tenney’s, 
which offers a thorough and extremely rich analysis of the construction of the pieces, 
focusing on tempo relationships and formal structures.12 In the decades since, following 
 
9Cage (1983), 66-67. 
10Amirkhanian (1977), 15. 
11Garland, ed. (1977). 
12Tenney (1977). 
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in Tenney’s excellent example, rhythm has been the primary focus of analytical discourse 
about the pieces, including several dissertations13 and numerous articles. Kyle Gann’s 
biography of Nancarrow, which offers a comprehensive overview of the studies, also 
focuses on rhythm as a primary subject and subscribes to the notion of pure 
mechanisation as the central feature of the works. As Gann describes, the player piano 
allowed Nancarrow to explore ‘more aspects of rhythmic superimposition and tempo 
clash than any other composer had dreamed of doing’.14 
More recent studies discuss Nancarrow’s output in terms of cultural history. These, 
too, have tended to take their technological independence for granted. For example, 
David Suisman’s history of the player piano frames Nancarrow in terms of capitalism and 
alienation, suggesting that his compositional technique approaches a future-oriented 
technological utopia. According to Suisman, Nancarrow ‘swept aside [the player piano’s] 
nominally mimetic character—the implication that it would convey only existing forms of 
music’15. Alison Rebecca Wente, whose doctoral thesis on the music of Nancarrow was 
concerned specifically with labour politics, also interprets the pieces as mechanized and 
anti-human; she characterises Nancarrow’s player piano as a mechanical performer, who 
allows for ‘new pianistic executions unlimited by any real performer’s technique.’16 
Eric Drott’s excellent analysis of Study no. 5 and Study no. 33, meanwhile, 
recognizes that a purely mechanical explanation for these pieces is insufficient. In 
response, he compares their awe-inspiring incomprehensibility with the Romantic awe of 
incomprehensible nature, calling them an instance of ‘the technological sublime’.17 The 
concept of the technological or mathematical sublime is, for Drott, a way of 
 
13See, for example. Thomas (1996), and Wilkes (2001). 
14Gann (1995), 2. 
15Suisman (2010), 30. (emphasis mine) 
16Wente (2016), 199. 
17Drott (2004), 53–63. 
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understanding why and how these works seem to transcend their mechanical medium. 
However, it accounts only for the notes and sounds contained in the pieces and does 
little to address another important element of the works: their relationship to the body 
and to the human. As Julian Johnson notes, ‘The elements of jazz and boogie-woogie 
imply a human performer, but the improbably rapid speeds and the complexity of the 
layers demonstrate the mechanical transcendence of the humanly possible. The interest 
of the music, however, lies precisely in this blurring of the boundaries between virtuosity 
and impossibility.’18 Indeed, what makes this music compelling, interesting, and as Michael 
Finnissy writes ‘teeming...with the very stuff of human existence’19 is not just the 
complexity of its mathematical and technological display, but also the proximity of this 
technology to the human body. 
In this chapter, I argue that although Nancarrow did not write études for human 
performers, he still used the genre of the étude to probe and expand the limits of the 
human body. From a practical perspective, the composition of the works was the product 
of a network of social relations that included both bodies and machines. Their notation—
which exists in multiple forms—is only made audible through human-machine 
interactions. In performance, the experience of listening suggests the behaviour of human 
bodies and engages the body of the listener. By virtue of being called ‘studies’, too, these 
pieces pose questions about what constitutes a musical performer, who is capable of 
learning, and the interactive relationship between human and machine in the creation of 
musical events. This analysis uses posthuman theory and new materialism, relying on the 
assumption that to sharply delineate between human and machine is arbitrary, and that 
artistic creation happens within a network of human and nonhuman relations. 
 
18Johnson (2015), 144-145. 
19Finnissy, quoted in Whittall (2006), 2. 
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The mechanical body of the player piano 
The instrument of the player piano itself has a close relationship to embodiment. Despite 
the absurdity of Cage’s mesostic above, his description of the moving, walking player 
piano is apt. Although Nancarrow’s pianos—both uprights—do not even have legs, they 
have a remarkably life-like quality. When plugged in, the immediate whirring of the 
bellows and whirls of the mechanism as the machine is turned on makes the pianos seem 
lifelike, with inflating lungs and a pulsing heartbeat. The player piano operates by means 
of a perforated roll of thin paper, which is rotated on a spool inside the instrument. As 
the roll spins, air is blown through the mechanism. Each time the air passes through a 
perforation, this activates the instrument such that the corresponding note is struck on 
the piano. 
Early marketing of the instrument often highlighted its capacity to be a substitute 
for the human. One of the commonly advertised uses of the player piano in the 1910s 
and 1920s was as accompaniment to a (usually female) singer or instrumentalist in the 
home. A 1921 advertisement in The Literary Digest claims that ‘in thousands of homes the 
Gulbransen has freed busy women from the drudgery of hand-practising their 
accompaniments’.20 Developments in the addition of expressive capabilities to the player 
piano were largely advertised as desirable for their proximity to human accomplishment. 
Brian Dolan, for example, remarks on the way player piano advertisements ‘proclaimed 
that the music on the rolls “captured” the artists’ individuality and expression’.21 Equally, 
the player piano was an important precursor to recording technology, and the distribution 
of player piano rolls created by specific performers and composers—Reinecke, Debussy, 
and Scriabin are among those composers who created piano rolls for public distribution—
literalise its aspirations to emulate a human being. These examples suggest the way the 
 
20Literary Digest (1921), 39. 
21Dolan (2009), xvi. 
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player piano was seen to both replace and imitate the human body, and even to act as an 
active, non-human collaborator alongside human performers.22 
 
Figure 11.1. Gulbransen Player Piano Advertisement.23 
	
As Huneman and Wolfe note, the association between machines and embodiment 
can be traced to the early modern period. They argue that early modern materialism 
interpreted mechanism and automata ‘as engagements with the organizational 
complexities of living being’, arguing that this association only faded in the early 20th 
 
22As the study of musical organology also tells us, there has always been a close relationship between 
keyboard instruments and the human body—and indeed even the term organology is tellingly derived 
from organon, which refers to both instrument and body. See Emily Dolan and John Tresch (2013). 
23The Literary Digest (November 1921), 39. 
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century.24 A lingering ‘historico-scientific dialectic of materialism and vitalism in…the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’25 evidently lasted in the reception and marketing of 
these new automatic instruments. 
The technology of the instrument—using air blown through perforated holes—is 
closely related to computing technology. Perforation is itself a form of digital inscription, 
which—like computing technology—relies on binary logic to store information. 
Information is stored digitally in the form of a 1 or a 0: a hole, or the absence of a hole. 
Despite the seemingly analogue nature of hand-played roll technology (in which playing is 
recorded directly onto the roll), the information is encoded in a distinctly digital storage 
mode. There is nothing inherent about the code of perforations that necessitates that it 
be replayed as those specific notes on the keyboard, nor is there anything about the code 
that requires that it manifest as musical notes at all. 
Rothenbuhler and Peters’ ‘Defining Phonography’ identifies the relationship 
between music and encoding as the key distinction between analogue and digital 
recording technology.26  Analogue recording technology—such as the phonograph—
directly corresponds to the sounds themselves, and can only be replayed as a replica 
(however distorted or faded) of those very sounds. On the other hand, digital recording 
technology—such as the Compact Disk—encodes abstracted information, that can be 
adapted, modified and transformed. Such a distinction, as Suisman notes in ‘Sound, 
Knowledge, and the “Immanence of Human Failure”: Rethinking Musical Mechanization 
through the Phonograph, the Player-Piano, and the Piano’, does not take into account the 
player piano’s capacity as a recording technology to blur such distinctions: though 
analogical in its method, its form of information storage is decidedly digital. 
 
24Huneman and Wolfe (2010), 275. 
25Huneman and Wolfe (2010), 275. 
26Rothenbuhler and Peters (1997), 
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For Nancarrow, the player piano is not being used as a form of recording 
technology, of course, but even still, such blurring of dichotomies remains. As Roger 
Moseley describes, this boundary is already transcended in any keyboard. In ‘Digital 
Analogies’, Moseley contends that the keyboard operates as a ‘field of play’ in which the 
binary operation of the pianist’s digits combines with the instrument’s musical capability 
to ‘give form to imaginative impulses: in short, to operate analogically’.27 The player piano 
then accentuates this tension, given its additional capacity to record and process digital 
information. In this respect, we should recognise it as what Katherine Hayles calls an 
‘inscription technology’: ‘a device [that initiates] material changes that can be read as 
marks’.28  Yet inscription is only one part of the device’s mechanism and capability for 
information storage and recognition. Although the information stored on the piano roll is 
digital—and therefore can be read on any number of other devices, transferred into MIDI 
files, or even used to produce a completely different set of sonic (or non-sonic) data—the 
experience of watching and producing the music is inseparable from its material.  For 
Hayles, this is called ‘incorporation’: ‘an incorporating practice such as a good-bye wave 
cannot be separated from its embodied medium’.29 One of my goals in this chapter is to 
explore the way that ‘incorporating practices are in constant interplay with inscriptions 
that abstract the practices into signs’,30 drawing a relationship between embodiment and 
the body through Nancarrow’s player piano studies. The music of the player piano is 
inscribed information, but the ghostly presence it conjures up is incorporated. 
 
27Moseley (2015), 192. 
28Hayles (2002), 24. 
29Hayles (1999), 199. 
30Hayles (1999), 200. 
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The material composition of the studies 
Nancarrow’s lively instruments also contain their own complex material history, spanning 
many countries and continents and including a network of other actors. Nancarrow 
himself began composing for player piano in the late 1940s.  At the time, he was living in 
Mexico City, but paid a visit to New York in 1947 for the specific purpose of acquiring a 
player piano. While in New York, he successfully located an instrument that he could 
bring back with him. The technology of the instrument is not, however, limited to the 
actual mechanism of the piano itself; Nancarrow also required a device for punching 
holes into the roll. The very machine used by Nancarrow is one that he had made 
specifically for the purpose. Even the story of its acquisition and construction is a 
complicated tale of bodies and machines, and social relationships between the two. As 
Nancarrow recounted it in an interview with Kyle Gann in 1989: 
I met this guy, J. Lawrence Cook, who worked [at QRS, the player piano roll 
company]. They had these big machines that mass-produced player piano rolls, 
punching a hundred at a time. But he had — it had nothing to do with the factory — a 
little punching machine for things he wanted to do that couldn’t be done on the big 
machines. Nothing as complicated as I’ve been doing…. Since I didn’t know that these 
things could be bought, I asked him — he was a very nice guy — if he’d mind if I got 
that copied by something. He said, ‘Of course not’. 
 I didn’t know who to get to copy it, but I was walking through the Village, and 
there was a shop there, run by a weird guy who repaired old instruments, lutes, and 
all kinds of Baroque and Renaissance instruments. I started talking to him, and I 
happened to mention that I was looking for someone who could copy a roll punching 
machine. He didn’t know anything about it, but by coincidence he had a friend who 
had a machine shop, who was an absolutely accurate metal worker. And I got him to 
go up to the Bronx with me and look at this machine and take all the measurements. 
And he made that…. When I got back to Mexico and started using it, right away I saw 
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all kinds of limitation and things that had to be changed. Also luckily, I found this 
fantastic mechanic in Mexico who rebuilt that machine.31 
He told this story—a tale of innovation and imitation, of intention and chance, of human 
and machine—on at least one other occasion, with the details slightly changed, which 
suggests that we might not want to take the details too seriously. Regardless of its 
accuracy, however, it is clear that the creation of Nancarrow’s works, and specifically his 
notated scores, involved and implicated large numbers of people and objects—assistants 
and machinists, original artifacts and functional copies. Indeed, the anecdote exemplifies 
the complicated material and social processes of music-making, in which machines and 
humans are equally interactive contributory agents. 
The punching machine is only one among many specific material objects that were 
necessary in the creation of Nancarrow’s unusual studies.	For example, his process of 
composition and notation began in each case with establishing underpinning tempo and 
rhythm relationships for the piece. These were first notated on a ‘punching score’: 
essentially, a short-hand score on staff notation which represented the eventual locations 
for perforations in the roll. In the early studies, tempo relationships of 3/4/5 were fairly 
easy to draw out on the punching score using ruled subdivisions. In general, he reduced 
these relationships to their lowest common denominator, which he used as a unit of 
measurement.32 As Nancarrow’s rhythmic explorations became more complicated, he 
developed more sophisticated notational methods for marking tempo relationships. In 
particular, he kept hundreds of pre-made strips of paper on which he had drawn the 
subdivisions for different tempo relationships, from ‘increase by 5%’ to ‘e/pi’.  (Although 
once strewn all over the studio, they are now housed demurely in a card-cabinet at the 
 
31Gann (1995), 43-44. Gann (1995), 43-44.  This story is also relayed with slightly different details to Charles 
Amirkhanian in an interview published in Conlon Nancarrow: Selected Studies for Player Piano, ed. Peter 
Garland (Berkeley: Soundings Book 4), 1977) 
32This was also necessary due to the nature of his punching machine, as I will explain later. 
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Paul Sacher Foundation. with labels on each of the drawers categorising the kind of 
tempo-relationships inside, and a large number of blank strips on which future tempo 
graphs might have been imagined).  At his long bespoke desk—which even featured a 
built-in rolling chair that could slide from one end of the desk to the other—he would 
affix these strips to the top of both the punching score and the roll, transferring the 
relevant markings in order to determine note placement. 
After laying out the temporal framework on the punching score, the next step was 
to compose the notes. According to Nancarrow himself, this was the least important part 
of his process: ‘I don’t think of a line, but of a collection of temporal relationships, and, in 
fact, the melodic line is simply a crutch in order to realize certain temporal ideas’.33 
Perhaps it is precisely this lack of importance that makes the lines so memorable in their 
simplicity: as Reynolds writes, ‘The melodic invention[…] is always bound to the bones of 
the music in a way that feels entirely right.’34 He never spoke about his specific process 
for composing the melodies, deeming it unimportant. However, I like to imagine that he 
composed the melodies, at least in part, at the piano: especially since they so frequently 
fit neatly under the hand. 
Next, the notes and rhythms were transferred to the roll. The initial machine that 
he acquired in New York was equipped to punch only one hole at a time, which was a 
physically demanding and time-consuming process; Nancarrow claimed that it took him 
six months simply to notate a piece of music of a few minutes’ length. The machine had 
another drawback for Nancarrow: the placement of the holes was determined by notches 
that demarcated pitch in one direction, and time in the other. The necessity of placing the 
holes according to a pre-determined temporal grid eventually limited Nancarrow’s 
capacity for temporal experimentation, as it limited the shortest interval of time between 
 
33Nancarrow, quoted in Reynolds, ‘Inexorable Continuities’, Soundings 4, 28. 
34Reynolds (1977), 28. 
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two attacks to the distance between two notches on the machine, and this meant that all 
of the rhythms and tempos of the piece needed to accord to a multiple of this smallest 
interval. 
Eventually, Nancarrow found that he wanted to incorporate time intervals more 
detailed than the notches would allow. With the help of a mechanic in Mexico, the 
machine was modified to eliminate reliance on the notches. It is commonly suggested 
that this change was made at some point during the composition of Study no. 21. Helena 
Bugallo’s analysis of the study—using both the punching score and original rolls—
demonstrates specific ways in which the piece relied on both tools.35 After this point, he 
employed the new punching device for composing all of his future Studies, liberated from 
the constraints of a pre-determined smallest time interval. 
This demonstrates the dynamic between Nancarrow’s imagination and his material 
constraints. Nancarrow’s initial compositions took the features of the punching machine 
for granted. As he composed further, his imagination led him to understand a possibility 
for composing beyond these material constraints, constructing new musical temporalities. 
With mechanical assistance from others, he was able to realise this new possibility. The 
materiality of the new instrument then affected the kind of music he would create 
thereafter, the material tools that he would use to compose, and the compositional 
process. For example, his method of composing using tempo graph strips emerged 
because of the necessity of finding a lowest common denominator for the punching 
machine. However, he continued to use this method even after he had adjusted the 
device. The same is true of his habit of writing the tempo on the roll before beginning to 
compose. As he described in an interview with Kyle Gann: 
When I got into these complex multitempo things, I’d take a blank roll, and knowing 
before I’d even do it how long the piece would be, and what the proportions would 
 
35Bugallo (2004), 82. 
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be, draw out those proportions on the whole roll, with the smallest value I thought I’d 
be needing in the piece. Then I’d take the width of the score paper, from here to 
here, and draw it off on the roll that size, and take blank score paper and put all of 
these things on the blank paper. And then write the piece. Up to then there was no 
piece, just a tempo relationship.36 
This working method predates the creation of the modified machine, but Nancarrow 
maintained it thereafter. These relationships emphasise the inextricable connection 
between process, materials, bodies, and sounds in this music. 
Although Nancarrow was able to have the machine adapted to suit his temporal 
purposes, it was prone to breakdown. In the early part of the 1980s, almost all of 
Nancarrow’s letters mention some frustration with the punching machine slowing down 
his rate of composition.  From his letters, it would seem that he was without a 
functioning machine for at least six months in 1981. He wrote to Reynolds in August 
1981, ‘I forgot to tell you that my punching started to go bad about half way through one 
of the rolls of the Aleatory Round. After the machine was fixed I thought I could patch 
that part, but it became so messy that I decided to punch that half again. […] (The 
“aleatory” bit was not supposed to apply to wrong notes).’37 The ‘patching’ of mistakes is 
another notable part of Nancarrow’s process. Because sound is created by the passing of 
air, correcting an accidental note requires covering the hole. Nancarrow’s preferred 
method of doing so was using scotch tape to cover the hole, a laborious and messy 
process. It is worth noting that it also caused problems for his ability to copy and archive 
the rolls themselves. Since most methods of photocopying use light, they are unable to 
account for a hole that has been covered by (clear) tape. At some point in the early 
1980s, the mechanic who had been working with Nancarrow on his punching machine 
 
36Gann (1995), 30-31. 
37Letter from Conlon Nancarrow to Roger Reynolds, 24 August 1981. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, Paul 
Sacher Foundation. 
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retired, making repairs more difficult and less frequent. It would hardly seem coincidental 
that, as time went on, fewer of Nancarrow’s works were written for his player pianos.38 
Nancarrow’s own pianos, too, became collaborators in helping and hindering his 
compositional efforts. The majority of his pieces were written for and recorded on one of 
two Marshall and Wendell upright pianos that he kept in his studio. Just as he adapted 
the punching machine to suit his needs, he also adapted the pianos themselves in order 
to create the sound he wanted—in particular, to have a clarity of sound for such fast-
moving lines and to differentiate between registers: 
In the beginning, I tried various things. The first was called a mandolin attachment. It 
is a wooden strip with a lot of little leather straps fixed with metallic things that 
dangle in front of the strings. You can lower or raise the wooden strip, and I liked the 
idea that you could have a normal piano or altered sound. Unfortunately, it was a 
mess; the leather straps were always getting tangled in the strings, especially with 
loud playing. Then I tried soaking the hammers in lacquer, hardening the felt. That 
wasn’t too bad, but it wasn’t what I wanted. I tried various other things, then finally 
settled on these: one of them has hardwood hammers with steel straps over them 
and the other, felt hammers covered with leather in which are embedded the small 
snaps that are used in clothing. The felt cushions a little, then the leather, and then, 
that metallic snap.39 
The resulting sound on both instruments is harpsichord-like, in that there is a 
strong attack and quick decay. Additionally, the registers are clearly differentiated from 
each other. As Helena Bugallo describes in her 2004 dissertation, ‘the bass register is 
 
38The other reason that Nancarrow himself gave for returning to compositions for live performers is also a 
practical, material concern.  In a letter to Peter Garland, he admits: ‘I’m afraid I will have to drop the 
player piano bit. No money in it. Now I can get all the commissions I want for live pieces at fancy prices.’ 
Nancarrow to Garland, letter from 27 May 1987. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, Paul Sacher 
Foundation. 
39Jürgen Hocker, (1997), 23. 
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relatively weak and lacks resonance, the middle register is rather prominent, and the top 
register is brilliant yet not too distinct’40.  Bugallo also explains how Nancarrow wrote 
specifically for this dynamic profile, giving the example of Study no. 9, in which the 
ostinato layers are situated distinctly in three different registers of the piano.  Kyle Gann 
suggests that when reproduced on an instrument with equal registration, Nancarrow’s 
player piano pieces lose their effect: 
At New Music America in New York in 1989 the German composer/engineer 
Trimpin played his computer-driven version of Study No. 48 on two unaltered grand 
pianos; the sound was muddy, its contrapuntal clarity—so crystalline in Nancarrow’s 
studio—greatly diminished. The comprehensibility of the late studies depends on his 
altered piano hammers.41 
 In these examples, we see another way in which Nancarrow adapted the tools to suit his 
compositional desires, even as those same tools affected the kinds of choices he was 
likely to think of and make. 
One particular problem plagued Nancarrow throughout his compositional career: 
the difficulty of synchronising two player pianos. This difficulty comes from a feature of 
their notational mechanism: the spinning of the roll. The length of time it takes for the roll 
to spin is determined at every point by its diameter; as a result, the speed of the music 
increases as the piece goes along.  Nancarrow had no problem with this phenomenon on 
one piano alone, likening it to the way in which African drumming ensembles get faster 
over time.42 However, the unequal nature of this acceleration, given two separate rolls 
(which often have slightly different thicknesses of paper, for example), deeply troubled 
him in his efforts to write pieces for two instruments. After much frustration, he 
 
40Bugallo (2004), 39. 
41Gann (1995), 28. 
42As, indeed, do many pianists! 
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eventually settled on composing the Study no. 44 as what he called an ‘aleatory canon’, 
in which the two pianos could be played at any tempo relationship. Although this solution 
evidently bothered him, both his resignation and his efforts demonstrate the extent to 
which he was deliberately and expressly composing according to the limitations and 
capabilities of the compositional tools at his disposal, clearly attending to and respecting 
their material constraints. 
Thus far I have focused on describing two notated forms of Nancarrow’s player 
piano pieces: the punching score and the piano roll. However, the scores also exist in a 
third form, as traditionally notated scores on staff notation. The first of Nancarrow’s 
player piano pieces to be published in this way was the Study no. 1 (published as Rhythm 
Study no. 1) which appeared in New Music in 1951, submitted to the journal by Elliott 
Carter—apparently without Nancarrow’s knowledge. Nancarrow would meticulously write 
further printed scores throughout his career, apparently taking a break from composing 
new pieces and devoting himself to the task throughout the 1960s. Beginning from the 
Soundings volume in 1977, these would become published and disseminated. However, 
his motives for writing these scores prior to that volume are unclear, as he was in the 
habit of mailing tapes abroad to people he thought might be interested in his work, not 
sending them scores. A clue can be found in his correspondence with Aaron Copland, 
who wrote him a letter in February 1965 after receiving (apparently unprompted) three 
tapes of Nancarrow’s studies in the mail. Copland wrote to suggest that Nancarrow 
consider releasing the music on a commercial record, but warning that he should consider 
‘what the copyright situation would be in selling records of music not written down (I 
assume) and not copyrighted’.43 Was Nancarrow’s writing spree inspired by a fear of 
preserving copyright for his own music? If so, this additional notational form has its own 
deeply material origin: an attempt to claim intellectual property and thus remuneration. 
 
43Letter from Aaron Copland to Conlon Nancarrow, February 17 1965. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, Paul 
Sacher Foundation. 
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By tracing Nancarrow’s notational process in the unusual medium of the player 
piano, a few key observations about the posthuman construction of notation and 
composition of music have emerged. Firstly, the site of notation is itself dispersed. The 
player piano studies exist in several notated forms, including the punching score, the roll, 
and the traditional score. Thinking about notation as ‘a visual analogue of musical 
sound’,44 each of these can feasibly be considered notation, despite their very different 
roles, functional purposes, and legibility. Not only do these scores use different visual 
formats and different visual codes, the specific materiality of these is also key to the way 
they each operate. 
Most obviously, the piano roll is a form of notation that directly produces the 
sounds of the music by material means. Even though information is encoded digitally, the 
means by which this information is processed is material. When Nancarrow’s studies are 
performed on a player piano, they are typically executed using copies of Nancarrow’s 
original hand-punched rolls. Interestingly, these copies are liable to contain errors 
precisely because of a material aspect of Nancarrow’s musical process: in order to cover 
up holes punched by mistake, he used clear tape, which still appears as a hole when the 
rolls are copies using light. And even in cases in which the placement of holes is exactly 
identical from roll to roll, the precise thickness of the paper affects—subtly—both the 
overall tempo of the piece and the rate of acceleration as the size of the roll gradually 
diminishes. 
Secondly, Nancarrow’s ‘punching score’ was a necessary component of the 
compositional process, itself materially dependent on other materials and tools. His ability 
to compose on the punching score relied on tempo graph strips, a desk that could 
accommodate such sheets of paper, and various other implements—rulers, mathematical 
instruments—that he used to calculate and measure the tempo proportions. The 
 
44‘Notation’, Grove Music Online (2001). 
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punching score is usually at least partly legible to the reader, combining temporal 
elements from the roll and pitch representation on a staff. However, it is not functional as 
an aid for performance, nor was it intended to be read by anyone other than Nancarrow 
himself, as these scores were simply written as aids to assist in the eventual roll-
punching. 
Finally, the traditional scores of the studies are the least materially contingent, even 
if—as I have speculated—they may have been created specifically for the purposes of 
material remuneration to ensure copyright. It is also worth noting that, for both analytical 
and performance purposes, others have transcribed their own scores of the Studies for 
Player Piano.45 For example, Helena Bugallo’s doctoral dissertation proposes a ‘hybrid type 
of notation (combining both traditional and graphic elements) designed specifically for his 
player-piano music’46 in the course of her analysis. The necessity of such ‘transcriptions’ 
in order to read, think, and play the pieces also speaks to the material dispersal of 
notation. Notation exists in many forms, and no kind of notation alone is adequate for 
composer, analyst, or performer. This fact speaks not only to the ontology of notation, 
but also to the way these notational practices, and the instrument of the player piano, 
disrupt, disperse, and perforate the subjects of musical composition and performance. 
Not only is the actual site of notation dispersed, but it is also reliant on many other 
tools and machines, all of which had capabilities and constraints. These include the 
punching machine, the roll paper, the desk, and the pianos. These instruments required 
Nancarrow to change his behaviour in order to use them, but were also modified by 
 
45Some notable performance transcriptions of the Studies for Player Piano include Thomas Ades’ 
transcription of the Study no. 7 for two pianos (www.youtube.com/LPYWNod7OdQ), American 
experimental ensemble Alarm Will Sound’s performances of Study no. 2A (arr. Gordon Beeferman), Study 
no. 2a (arr. Gavin Chuck), Study no. 3A (arr. Derek Bermel), and Study no. 6 (arr. Yvar Mikhashoff), and 
transcriptions of numerous studies by the Bugallo-Williams Duo (Wergo, 2004). 
46Bugallo (2004), 3. 
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Nancarrow to suit his needs. For example, Nancarrow tampered with the hammers of his 
pianos in order to create a specific sonic effect; meanwhile, the distinct registration—
specific to his instruments and tampering—affected the way in which he composed, as in 
the use of three distinct layers in the Study no. 9. Likewise, as Nancarrow’s music 
increased in complexity, he modified his punching machine to create more specific and 
precise temporal subdivisions than the original machine would allow. Equally, the physics 
of roll diameter made the process of synchronizing two pianos too complicated, and 
affected his decision to compose his Study no. 44 as an aleatoric, rather than a strict, 
canon. 
Finally, Nancarrow’s notational process exposes the number of people and 
complexity of social relationships involved in creating and ‘reading’ Nancarrow’s notation. 
Practically, the punched roll is made possible by the punching machine which was 
fabricated and repaired by other (unnamed) agents, and which offers certain specific 
affordances. The notation is ‘read’ and ‘performed’ only by a non-human, the player piano 
itself—though this non-human performer, too, interacts with other human and non-
human agents to make the performance possible. Nancarrow’s original instruments were 
(and are) prone to breaking and were repaired by technicians (and Nancarrow himself). 
They went easily and quickly out of tune. Nancarrow himself added extensions and 
alterations to the hammers. Furthermore, the initial medium of transmission of the player 
piano studies was not in intimate, live performance, but by tapes, involving still more 
materials and humans, and further social networks of interaction. Take, for example, the 
major recording project of Nancarrow’s music undertaken in 1977 by 1750 Arch records 
in California, which involved significant input and collaboration from producer Charles 
Amirkhanian and the visiting recording engineers who came to Mexico City, as well as the 
equipment that they used to record in the specific acoustics of Nancarrow’s studio. 
Understanding the material conditions under which Nancarrow’s Studies for Player 
Piano were composed is necessary for a fuller picture of the pieces. The fact that 
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Nancarrow was writing for a mechanical instrument means that in order to talk about 
their composition and notation, the normal categories we use to talk about music are 
disrupted. Given the lack of a human performer, for example, it is unclear which form of 
notation—if any—is most relevant. Nancarrow’s unusual process highlights the specific 
material constraints and other human and non-human collaborators involved in the 
process of composition. Recognising these pieces as material is also necessary for 
understanding what they mean in performance, and in what ways they use the genre of 
the étude to extend and alter the limits of the human body. 
Nancarrow in Performance 
The material, social, and fragile features of Nancarrow’s music translate beyond notation 
into the performance and listening experience of these works. Nancarrow himself might 
have been suspicious of any suggestion that his music was predicated on liveness. He 
expressed a comedic disdain for his friends and colleagues for whom the experience of 
music centred on live performance: 
Once I had a discussion with Copland. He was discussing this thing of electronic, or 
mechanical, music. And he said, ‘You know I go to a concert, and to me it’s so exciting 
- -‘ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I don’t want the first horn to miss the note, but the fact that he 
MIGHT miss it - - the tension of MIGHT MISS IT is . . .’ (Laughing) No, but I told him 
I’d rather have a good recording where he hit the note! ‘No,’ he said, ‘that’s very 
boring because you know he’s going to hit it.’47 
And yet, whether he liked it or not, Nancarrow himself was aware that his instruments 
were just as troublesome as performers, only in different ways. When corresponding with 
Charles Amirkhanian, who produced the recording of his studies on 1750 Arch Records, 
Nancarrow warned Amirkhanian repeatedly about the possible breakdowns of his 
 
47Interview with Charles Amirkhanian, in Conlon Nancarrow: Selected Studies for Player Piano (1977), 15. 
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instruments during their recording process: 
Maybe I did not make it clear what happens when a string breaks on one of these 
pianos (which happens fairly often). On a normal piano to put a new string is fairly 
simple. With these pianos it is a major operation because one has to take the whole 
player mechanism apart just to get at the strings…. Apart from the fact that the more 
time the pianos are used the more likely that a string will break, after an hour or so of 
playing they begin to go out of tune.48 
Although these failures could be managed in recording, with patience and repeated takes, 
they made the possibility of truly live performance on Nancarrow’s own instruments 
almost impossible. 
Nancarrow’s response to this possibility of failure was—at least at first—to actively 
prevent live performances of his works. For several years in the early 1980s, the head of 
programming at the Westdeustcher Rundfunk, Wolfgang Becker, actively courted 
Nancarrow, proposing to transport his instruments and offer him a studio space in 
Germany, a proposal that Nancarrow flatly and repeatedly refused: ‘The idea of a live 
performance of my things is simply too complicated to even consider. For one thing, it 
took me about a year to get these pieces fixed to sound the way I want them. 
Unfortunately my music is for either radio or private listening to records.’49 However, this 
aversion to liveness and the possibility of failure does not imply that the materiality of his 
music and horizon of breakdown was not a crucial part of Nancarrow’s compositional 
practice or experience of his own music. Instead, the situation is the complete reverse. 
Nancarrow’s own experience of his music was so inherently tied to the very specific 
conditions under which he himself was able to hear it—the very materiality of his own 
 
48Letter from Conlon Nancarrow to Charles Amirkhanian, January 26 1977.“Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, 
Paul Sacher Foundation. 
49Letter from Conlon Nancarrow to Wolfgang Becker, December 3 1980. “Conlon Nancarrow Collection”, 
Paul Sacher Foundation. 
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instruments and acoustic—that he deemed that materiality essential to the listening 
experience, even if mediated by recording technology. Furthermore, the limitations of his 
tools and instruments both constrained the ideas that he generated and put into practice, 
while also inspiring him to imagine how they might be surpassed. Nancarrow’s pieces 
were thus composed as collaborations between both machines and humans , including 
those who copied the initial machine, adapted the new one in Mexico, helped to repair 
and adjust and re-tune his pianos, and presumably many more. The result was a dynamic 
push-and-pull between possibility and potentiality, breakdown and repair. 
Despite Nancarrow’s aversion to performance, his studies have been and are 
performed, albeit in a range of mediums and in ways that challenges standard notions of 
musical performance. The first commercial recording of the studies was released in 1969. 
When featured in concerts, the player pianos were often performed on tapes (such as at 
concerts in Los Angeles in 1984). Until 1989, only one performance had been given on a 
player piano itself: in 1962 at the Palacio de Bellas Artes in Mexico City.  Crucially, what 
changed in 1989 was the introduction of new human and machine agents. The German 
mechanic Jurg Borchardt, protégé of Jurgen Hocker (a composer and Nancarrow fan) 
visited Mexico to restore Nancarrow’s instruments (by this point in disrepair) to their 
original condition. Around the same time, German musician/engineer Trimpin arrived and 
developed a machine to transcribe Nancarrow’s piano rolls to MIDI-compatible digitized 
information, preserving them in yet another informational form. More performances then 
became possible, both in the original perforated mechanism and in novel digital 
arrangement. 
All of this resistant materiality—the innate fallibility of human bodies and musical 
instruments—is encountered in any performance of the Studies. Now, they are most 
frequently encountered in ‘performance’ on YouTube, in videos recorded by Jürgen 
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Hocker on a restored Ampico Bösendorfer (without Nancarrow’s modifications)50, and 
can still be listened to on records, including the original 1750 Arch Records recording 
from 1977, and the later Wergo record released in 1991, both recorded in the 
composer’s studio. Rarely, player pianos can be watched performing the Studies live, 
whether in private in the archives at the Paul Sacher Foundation in Basel, where 
Nancarrow’s own pianos are kept, or in rare public occasions, such as a 2012 event at the 
Southbank Centre in which a Marshall and Wendell Ampico piano was used to perform 
most of the Studies from copies of the rolls.51 To watch the roll spin or listen to the 
fragile-sounding notes is to be aware of its precarity; the thin strip of paper reminds us of 
the fragile material format in which information is preserved. And when performed using 
more durable and objective mechanisms—such as on MIDI-generated recordings—
something is undoubtedly lost. If the Studies seem to speed up as they go along, this is 
not only (though of course occasionally) a feature of rising tempos: as the roll spins, its 
diameter decreases, and so the tempo becomes subtly faster over the course of any 
piece. 
As a listener to the Nancarrow Studies, what is most striking and surprising to me is 
the way they insert themselves into my body. As a pianist myself, I had always imagined 
that the way my body responded to piano music was a matter of empathy with the 
specific performer on stage. In the case of the Nancarrow Studies, of course, there is no 
performer to watch.  However, as I listen to the Studies, it is almost impossible not to tap 
a foot along to the ‘beat’—even though its pace might change 10 times in the course of a 
single study. I feel my fingers activate alongside jazzy melodies and walking bass lines. 
With whose fingers are my own empathising?  No fingers made the piece, at least not in 
the way that mine are imagining: though of course several mechanic and builders’ fingers 
built the mechanisms that make it run, and Nancarrow’s own fingers grasped the tools 
 
50www.youtube.com/user/playerpianoJH/ [accessed July 2 2019] 
51Murcott (2014), 33. 
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that punched the holes that let in the air that cause the keys to strike. I imagine, though, 
an imaginary pianist’s body playing these notes, even if a real human pianist would not be 
able to play at such speeds, or with such precision and complexity. My body allows itself 
to be taken in by, and empathise with, a kind of spectre: a phantom body, whose digits 
and limbs have been created by the sound itself. 
According to Peter Szendy, such creation is not unique to the mechanism of the 
player piano or the compositions of Nancarrow. Indeed, Szendy explores the way that the 
musical instrument of the piano, in particular, destabilises the imagined sense that one 
‘has’ or ‘owns’ a body, due to the way that body is reconfigured in the relationship with 
the keyboard.52 His most striking example of this is perhaps his assessment of the 
practice of articulating repeated notes, in which fingers alternate to strike the same note 
at the keyboard. As each finger takes the next one’s place, in Szendy’s telling, the 
keyboard creates a new finger—a phantom composed of the actions of the individual 
fingers being struck in alternation—engages in repetition. 
In Nancarrow, this phenomenon is all the more present because of features of the 
music itself. Despite being composed using a technique that permits the keyboard to do 
things that would be ‘impossible’ for a human body, Nancarrow exploits such possibilities 
in very distinctive ways. In particular, his studies generally give the impression of having 
been executed by a human—both because of the uncanny presence of a physical piano 
with depressed keys, and also because of the content of the melodies. For example, a 
common way in which Nancarrow extends the human and explores the machine’s 
impossibility and virtuosity is by layering more and more melodies on top of each other, 
at tempo relationships that are beyond human computation, and would take three, four, 
or five hands to execute. Each individual melody, however, seems relatively 
straightforward; it is the combination that exceeds human capabilities. 
 
52Szendy (2005), 5. 
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This is especially true in the early studies. Take, for example, the Study No. 7.53 
Though it begins at a fast pace, it opens quite simply: with a running bass line in the 
middle register of the piano (see Figure 11.2). A melody soon enters (I stop myself from 
writing ‘in the right hand’) in a higher register, based on triplet quavers, with added triplet 
semi-quavers. The pacing of both melodies lends them to being thought of under the 
hand. The running bass line follows a simple pattern that is easily and comfortable played 
at the piano. Likewise, the second melody is structured in short sets of quick gestures, 
each of which fit neatly within the fifth (Figure 11.2 demonstrates both lines, along with 
my proposed fingering for a human pianist). Even as the Study becomes more 
complicated, adding more and more lines with different relationships to the original, the 
individual lines themselves remain perfectly reasonable to perform. The next entrance, 
for example, is a pattern of ascending and descending major triads. 
 
 
Figure 11.2. First two melodies in the Study no. 7, re-notated and with fingering. 
	
 
53Nancarrow, ‘Studies for Player Piano’ (Arch Records: 1977), https://youtu.be/TDs-gh3Bt1Y [accessed 2 
July 2019] 
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The piece continues in this manner: aside from the extremely fast (and rising) 
tempo, the individual lines themselves are fairly easy to comprehend, to process, and to 
imagine at hand. This is especially true later in the piece when different ‘lines’  engage 
with each other imitatively. The repetition of the same rhythmic and melodic figures at 
different registers and pitches makes them more easily comprehensible, even when this is 
in stark contrast to the sheer excess of the number of simultaneous lines that have 
emerged. 
The Study is particularly seductive not necessarily because of how excessive and 
complicated it is, but rather because of how often it tethers us. Structurally, it is 
punctuated by frequent moments of rest that help us gain our bearings.  By clearly 
articulating the melodies as they come in, they become easy to identify in the canons that 
will follow. Even during the most dense moments of canon, little snippets of familiarity 
continually emerge from the texture and then disappear, giving a semblance of 
comprehension that is all the more tantalizing and powerful for having eluded us seconds 
before. The virtuosic ending—a rapidly descending and then ascending scale that 
concludes solidly on E major—feels almost like a joke (see Figure 11.3). It is lightning fast, 
and yet also so ‘normal’—so close to reality—that one has the strong impression that 
perhaps the earlier superfluities were simply figments of the imagination. It is very much 
like seeing a ghost, and then doubting one’s senses.   
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Figure 11.3. Final bars of Study no. 7 in Nancarrow’s transcription. Nancarrow (1984), 79. 
 
The presence of phantoms—of active agents other than living, breathing human 
beings—is also explored by Piekut and Stanyek in their study of ‘deadness’, a 
phenomenon that they see as arising specifically from recording technology. As they 
write, ‘being recorded means being enrolled in futures (and past) that one cannot wholly 
predict nor control’.54 The player piano, of course, is also a recording technology, and 
when it was most popular, it was seen as a means for precisely this: the active presence 
of past, or dead, performers. One Pianola advertisement, for example, claimed that by 
owning a player piano, ‘the performance of a master becomes the possession of the 
centuries’.55 The capacity for ‘deadness’ here extends beyond simply the active 
 
54Piekut and Stanyek (2010), 18. 
55Ord-Hume (1984), 272 . 
 179 
engagement of actors who might be dead human beings. As they write, ‘moving beyond 
human exceptionalism by framing agency as effectivity allows us to rebuild the idea of 
personhood to encompass far more than a simple body or a hunk of flesh, as if 
personhood could be limited to the boundaries of the epidermal wall. In our framing 
personhood is not equivalent to a lone body, but is distributed among and articlated with 
other entities that are textual, technological, juridical, and affective’.56  In the Nancarrow 
studies, we might understand deadness also as a liveness that constructs itself through 
absence—of the performer, composer, and labour—and through the seeming stasis of the 
crucial performing body: the dead material of the player piano itself. 
Piekut and Stanyek’s term ‘corpauralities’ is helpful in its capacity to signal 
relationships between sounds and bodies that may not be linear. Throughout their past 
and ongoing history of composition and performance, many bodies have interacted with 
the materials and sounds. There is also a crucial back and forth. For Nancarrow, the way 
in which he composed the études themselves was often a process of collaboration with 
the instrument. As he describes in a 1975 interview with Roger Reynolds: ‘everytime I do 
something and hear it, it has an effect on the next thing I do’.57 Indeed, the sound of the 
instrument itself would give him ideas for composition—which, when he could not 
execute them easily, would require enlisting another body to shift and alter the 
mechanisms of the instrument that he had available—and then would allow the 
instrument to produce yet new sounds, in a continuous back-and-forth relationship. 
The Studies treat bodies and machines as part of a continuum of personhood and 
action, rather than as separate entities, and thus remind us that agency is not only limited 
to our bones and muscles, but extends far beyond.  This is in part because of the way 
that they continually reference the body, even in their presentation as technological and 
 
56Piekut and Stanyek (2010), 18. 
57Reynolds (1975), 2. 
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informational. This reference occurs in the physical labour of their process of composition 
and the gestural content of their music, reminding us that the body is never far away. 
Instead of alienating and disembodying the many actors involved in their process, we 
might imagine these bodies as coterminous: all of these bodies are simultaneously and 
collectively involved in the sound-making, just as the sound makes its own imaginary 
bodies. 
My own experience ‘playing’ the Study no. 12 (Flamenco) on one of Nancarrow’s 
original pianos, housed at the Paul Sacher Stiftung, was electric, touching, and very much 
embodied. The immediate whirring of the bellows and whirls of the mechanism as the 
machine is turned on gives the pianos a lifelike impression of inflating lungs and a pulsing 
heartbeat. It was also exciting because—like bodies—instruments, tools, and scores do 
contain the possibility of failure. The roll itself (a copy of the original) was slightly ripped 
at the base, and had to be carefully mounted to avoid breaking. More likely than not, it 
contains errors. Because of Nancarrow’s habit of using scotch tape to cover erroneous 
holes, copying procedures based on light are prone to include holes punched by mistake. 
The study was chosen because it is among the shorter in length, to avoid wearing the 
instrument out. Our first attempt to play the piece, on the piano modified with metal over 
wooden hammers—failed almost completely. While the melody came out clearly, the 
upper register of the piano was not sounding adequately, rendering the rolled chord 
effect non-existent. (So much for the ‘good behaviour on the part of musical instruments’ 
that Cage’s Satie describes). It was necessary to switch to the other piano—with leather 
hammers—which delivered a seductive and charming performance. 
In proximity to the instruments, I could almost feel my own fingers moving, as the 
content of the study conjures and suggests bodies. It is telling how clearly, for example, 
the melody is identified as coming from the ‘left hand’, based on cues from its register, 
timbre, and shape, and on its relationship to the surrounding interruptions, although they 
come from both above and below. It is not just my fingers that moved along with this 
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study, though. As the ‘flamenco’ subtitle suggests, the piece engages the whole body 
with its dance-like rhythms. It seems all the more unusual with the knowledge that the 
performer is a machine, playing with human-like abandon. 
As Kyle Gann describes in his biography of Nancarrow, a subtle and intuitive 
understanding of rhythm and even indeed of human psychology on Nancarrow’s part 
allowed him to create rhythms that—in their extremely precise irregularity—feel deeply 
human in a way that absolute rhythmic regularity does not. It is often strange to listen to 
transcriptions of these studies for human performers, who ironically sound stilted in their 
attempts to perform complex rhythms accurately. For this reason, Nancarrow’s music 
translates poorly to traditional staff notation, and in his notated score for this piece—as in 
many others, and all of Nancarrow’s later studies—the score eschews traditional bar lines 
in favour of an open score in which the horizontal placement of the notes corresponds to 
the rhythm, as it would on the roll itself.   
In this intimate live connection, a sympathetic relationship is created between the 
body of the listener and the sound, the instrument, and indeed the composer, whose own 
body was actively involved in the creation of the means of producing the sound. Our toes 
are made to tap and heads are made to beat and hands are made to twitch in 
sympathetic stride; we experience the pieces with an undoubtedly pervasive feeling of 
physicality. And so, in this respect, Nancarrow’s player piano extends all of our bodies, 
reaching them beyond their physical limits to include an entire network of human and 
nonhuman collaborators. Just as Cage’s and Ligeti’s studies push bodies to their limits and 
beyond, so, too, do Nancarrow’s, recognising that those limits might be extended to the 
technological realm. 
Conclusion 
A posthuman orientation to the world, as Hayles reminds us, is one in which the 
limitations of the body are arbitrary and new things are possible. ‘Interpreted through 
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metaphors resonant with cultural meanings, the body itself is a congealed metaphor, a 
physical structure whose constraints and possibilities have been formed by an 
evolutionary history that intelligent machines do not share’.58 In this light, a newly 
configured social organisation in which man and machine interact reframes the impossible 
beyond the limits of human skin. Nancarrow’s Studies for Player piano use the struggle of 
the human body—even though he does not put bodies on stage—to explore and 
complicate its limits and capabilities. 
To return to Cage’s story about Satie and the walking player pianos, the 
anthropomorphism of the pianos suggests the social and ephemeral nature of 
experiencing these instruments up close. The assessment of their behaviour—and implicit 
comparison with other instruments less well-behaved—conjures the way that all musical 
instruments and materials have the capacity both to obey and to defy our wishes. Indeed, 
the agency and (to quote Piekut and Stanyek) ‘effectivity’ that Cage gives the pianos in 
this telling reminds us that as much as we see instruments as behaving according to our 
requests and desires, they are in charge of their own affordances, and human bodies 
merely work with or against what is offered, and allow ourselves to be ‘touched’. Hayles 
tells us that ‘a critical practice that ignores materiality, or that reduces it to a narrow 
range of engagements, cuts itself off from the exuberant possibilities of all the 
unpredictable things that happen when we as embodied creatures interact with the rich 
physicality of the world’.59 It is these very exuberant possibilities that Cage captures in his 
poem; and it is the exuberant (im)possibilities of the body that Nancarrow so powerfully 
and poetically explores and extends in his radical posthuman études. 
 
58Hayles (1999), 284. 
59Hayles (2002), 107. 
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Étude 12: Technologies of the Impossible—Nicole 
Lizée’s Hitchcock Études 
 
Electronic music doesn’t take the body away. It gives us a new body.1 
 
The Canadian composer Nicole Lizée’s three sets of piano études—Lynch Études (2016),  
Kubrick Études (2013), and Hitchcock Études (2010)—push the genre beyond the 
boundaries of the human body by supplementing the live human pianist with an 
electronic soundtrack and a video projection. As their titles suggest, cinema is an 
important component of these works; they consist of sets of études in which sonic and 
visual material is taken from films by the named directors. 
 The Hitchcock Études, which will be the focus of this chapter, are a set of seven 
short études, designed to be performed in sequence. The score includes a video and an 
audio file that play simultaneously with the live pianist.2 On the video, short film clips 
from a specific Hitchcock films are altered, looped, and distorted. Each étude focuses on 
a different scene or motive from Psycho, The Man Who Knew Too Much, Rope, or The Birds, 
as indicated by the étude titles (below in Figure 12.1). The audio file similarly contains an 
electronic soundtrack that mixes distorted audio from the original film scene with newly 
composed electronic sounds. The pianist plays alongside the film and electronic 
 
1Noe (2012), 60. 
2Morano notes in his dissertation that these can come in the form of a CD and a DVD. However, the score 
of the Hitchcock Études that I purchased was actually accompanied with an mp4 video file and an mp3 
audio file. Morano (2016), 33. 
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soundtrack, synchronised by wearing headphones with a clicktrack.3 For practical 
purposes, the score itself includes not only the piano part, but also another line loosely 
notating the electronic soundtrack and occasional verbal descriptions to assist the live 
pianist. 
1 ‘Psycho — Saul Bass Étude’ 
2 ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much — Doris Day Étude’ 
3 ’Psycho — Stutter Étude’ 
4 ‘Rope — The Party Étude’ 
5 ‘The Birds — Schoolhouse Étude’ 
6  ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much — Phonograph Étude’ 
7  ‘Psycho — Shower Étude’ 
  
Figure 12.1. Titles of Lizée’s Hitchcock Études. 
 
According to Lizée, her goal in composing these études was ‘to stretch and reimagine the 
scope of what an étude could imply’.4 Stretching beyond not only the body, but also 
beyond the étude itself, Lizée thus uses the étude to pose questions about the body and 
technology. Are these études for piano or for electronics, for example: or both? Who is 
being trained, and how? The Hitchcock Études are not only Lizée’s first set of études, but 
also her first pieces to incorporate live instruments, electronics, and video, a combination 
that now forms the bulk of her compositional output. Given the role of the étude in 
training not only performers but also composers, using her very first set of études as a 
 
3A video of pianist Megumi Masaki performing the Hitchcock Études can be found online at 
https://vimeo.com/80063226 [accessed 1 July 2019] as well as on the commercial CD/DVD 
Bookburners (2014). 
4Lizée (2019), email correspondence with author. 
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study seems especially appropriate. The questions and problems being posed are in their 
most basic state, in keeping with the genre itself. 
 One of the most striking aspects of these études is how immersive they are, for 
both performer and listener. The sonic boundaries between live and recorded sounds—
human and machine sounds—are unclear, and Lizée uses sonic effects that consistently 
emphasise interaction between electronic sounds and the bodies of both performer and 
listener. The interaction between live and recorded sound is especially pertinent because 
of fact that several études refer specifically to scenes in which music appears in the film. 
Thus, the music also blurs the line between sounds that seem to be occurring within the 
world of the film and sounds that occur outside of it. 
For example, the material in the second étude, ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much—
Doris Day Étude’ is taken from a scene in which actress Doris Day sings the now-famous 
tune ‘Che Sera, Sera (Whatever Will Be, Will Be)’. Rather than retaining the original audio 
from the film, in which Day sang with orchestral accompaniment (although she appeared 
to be playing piano), Lizée crafts a new melody by jumping between different pitches in 
Day’s original song. Day appears seated at the piano, her head uncannily changing 
positions as her vocal pitch changes. Day’s new melody is accompanied by a piano part 
performed by the live pianist. Day’s hands are not visible in the scene, and so the sound 
produced by the live pianist seems to be filling the role of the piano on screen. To further 
the confusion between real and fiction, Lizée inserts herself into the visuals, sitting at the 
piano next to Doris Day. 
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Figure 12.2. Lizée at the piano with Doris Day. Hitchcock Études (Video), 00:05:48 
  
 Likewise, the fourth étude (‘Rope—The Party Étude’) also features a living room 
scene at the piano. Lizée’s edit incorporates three separate moments from Rope (1948), 
one of Hitchcock’s most experimental films. The first features Mrs. Atwater (played by 
Constance Collier) asking Phillip (played by Farley Granger) to play the piano, to which he 
obliges with a performance of Poulenc’s surreal and ironic ‘Mouvement Perpetuel no. 1’ 
(1918). In the second clip, Phillip is looking at his hands in horror after Mrs. Atwater has 
told him that his hands will make him famous. In the final clip, Rupert (played by James 
Stewart) stands over Phillip at the piano with a metronome ticking while Phillip plays. In 
the opening of the étude, we first hear the original soundtrack of Phillip playing the piece 
on the piano, although the soundtrack has been slightly altered to sound distant and 
distorted.5 When the live pianist joins for a few phrases, it is hard to tell whether the 
piano sounds are coming from the speakers or from the live instrument. 
 Later in the étude, Lizée further expands the texture by adding a drum beat to the 
 
5Lizée’s score describes the track for the pianist as ‘Warped piano’. Lizée (2010), 23. 
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electronic soundtrack in bar 259.6 The beat is unambiguously dance-like, and conjures for 
the listener the sense of a different, more energetic party than the one pictured on 
screen. This is a striking example of the capacity for electronic sounds to affect listening 
bodies, making the listener want to dance. The desire to dance is echoed on screen, as 
Lizée edits an image of Phillip staring at his hands to appear as if Phillip is moving his 
body back and forth. The dance-like environment is at once in the listener’s body and the 
body on screen, and yet it is also in neither place, but rather simply in a disembodied 
electronic drumbeat. 
 In the fifth étude, ‘The Birds—Schoolhouse Étude’ the musical material is vocal. In 
the scene, a group of schoolchildren are singing the children’s song ‘Risseldy, Rosseldy’ 
(which Lizée spells as ‘ris-tle-tee, ros-tle-tee’), conducted by their teacher Anne Hayworth 
(played by Suzanne Pleshette). 
 
6This moment occurs at 10:11 in the video track. 
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Figure 12.3. ‘Risseldy-Rosseldy’ in ‘The Birds—Schoolhouse Étude’.7 
 
When the classroom has completed a verse, arriving at the repeated ‘now, now, now’, 
Lizée begins to loop these last three notes of their singing, to create a trance-like, rocking 
ostinato, to which the piano adds harmonising chords. Although the piano sounds are 
consonant, unlike in the previous two études discussed, they feel as if they come from a 
different world than the classroom scene on screen. Lizée emphasises this juxtaposition 
in the next scene of the étude, in which very similar music is used to accompany the next 
scene of the film: in which the children run away from the school while birds swoop past 
 
7Lizée (2010), 29-30. 
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attacking them.8 The sound of the children singing ‘now, now, now’ makes this scene feel 
almost more harrowing than in the original moment from The Birds (1963), in which the 
only sounds are screeching birds and screaming children. It is a moment in which Lizée 
uses musical material from the film to create a sense of disjunction—it is obvious that this 
music is designed as soundtrack, rather than a reflection of the action in the film. 
 In étude three, ‘Psycho—Stutter Étude’, Lizée does not choose a musical moment in 
the film. Instead, Lizée treats the spoken stutter of character Norman Bates (played by 
Anthony Perkins) as if it were ‘musical material’.9 The piece opens with an introduction 
(which Lizée calls a ‘stutter collage’10) using electronics and video alone, in which several 
brief stutters are heard and visually emulated by frequent cuts between disconnected 
scenes, and faltering moments in which the screen temporarily goes black. After this, the 
piano enters alongside the main visual film material for the piece: the famous parlour 
scene from the beginning of Psycho (1960). In the featured scene, Bates first tells the 
character Marion Crane (played by Janet Leigh), ‘You-...you eat like a bird’, before 
clarifying: ‘I hear the expression “you eat like a bird” is really a fa-fal-fals-falsity, because, 
w-because… birds really eat a tremendous lot.’11 In Lizée’s adaptation, only excerpts of 
Bates’ phrase are used. As a stuttering version of the original stutter, these are looped 
consistently throughout the étude, serving as—in Christopher Morano’s words—a ‘visual 
and audio ostinato’.12 The pianist begins by playing synchronously with the sounds from 
the film, but as the piece progresses, the pianist’s figures become longer and more dense, 
eventually exceeding the rhythmic patterns of the stuttering phrase. The piece ends with 
the voice becoming so distorted that it is no longer understood as words, taking over 
 
813:58-15:43 in the film. 
9Lizée cited in Morano (2016), 32. 
10Lizée (2010), 1. 
11Psycho (1960). 00:35:29-00:35:49 
12Morano (2016), 36. 
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from the piano as an electronic texture. 
 All of these études mix sonic and musical material, blurring the boundaries between 
what happens on stage, on screen, and on the soundtrack. In the process, they confuse 
distinctions between the two traditional kinds of sound in cinematic and theatrical 
analysis: diegetic and extradiegetic sound.13 Sounds that begin as representations of what 
is happening sonically in the narrative become the backdrop for glitching visuals, just as 
sounds that have been added by Lizée become incorporated into the visual world. The 
sounds in these études also operate on the boundary of what Pierre Schaeffer called 
‘acousmatic’ sound: sound that is audible but whose source is invisible.14 Both the 
performed and recorded sounds in the Hitchcock Études transcend distinctions between 
acousmatic and non-acousmatic. For example, the piano sounds in both the ‘Doris Day 
Étude’ and ‘The Party Étude’ seem to have multiple sources: the piano on screen, the 
piano on stage, and the ‘invisible’ speaker. 
 Although these two distinctions—diegetic and acousmatic—refer to sonic and 
musical properties, they are both properties that refer to the relationship between sound 
and the visual images on screen. In order to be defined and understood, these sonic 
properties require a visual referent. Similarly, the relationship constructed between the 
technological sounds and performing bodies—and the way in which the études construct 
and expand the limits of the body—is reliant on the property of sight. The études are for 
video as much as they are for live performer, and they are intended for viewing as much 
as listening. 
 The idea that visual display might be an important part of virtuosic performance in 
the concert étude is not necessarily novel. The visual as a phenomenon of virtuosic 
display extends back to the 19th century. As Dana Gooley writes, ‘the experience of Liszt 
 
13In film theory, diegesis refers to anything that happens—especially sonically—within ‘the spatio-temporal 
world depicted in the film’. Oxford Reference (2019). 
14Schaeffer (1966). 
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in performance was as much about watching as about listening’.15 However, in Lizee’s 
piece, the importance of the visual is made more complicated by the medium of film and 
cinematic allusion. In particular, the use of film—and references to Hitchcock in 
particular—create an implicit association with narrative. 
 Given the role that narrative plays in viewing Lizée’s altered films, I suggest 
Katherine Hayles’ model of literary hypertexts and technotexts as a tool that helps to 
elucidate the experience of listening to Lizée’s Hitchcock Études. Hayles defines a 
‘hypertext’ as having three necessary components: ‘multiple reading paths; text that is 
chunked in some way; and some kind of linking mechanism that connects the chunks 
together so as to create the multiple reading paths.’16 In the context of cinema, 
scholarship on the hypertext has tended to focus on film media that have prompted 
extra-cinematic online discussion, or film media in choose-your-own-adventure formats. 
However, hypertextual analysis might also offer useful insight into performance, 
especially because—in comparison to analogue text—performance already incorporates 
many hypertextual features. 
 In the Hitchcock Études, there are several ways in which the performance of this 
piece fulfils these three hypertextual criteria. For example, when Hayles refers to 
‘chunked’ text, she specifically means sections of text that are ‘separated typographically 
from one another’.17 Although the performance does not consist of written text or 
typography, the material of the piece is clearly chunked, especially insofar as it is 
presented in different media. Though through-composed, the piece consists of ‘chunks’ 
of seven separate études each using different scenes from several different films. Equally, 
it contains disparate chunks of musical material played by the live pianist, sonic material 
on the soundtrack, and visual material on screen. The chunks are connected—as Hayles 
 
15Gooley (2004), 11. 
16Hayles (2002), 21. 
17Hayles (2002), 26. 
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requires of the hypertext—by a linking mechanism. In the case of these études, the linking 
mechanism that connects these distinct groups of material is their presentation in time. 
Unlike a book, performance defines the temporality at which it is experienced; thus, the 
different chunks are automatically linked together by virtue of being perceived 
simultaneously or sequentially. 
 Finally, the piece permits ‘multiple reading paths’ because of the many ways of 
understanding the material live. In the conventional literary hypertext, these reading 
paths often take the form of making active choices about which passages or websites to 
engage with next, in the form of a ‘choose your own adventure’ story. The listeners’ 
engagement with live musical performance is obviously different, as it is chronologically 
structured and ordered. However, the experience nonetheless passes back and forth 
between different modes of engagement. The simultaneous presence of multiple media 
means the listener makes conscious and unconscious choices at all points and is forced to 
move not only between different narratives, but also between different approaches to 
narrative—or, more accurately, between seeming narrative and a lack thereof. When the 
same scene becomes looped over and over, the effect is no longer narrative but instead 
conjures some other relationship to visual material. The viewer’s attention is always split 
between the different media, passing between sound, video, and simultaneous 
apprehension. Lizée’s use of looped visual and sonic phrases creates a multiplicity in the 
act of reading and watching: each time the same scene is pictured, it is viewed 
differently. 
 In her book Writing Machines, Hayles also develops a notion of the ‘technotext’, 
another useful device for understanding what is at stake in the Hitchcock Études. The 
term technotext, for Hayles, refers to literature that deliberately foregrounds its own 
materiality and is inherently dependent on a specific medium. The Hitchcock Études does 
this most strikingly in the use of scenes that feature a piano on screen, emphasising the 
relationship between the reference to the piano in the cinematic ‘text’ and the material 
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piano performing the music. 
 Understanding Lizee’s Hitchcock Études as hypertexts and technotexts provides a 
useful way of thinking about how they are performed, heard, and viewed. Hypertextual 
analysis recognises the importance of narrative to a listener/viewer’s perception of the 
études, as well as to Lizee’s composition. In her composition, the listener’s visual 
understanding of the characters is punctured by the characteristic features of the 
hypertext, and in particular, its ‘ruptures, juxtapositions, and implied links’.18 The 
combination of film and live pianist in performance, and the way in which these worlds 
intertwine, also creates juxtapositions and implied links between the screen characters, 
the human pianist, and the venue of the performance. 
 In particular, the listener-viewer’s experience is subverted and altered through the 
hypertext’s characteristic ‘ruptures’ and through the cinematic device of the cut. From 
the 1960s onward, film theorists have attended to the ways in which the juxtaposition of 
shots is more than a device to efficiently communicate narrative in a visual medium, but 
also the mechanism through which viewers are constructed as observing subjects. In 
narrative cinema, ‘films are articulated and the viewing subject spoken by means of 
interlocking shots’.19 As Kaja Silverman describes, it is through these relationships 
between different shots that the spectator becomes a subject of film. 
A prime agency of disclosure is the cut, which divides one shot from the next. The 
cut guarantees that both the preceding and the subsequent shots will function as 
structuring absences to the present shot. These absences make possible a signifying 
ensemble, convert one shot into a signifier of the next one, and the signified of the 
preceding one. Thus cinematic coherence and plenitude emerge through multiple 
cuts and negations.20 
 
18Hayles (1999), 251. 
19Silverman (1983), 201. 
20Silverman (1983), 222. 
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Lizée’s use of interlocking shots, however, is unconventional, as it relies on repetition, 
loops, and nonsensical juxtapositions. In Lizée’s hands, the use of absurd repetitions and 
jump cuts between closely related visuals disrupts the construction of subjectivity and 
undermines the ‘cinematic coherence’ that is normally created through cut scenes. When 
the viewer sees two scenes juxtaposed, the first instinct is to read them as continuous 
and narrative. When the same scene appears again—and again—on screen, it becomes 
clear that it could not be continuous. As such, the viewer is not only aware of their 
distance from the film’s narrative, but also becomes conflicted and aware of their 
discontinuity as a viewing subject. 
 This technique is especially powerful in ‘Rope—The Party Étude’, perhaps because 
Lizée’s characteristic looping and cutting is in such stark juxtaposition with the cinematic 
style of Rope itself. The film is famous and unusual for the opposite quality: extremely 
long takes that create the illusion that the film is shot from only one perspective. Rather 
than moving between disconnected scenes to create coherence, in Rope the camera is in 
almost constant motion, ‘gliding around the characters at this party like it’s an invisible 
eighth guest.’21 By constantly switching between the camera’s different perspectives—
from looking at the pianist, to looking out the window, to looking closely at the pianist’s 
hands, to scanning the whole room—Lizée creates the feeling that the spectator is not a 
single coherent guest. Instead, the spectator feels as if they contain and perceive multiple 
viewpoints and temporalities simultaneously. The full weight of these hypertextual 
implications is contained not only within Lizée’s étude, but also in its relationship to the 
original film; as Lizée writes, she aimed to both ‘rely on and to subvert the audience’s 
preexisting knowledge of the material’.22 It does not necessarily require a viewer or 
listener to know the original Hitchcock, but this knowledge informs and inflects any 
interpretation or experience of listening. 
 
21Crow (2018). 
22Lizée (2010), i. 
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 The material focus of technotext analysis also lends insight into the experience of 
the performer. For one, the way in which the music is read by the performer challenges 
traditional notions of score and text. Although the notes of the score are notated 
traditionally, a necessary part of performing the piece is listening to a click track. The click 
track is not only necessary for syncing the audio in the piano with the electronic 
soundtrack and the video. It is also crucial for executing some of the subtle and precise 
tempo changes in the piece, which can occur as frequently as every bar (see Figure 12.4). 
In this example, the pianist must play at a metronome mark of crotchet=88 for two bars, 
followed by crotchet=84 for one bar, and then returning to crotchet=88 in the next bar. 
These sudden shifts make the score impossible to perform without the clicktrack, even 
though it is, of course, fully legible from a traditional notational perspective. This 
phenomenon is most obvious when listening to the piece alongside the score, as it is 
extremely difficult to follow along on the page. 
 
Figure 12.4. ‘Psycho—The Shower Étude, bars 511-514’.23 
 
 
23Lizée (2010), 49. 
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 The click track is not simply a convenient aid, then, but a necessary collaborator for 
the process of score-reading, rendering it legible. For Hayles, ‘illegibility is not simply a 
lack of meaning, then, but a signifier of distributed cognitive processes that construct 
reading as an active production of a cybernetic circuit and not merely an internal activity 
of the human mind.’24 Karen Barad claims similarly that posthuman collaboration always 
forms part of the act of understanding. She writes that ‘intelligibility is not a human-based 
affair. It is a matter of differential articulations and differential 
responsiveness/engagement’.25 The necessity of technological collaboration for even the 
basic process of score reading speaks to the Hitchcock Études as a technotext, 
reconstructing subjectivity through a posthuman lens. The pianist of the Hitchcock Études 
thus must already be a cyborg, reading through and with the click track. 
 In keeping with the designation of the piece as an étude, too, the cybernetic circuits 
created by illegible texts and distributed cognition also cause bodies to change: ‘In this 
broader context, illegible text reminds us of the changes our bodies are undergoing as 
they are remapped and reinterpreted by intelligent machines working within networks 
that bind together our flesh with their electronic materiality’.26 Indeed, for Hayles and 
other posthuman feminist thinkers, the use of hypertextual strategies is a fundamentally 
embodied practice. In general, Hayles argues that although posthuman scholarship has 
sometimes neglected the body, a posthuman approach emerging out of feminist new 
materialisms might reframe the body as central to the experience of media and to the 
interaction between human and nonhuman agents.27 Likewise, in her book Hypertext and 
the Female Imaginary, Jaishree Odin suggest that because of their discontinuity and 
 
24Hayles (2002), 51. 
25Barad (2003), 824. 
26Hayles (2002), 51. 
27Understanding the ‘disembodiment’ that has plagued posthuman studies and reembodying the field is the 
project of her 1999 book,How We Became Posthuman. 
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potential for subversive representation of under-theorised voices, hypertextual media 
might be used to shed light on ‘the embodied status of the human and the situated 
nature of experience’.28 Not only does Lizée’s writing use technology as an extension of 
the body, it also sheds light on the nature and constitution of the body itself. 
 At times, Lizée’s emphasis on embodiment is explicit. For example, in the ‘Doris Day 
Étude’, the pianist is asked to sing as well as play. Lizée’s notated instructions read: ‘Vocal 
style should mimic Doris Day (warm, sensual, sweet vibrato).’29 The singing is optional, 
but when executed, it offers a ‘warm, sensual’ reminder of the body of the pianist. With 
the singing voice, the pianist becomes more apparent as a breathing body and vocal 
instrument. As it turns out, Day’s own voice in the original film—The Man Who Knew Too 
Much—is also used to call attention to herself; she deliberately sings loudly and 
recognisably so that her son, who has been kidnapped and is elsewhere in the building, 
can hear her. 
 
Figure 12.5. ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much—Doris Day Étude’, bars 71-72.30 
  
 
28Odin (2010), ix. 
29Lizée (2010), 71. 
30Lizée (2010, 71. 
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The film scenes that Lizée chooses to explore are often moments in which embodiment is 
made present and palpable for the viewers. In ‘The Party Étude’, one visual to which 
Lizée keeps returning is a close-up shot of Phillip’s hands. In the original film, Mrs. 
Atwater has just drawn attention to his hands in order to read his palms, suggesting that 
they will bring him fame. Lizée omits this scene, choosing to loop instead the moment 
immediately afterwards, in which Phillip is looking down at his outstretched palms in 
horror. Although Mrs. Atwater’s comment was an innocent remark about his skill as a 
pianist, Phillip seems to believe it is a sign that he will be caught for the murder he has 
just committed. Lizée zooms in to focus just on the hands, alternating shots of the hands 
with shots of Phillip at the piano. Phillip’s body is treated as especially meaningful in this 
moment—Mrs. Atwater’s knowledge of the secret comes from her encounter with his 
hands, and Phillip fears that his hands have given him away. The sight of two large hands 
visible on the screen while piano music is playing also draws attention to the live hands of 
the pianist as well and therefore to the embodiment of live performance. 
 
 
Figure 12.6. Philip’s hands in ‘Rope—The Party Étude’. Hitchcock Études (Video), 00:10:01 
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 This attention to embodiment within the musical and visual text demonstrates the 
importance of attending to the body as also relevant to the technological components of 
the piece. Viewing the piece as a hypertext and technotext—thus emphasising embodied 
presence and materiality—encourages us to see this interaction between the body and 
machine as one of entanglement, rather than separation. One way in which we might 
understand this relationship is by thinking of the various technological components as 
prosthetics: ‘an artificial body part that supplements the body, but a part that carries an 
operating system different from the body’s organic processes’.31 In this way, Lizée’s 
études operate at the limit of the body by literally extending it using various technological 
supplements. 
 For example, one aspect of the piece that might be seen as prosthetic is the click 
track. The click track effectively offers a metronome as technical support to the pianist, 
literally attached to their body in the form of headphones. Sonic features might function 
as prosthetics, too: moments in which electronic and pianistic sounds play in unison 
create the sonic impression that the live pianist has been extended and enhanced by 
electronic sound. As Guy Garnett suggests, electronic sound conveys the impression of 
‘Other’ and an ‘aesthetics of the machine’,32 and according to Iverson, the differences 
between acoustic and electronic sound ‘reinscribe a binary definition: the acoustic is 
natural, the electronic is technological’.33 Thus, their simultaneity in the piece heightens 
the sense of the technological sound as supplementing the live body. Furthermore, the 
video screen is a prosthetic that extends the pianist’s visual display in both size and 
capability.34 Equally, though, the instrument of the piano is already a prosthetic. As Julian 
 
31Wilson (1995), 243. 
32Garnett (2001), 21. 
33Iverson (2015), 158. 
34Adding to this impression, some pianists have recorded the piece and published it on YouTube so that both 
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Johnson writes: ‘like all tools and machines, the musical instrument is a prosthetic 
augmentation of the human body, enabling the body to exceed itself (to sound faster, 
higher, louder than any voice, and to enable the individual to do so often in multiple parts 
simultaneously)’.35 
 The logic of the prosthetic comes largely from recent work in disability studies. 
Jennifer Iverson has aptly summarized some of the concerns and dangers of using the 
prosthetic as a theory or metaphor, focusing on its potential to re-inscribe the binary 
logic between a body that lacks and a technological prosthesis that mitigates against that 
perceived lack. However, as she describes in the music of Bjork, the prosthetic also has 
the potential to powerfully undermine that very same distinction. She writes that 
electronic music might ‘[prepare] listeners to move out of the binary between abled and 
disabled’36 by questioning the idea of an original, whole body and ‘[positing] the 
technologically mediated body as normative’.37 Instead of understanding the prosthetic as 
a corrective, it might instead be understood as ubiquitous; as Katherine Hayles writes, 
‘the body [is] the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or re-
placing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began 
before we were born’.38 
 How does Lizée’s use of the click track—understood now as a ‘prosthetic’—
reconfigure how we understand the body? It would be easy to suggest, for example, that 
the click track is a corrective prosthetic that enables a flawed body to accomplish an 
 
the live pianist and the video are visible. Rather than placing the two side-by-side, the technique used is 
one of transparent overlay, suggesting that both are equally important, entangled, components of 
performance. See, for example, Andrew Burashko’s recording from February 2017 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=T0P0RG1UInw> 
35Johnson (2015), 142. 
36Iverson (2016), 155. 
37Iverson (2016), 160. 
38Hayles (1999), 3. 
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otherwise impossible task. In this respect, the click track would be seen as a prosthetic 
that constructs the body in the way that disability theorists David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder describe: ‘A body deemed lacking, unfunctional, or inappropriately functional 
needs compensation, and prosthesis helps to effect this end’.39 Without the click track 
prosthetic, the naked body of the pianist would be insufficient for performing this piece 
and unable to follow the score. Viewed in this way, the click track prosthetic would not 
only reinforce the idea of the body as flawed in relation to a particular ideal, but also 
construct that ideal as contained within the musical score, thus reinforcing notions of the 
work. 
 However, I believe Lizée uses the click track in such a way that subverts rather than 
reinforces these notions. For example, although the clicktrack functions specifically to 
help the pianist execute an otherwise illegible score, Lizée’s composition suggests that 
the score is not a perfect ideal towards which performance strives. Instead, the score 
itself is an imperfect representation of sound. This is especially because of the important 
role that transcription plays in her composition. In the ‘Stutter Étude’, for example, the 
material on the score is taken from Lizée’s transcription of Norman Bates’ speech and 
stutter in Psycho. Both the transcription—which Lizée notates in the score so that the 
pianist can follow it—and the pianist’s figures use precise rhythmic subdivisions of semi-
quavers, quintuplets, and sextuplets. In addition to these punctuated notes and 
utterances in different subdivisions, the metre also changes between 4/4 and 5/4+1/8 
(see Figure 12.7). Like many passages in the Hitchcock Études, this would be difficult to 
realise accurately without the aid of the click track. However, the click track does not 
entirely aid in the realisation of the score itself; if there were no video and electronics, 
such a track would not be necessary. It is, in fact, the characters on screen to which the 
score, and performance, aspire, and the notation is derived from these sounds. As Lizée 
 
39Mitchell and Snyder (2000), 6. 
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has described, ‘transcription...has expanded [her] world and notation language’.40 This 
emphasises the fact that the notation emerges as a secondary property from the process 
and goals of the composition. If the imperfect representation offered by the score is the 
click track’s goal, this undercuts any illusions that the body might be made ‘perfect’ 
through a corrective prosthetic. 
 
Figure 12.7. ‘Psycho—Stutter Étude’, bars 177-182.41 
  
Likewise, the characters the pianist imitates are not themselves perfect bodies. This is 
particularly true in the passage I have just described: the imperfection of Bates’ stuttering 
voice is precisely what makes his rhythmic cadence so complex and difficult to imitate. It 
 
40Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
41Lizée (2010), 17. 
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is this imperfection that results in the complexity of Lizée’s transcription in the score, and 
which necessitates the click track to perform. Again, this allows the prosthetic to operate 
in a way that does not suggest a flawed body becoming whole. Instead, the corrective 
click track simply transforms the body from one flawed state to another, recognising the 
imperfections always present in the material body. The malfunctioning body becomes the 
norm to which the performer must aspire. 
 This music also alters the mentality that the click track is a corrective supplement 
by depicting the body as always technologically mediated. In this light, the use of a 
prosthetic simply places the click track-equipped body on a continuum between human 
and machine. For example, Lizée suggests that in her music, technology operates as a 
collaborator working alongside the human performer, rather than simply a bodily 
extension. As she writes, ‘this process is the ultimate way by which glitch becomes a true 
chamber music partner’.42 This understanding offers an interesting perspective on the 
limits of the body. Treating technological devices as collaborators reflects an 
understanding of agency in which humans and machines are equal partners. 
 A striking depiction of the body in relation to technology  occurs in ‘Rope—The 
Party Étude’, in which a click track-like device appears on screen: Phillip’s metronome. In 
the original scene from Rope, Rupert picks up the metronome and asked Phillip: ‘Do you 
use this?’ while turning the metronome on.43 Lizée begins shortly after this moment, 
when the metronome is already playing and Phillip, who is being questioned by Rupert, 
asks: ‘What do you suspect?’ Lizée incorporates the audible metronome sound into her 
electronic soundscape. The moment is particularly interesting when reading the piece as 
a technotext, as it draws attention to the medium and materiality of the live performance: 
the sounding metronome on-screen mimics the track in the pianist’s ear (although it does 
not click exactly alongside it!). From the perspective of the prosthetic, this moment 
 
42Lizée, email with the author. 
43Hitchcock (1948), 00:48:42 
 204 
references the ubiquity of the metronome as a practice device for pianists and musicians. 
Especially in technical contexts—in the context of études—the metronome is a constant 
feature of musical learning. Seeing the pianist on screen with a visible metronome 
portrays the pianist’s body as already technologically mediated by mechanical supports 
and tools.44 
 Lizée also questions whether the metronome is really a tool to perfect the body. As 
with Björk, whose music ‘never asks us to believe that technological or sensory 
prostheses will make our becoming bodies whole or well’,45 in Lizée’s reworking of this 
moment, the metronome never seems to be a norm to which Phillips should aspire. For 
one, the metronome click is slightly offset from the rhythm of the melody that Phillip—
and the live pianist—are playing in unison. Furthermore, as Lizée loops the short clip over 
and over, she slightly varies its length (see Figure 12.8). Each time she restarts the phrase 
(for example, at the beginning of bar 305), the metronome click sounds early. The 
prosthetic, then, seems to falter amidst a live human body that stays consistent. This 
impression is made even more clear when Lizée adds another layer of sound, an 
irregularly clicking electronic sound that amplifies the sense of technological irregularity 
(beginning at 00:11:05). 
 
44Ironically, Rupert dismissively tells Phillip in the film, ‘I thought only beginners [use a metronome]’. 
45Iverson (2016), 170, referencing Erin Manning’s concept of the ‘becoming body’. 
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Figure 12.8. ‘Rope—The Party Étude, bars 304-309’.46 
 
 Mark Wigley—who writes about architecture and buildings as a prosthetic—
suggests that when using a prosthetic, ‘the body itself becomes artifice’.47 The artifice of 
the body is a common theme throughout the Hitchcock Études. The loops and cutting 
techniques used by Lizée in the film make the characters seem to move in jarring and 
sudden ways. The body of the performer also often seems artificial or strange. The fact 
that the listener is often uncertain whether pianistic sound occurs live or on the 
soundtrack means that the live pianist’s body seem artificial when those expectations are 
subverted. The artificiality of the body also becomes apparent when the body seems to 
be constructed out of multiple disjunct parts. This aligns with the way that Samuel Wilson 
describes the prosthetic, claiming that ‘not only is the body extended as a part within a 
system of technology, but the body itself comes to be thought of as a system of 
 
46Lizée (2010), 29. 
47Wigley (1991), 9. 
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constituent parts.’48 This is true from the perspective of the performer, whose 
subjectivity is exposed as split. And it is also true from an aesthetic perspective, even 
insofar as the pianist’s body must simultaneously complete several different tasks that 
seem to work together as a system—listening to the click track, listening to the 
soundtrack, and ideally watching the video, alongside ‘simply’ playing the piano. 
 It is not only the stuttering Bates’ body that ‘fails’ in the Hitchcock Études. 
Throughout, the sonic and visual aesthetic is pervaded by what Lizée calls ‘glitch’. The 
term alludes to an 80s and 90s movement in electronic music marked by sounds that 
seem to have been created in error, such as vinyl scratches and static.49 In Lizée’s music, 
the phenomenon of glitch extends even beyond sound. The video, too, often features 
seemingly faulty visuals. This theme is set up by the opening étude, ‘Psycho—The Saul 
Bass Étude’, which takes its visual material from graphic designer Saul Bass’ famous title 
sequence for the 1960 film. In the sequence, Bass presents the typography as horizontal 
and vertical bars, which are often offset from each other, giving the impression of a 
television screen in which the image is composed of horizontal lines that do not line up. 
The use of glitch as a pervasive aesthetic principle throughout the piece yet again 
emphasises failure itself as a norm and questions the notion of a whole body. 
 
48Wilson (2017), 145. 
49In electronic and computer music, the term ‘glitch’ to refer to a genre of style of music dates to the late 
1990s. Early studies of this musical trend can be found in Kim Cascone, ‘The Aesthetics of Failure: “Post-
Digital” Tendencies in Contemporary Computer Music’ Computer Music Journal 24.4 (2000) and Torben 
Sangild, ‘Glitch—The Beauty of Malfunction’, Bad Music: The Music We Love to Hate, ed. Christopher 
Washburn and Maiken Derno (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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Figure 12.9. Psycho (1960), distorted title sequence. Hitchcock Études (video), 00:00:38. 
 
 Lizée’s music also does this in a way that is fundamentally tied to the medium of 
the cinema. Mary Ann Doane suggests that the traditional relationship between sound 
and image in the cinema is to construct organic whole bodies. Of early ‘talkies’, she 
writes: ‘The attributes of this fantasmatic body are first and foremost unity (through the 
emphasis on a coherence of the senses) and presence-to-itself. The addition of sound to 
the cinema introduces the possibility of re-presenting a fuller (and organically unified) 
body, and of confirming the status of speech as an individual property right.’50 According 
to this reading, one might think that the addition of live music in Lizée’s video and sound 
pieces further extends the possibility of the full and coherent body, from the perspective 
of both the film and the performers. However, Lizée’s études instead understand 
technological mediation as normative and the human body as porous. This subverts the 
assumption that the body is improved or made whole by its electronic appendages, thus 
also upending the logic that cinematic sound makes the body whole. 
 
50Doane (1980), 34. 
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 By destabilising the idea of the body as whole, coherent, and capable of 
perfection, the prosthetic relationships and posthuman entanglements in Lizée’s 
Hitchcock Études thus also reflect on the étude as a genre. The idea that the étude—a 
virtuosic genre—might be situated at the intersection between technology and the body 
nevertheless has a longer history. As Julian Johnson writes:  
[The] ambivalence of the mechanical and the human, technology and nature, is 
enshrined in the figure of the piano virtuoso, bringing together a contradictory set of 
interrelated topoi. On the one hand, the virtuoso is a kind of heroic figure who, in the 
realm of performance technique, extends the boundaries of human endeavour like 
some aesthetic explorer; on the other, the machine-like precision and speed calls up 
the spectre of something inhuman, either a supernatural and diabolical force, or else 
that of the machine.51  
Johnson writes here about the 19th century virtuoso, yet this legacy carries forward to 
Lizée’s virtuosity études. The performer in Lizée’s études both extends the body (through 
new techniques and prosthetic limbs) and also becomes herself more machine. These two 
poles need no longer be in tension as they were previously, however. As Samuel Wilson 
writes, in the context of the 20th and 21st centuries, ‘[the] prostheses [of music and 
instruments] have more recently been instrumental in enabling us to posit and interrogate 
the body in a historical moment in which its matter is itself in question’.52 Lizée’s études—
as bodily extension and mechanical reconfigurations—are thus also questions about the 
composition of the body and offer a recognition of its status as inherently incomplete and 
already technological. 
 Changing notions of the body, especially in its relationship to technology, thus 
also change the kind of work—or ‘study’—that an étude might do.  Lizée is explicit that 
her use of the étude involves experimentation. She writes: 
 
51Johnson (2015), 143-144. 
52Wilson (2017), 150. 
 209 
The idea of the ‘étude’ extends into other components—the film techniques, dramatic 
elements, glitch as a performance practice, recontextualization of typically non-
musical elements (the use of a stutter as musical material, for example), and even the 
role of the click track. I wanted the études to encompass as wide of a range of 
challenges as film does.53 
Indeed, as études for the performer, they confront novel problems for the body 
according to an understanding of the body as an amalgam of parts rather than a fixed and 
stable unit. According to Lizée, ‘all performances call for precision but in the case of glitch 
pieces it embraces the unlikely, the unnatural, the irrational…. It’s this kind of precision 
that creates a new type of virtuosity. The glitch lures the performer to interact and 
express differently and to add new performance practices to their roster.’54 This kind of 
virtuosity is explicitly posthuman in the way that it treats performer and machine as 
continuous and collaborative. The tension required of the performer is to be precise in a 
way that attends to the fallibility of technology, or technology’s glitch. In this way, it 
brings the human and machine closer together. 
 As Lizée suggests, learning these pieces forces the performer to assimilate new 
sets of skills, which they are then able to incorporate into future practice and 
performance. This again reflects a tension at the heart of the étude as a genre—that it 
both reinforces and subverts the concept of the work. Here, as in the 19th century, the 
étude is evidently composed as a standalone (set) of piece(s) and designed for the 
concert hall. Going along with the public presentation in concert, it creates the illusion of 
a coherent sense of meaning, and a guise of authenticity. At the same time, the evident 
pedagogical ends of the piece lend a slight challenge to the idea of a work as artwork for 
its own sake, as does the gain that a performer might accrue in the service of other pieces. 
 The same is true of Lizée’s understanding of the pieces as ‘chamber music’, 
 
53Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
54Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
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referring to the click track in particular as an ‘irrational ensemble member’55 in the 
performance. This speaks to a truly posthuman orientation of distributed creativity and 
collaboration. It is not simply that she sees the click track, electronic soundtrack, and 
video as accompanying or playing alongside the pianist; instead, in her words, she ‘strived 
to stretch and reimagine the scope of what an étude could imply that could address 
different ideas about what [she] thinks chamber music or concert music could be.’56 The 
identification of posthuman collaboration as a kind of chamber music is telling, especially 
as Lizée suggests that ‘it is essential for the performer to form a partnership with this new 
instrument/ensemble member and to accept—even assume—its traits’.57 Indeed, pianist 
Christopher Morano has detailed several techniques for  learning the piece that involve 
active partnership between the human pianist and technological apparati, such as slowing 
down the video/soundtrack/click track for practice at various speeds, and memorizing the 
soundtrack itself.58 As performance études, the notion of a ‘chamber music’ étude is 
already novel—études  are traditionally exclusively for solo instruments. The idea that the 
étude could specifically train the interaction between a human pianist and an electronic 
soundtrack furthers the notion that the étude pushes at the limits of the body. 
 These are not only études for performers, though, and draw on the tradition of 
études also being exercises or studies of composition. They allow Lizée to develop and 
explore new compositional techniques, specifically in the realm of film and glitch, and 
provide examples which other composers might follow. It is notable that Lizée also 
describes learning during her compositional process. For example, her method of 
transcription has ‘tested and stretched my capacity as a notator and composer. There 
were moments of pain. But I’m better for it - it brought me to different places and 
 
55Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
56Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
57Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
58Morano (2016), 43. 
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opened my brain.’59 Likewise, Lizée recounts her growth as a film editor, especially in the 
composition of the Hitchcock Études, her first work for film with live instruments. She 
describes: ‘when there comes to a point when I don’t immediately know how to create 
something visually I have to figure out a way.’60 
 These techniques not only stretch Lizée as a composer, but also expand the 
boundaries and capabilities of film itself, reinforcing a posthuman approach in which 
machines—like humans—can extend, grow, and learn. Lizée mentions in the introduction 
to her piece that she was inspired by Douglas Gordon’s art installation 24 Hour Psycho, in 
which Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960) is stretched to take place over an entire day. Her 
reading of Gordon’s work is that it ‘[uncovers] the unforeseen ‘micro-narratives’ lurking in 
Hitchcock’s film’,61 something she also strives to accomplish. By looping, slowing, and 
experimenting with short scenes, Lizée allows viewers of the Hitchcock Études to see 
these films and characters in new ways. In Lizée’s hands, the medium of film gains new 
abilities, and becomes capable of commentary, interpretation, and uncovering. 
 There are other relevant post-human collaborators in the piece, besides the 
technological ones already discussed. As I have described, all of the visual material in the 
piece is taken from films by Alfred Hitchcock—distorted, re-edited, and looped. These 
films—and the scenes that Lizée chooses to explore—are rich in cinematographic and 
historic allusions. As Lizée claims, ‘these characters have seriously been in my brain for 
years: their timbres, inflections and visual expressions.’62It is not only in Lizée’s brain that 
the characters have been percolating, of course, but also in the lens of cinematographic 
history, and they are also already in many viewer’s and performer’s brains when they 
view and perform the Études.  The characters themselves are thus active participants in 
 
59Lizée (2019), email with author. 
60Lizee (2019), email with the author. 
61Lizée (2010), 1. 
62Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
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the performance, as ‘instruments and ensemble members’.63 Indeed, even if the pianist 
has never seen the films to which the Hitchcock Études refer, it is necessary in practising 
to become intimate with—as Lizée has—‘their timbres, inflections, and visual expressions’. 
The act of playing these pieces, which in many cases requires imitating and synchronising 
with such idiosyncratic sonic gestures as Norman Bates’ stutter and Doris Day’s 
exaggerated singing—each meticulously transcribed by Lizée—performs a kind of intimacy 
with the characters on screen. When the pianist is memorizing the soundtrack, they are 
not merely collaborating with a technological device, but also memorizing the intimate 
rhythms and patterns of a character’s voice: in the case of Norman Bates, a voice that by 
its failure is particularly revealing. Alongside the characters, Nicole Lizée, and the pieces’ 
performers, also collaborate with Alfred Hitchcock, in what Jason Stanyek and Benjamin 
Piekut might describe as an intermundane interpenetration between living and dead.64 
 Given the proposition at the heart of this project—that concert études in the 20th 
and 21st centuries offer a way to examine and understand the limits of the body—Lizée’s 
technological étude experiments probe the limits of the body in ways that are distinctly 
posthuman. On the most basic level, it is obvious that Lizée uses the étude to extend the 
limits of the body by incorporating electronics and video into the live performance. 
However, the more interesting way in which the limits of the body are questioned in 
these études concerns how these technological entanglements question the nature and 
composition of the body itself. The technological implements that function as prosthetics 
are used in such a way as to reject the idea that prosthesis might make flawed bodies 
whole. Active collaboration between human and technological performers makes the 
boundary between the two more flexible, as do Lizée’s playful experiments with 
subverting hierarchies of imitation between human and machine. These études not only 
 
63Lizée (2019), email with the author. 
64see Stanyek and Piekut (2014). 
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offer a commentary on contemporary doubts about the unity of the body, but also use 
the étude—an embodied practice of performance—to enact and construct a ‘new body’.65 	
 
65Noe (2012), 53. 
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Étude 13: Case Study—Nicole Lizée’s ‘Stutter 
Étude’ 
 
Nicole Lizée’s Hitchcock Études seem to push away from the idea that études are 
pedagogical works. Rather than being isolated sets of études, they are through-composed 
and designed exclusively for performance, as they include a full technological setup 
including video and audio. They are, in the most literal way, a spectacle to behold, visually 
and sonically. And yet, for the pianist that learns them, there is an undeniable pedagogical 
benefit. As pianists of mixed-music have noted, the performance of pianistic works 
incorporating video and electronics involves a learning curve for all performers. Zubin 
Kanga writes of works in this medium, that ‘the skills required to perform these works are 
unique, and the skill for the composer in establishing a relationship between pianist and 
screen that is both innovative and effective is similarly new and relatively uncharted’.1 As 
such, I suggest that the title of the étude carries with it a suggestion of pedagogy that 
conjures the idea of learning, and encourages pianists to confront the pieces in a 
pedagogical way, especially given the relative novelty of the skills involved, and their 
potential usefulness for the performance of other works for piano, electronics, and video. 
Taking this impulse seriously, I consider the latent aspects of pedagogy to be found in 
Nicole Lizée’s Hitchcock Études. If there is pedagogy in them, what kind of pedagogy is it?  
For whom is its training—the pianist, the composer, the technology, or none of these?   
I return here to the notion of study proposed by Frank Moten and Stefano Harney 
that I mentioned in Étude 10 on Ligeti’s L’Escalier du diable. As Moten and Harney 
describe in Undercommons—a manifesto and critical exploration of radical knowledge 
 
1Kanga (2017). 
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creation and learning—‘study is something we do together… talking and walking around 
with other people, working, dancing, suffering, some irreducible convergence of all three, 
held under the name of speculative practice.’2 
Their notion of study will linger throughout this reflection on pedagogy in 
numerous ways. In particular, I will take their suggestion that ‘study’ is ‘speculative 
practice’. First, their assessment of ‘study’ treats it as both a verb and a noun. They avoid 
the infinitive—‘to study’—instead emphasising that ‘study’ is a thing: in the case of music, 
it is quite literally a ‘thing’, as a piece of music. At the same time, they highlight that study 
is ‘a thing we do’: an action verb. Their use of the work ‘practice’ further calls on the 
embodied, process-oriented, and active nature of ‘study’, drawing on the praxis theory of 
the Frankfurt school, and indeed of critical pedagogy theory. With Paulo Freire, critical 
pedagogical praxis encompasses both ‘reflection and action directed at the structures to 
be transformed’3, and indeed, at the piano and in the musical study, a necessary 
component of learning is ‘practising’, through reflection, action, and repetition. Finally, the 
kind of practice that Moten and Harney propose is encompassed by ‘study’ is 
‘speculative’. I find this notion an inspiring and useful one with respect to the concert 
étude at the piano. A study asks a question—as each of the Études in my thesis have—but 
rather than relying on the pursuit of set answers, is a medium of wondering, questioning, 
and exploring the asking in practice. 
Given this orientation, this pedagogical investigation will explore the questions for 
speculation that Nicole Lizée’s Hitchcock Études raise. Perhaps the most obvious—about 
which Lizée has often spoken—is ‘the use of a stutter as musical material’.4  In several 
obvious ways, Lizée has treated the stutter as material for composition, which I have 
explored in the previous chapter. Yet the stutter is also used as musical material for the 
 
2Moten and Harney (2013), 110. 
3Freire (2007), 126. 
4Lizée, email with the author. 
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performer, in collaboration with the video, and the soundtrack. In fact, the pianist learns, 
through repetition and coordinating, how to exactly imitate the unnatural rhythms of the 
stutter. Ironically, these are closely notated in the score—and transcription is an important 
part of Lizée’s composition practice. To the listener, they sound like natural and irregular 
occurrences, as a stutter is, after all, a disruption or break to speech, rather than 
something calculated. However, for the performer, they must be executed precisely, 
alongside the clicktrack, in tandem with the electronics and video, and adhering to the 
precise notation in the score. 
This novel musical material offers the pianist a pedagogical lens into aspects of 
sound they would not otherwise have access to, via notation. As Lizée writes, ‘the 
process of transcription is a direct portal to the minutiae of sound. It is the epitome of 
active listening. It uncovers what is lurking underneath (whether real or imagined). 
Transcription and notation of sounds that weren’t intended to be expressed in musical 
notation—corruption, malfunction, and foley sounds—leads one down another portal.’5 In 
this respect, the question posed by the stutter is not simply ‘how can the stutter be 
treated as musical material?’, but also ‘what is the relationship between diegetic and non-
diegetic music?’ and ‘what is the relationship between human and machine?’ After all, the 
performer is forced to tangibly confront the different kinds of sounds in the film, going 
back and forth between diegetic and non-diegetic sounds, between foley sounds and 
soundtrack. In the process, the pianist must become comfortable with both kinds of film 
accompaniment, and yet retain a certain detachment in order to stay with the soundtrack. 
By learning the notes and rhythms with precision, the pianist learns to become more like 
a machine, but in the process, has become more like a human after all. 
From this pedagogical perspective, we imagine and are aware of all of the 
participants learning to imitate each other. For example, the pianist begins by playing 
 
5Lizée, email with the author. 
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synchronically with the diegetic sounds from the film, punctuating especially Bates’ 
stutter on ‘fa-fal-fals’.  Alongside music, and in its tireless repetition, the text begins to 
lose its semantic feeling and sound like a musical vocalisation: reminiscent, for example, 
of a ‘fa-la-la’. As the piece goes on, the pianist’s figures become longer and denser, 
exceeding the diegetic sounds, as does the electronic sound world, which begins to 
repeat the word ‘because’ and adds eerie sonic and visual echoes (an electronic stutter of 
sorts).  As the piece ends, the voice eventually becomes so distorted that it is no longer 
understood as words but as sound, at first seeming to finish the sentence, but in fact 
doing so nonsensically. Although the pianist is the only performer on stage, these are not 
études for solo piano, but in fact collaborative études for multiple participants—human 
and technological—to learn and develop together in practice. 
Of course, in thinking of the question or problem of the stutter as musical material, 
we must also attend to the implications of the stutter itself. Especially in Lizée’s 
exaggerated treatment—in which the sound of the stutter is also emphasized by visual 
jump cuts—encountering the stutter makes us powerfully confront its source: the human 
body. As listeners—and as a pianist—it is as if we are working through the stutter with the 
character. Notice how, as the passage goes on, the piano line moves from simply 
punctuating the rhythm of the stutter, to creating an organic sense of emergence and 
growth within each utterance on the word ‘because’—the word where his sentence fails. 
Each time, the gaps between Bates’ stuttered syllables are filled in with more and more 
notes, coaxing, guiding, helping him to finish his sentence (the etymology of pedagogy 
containing, after all, ‘agogic’, meaning to guide). And so is it any surprise when his 
sentence finishes absurdly with a line not in the film at all—‘because the body, because 
the body, because the body, because the body…’—which according to Lizée was created 
by combining the line with the first line of the following movement (‘are you going to 
play’, spoken by Mrs. Atwater) and distorting both. The problem of the body, the site of 
 218 
learning for the performer, is thus put on display. In this respect, Lizée is engaging with an 
erotics of pedagogy, in which pedagogy is physical, engaged, embodied. 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, another important aspect of the stutter on 
screen and as music is that it represents a failure of the body—which relates to Lizée’s 
ongoing interest in the ‘fallibility of media’, and in particular her aesthetic of glitch that 
emerges from 1990s electronic music and the exposition of technological error. Both 
fictionally and practically, these technological failures are paired with human failures: in 
the stutter on screen and in the human pianist. The notation in the score is meticulously 
and surprisingly precise, considering it is documenting the uncertainty of a stuttered 
phrase. As a listener, the placement of the words feels uneven and unpredictable, arriving 
always a beat earlier or later than anticipated. As such, the performer is caught between 
the uneven spacing of sounds and images, and the highly measured score. This is 
accomplished notationally using different subdivisions of beats, including semi-quavers, 
quintuplets, and sextuplets, and keeping many of the vocalisations on off-beats. Each of 
the three faltered utterances of the opening of the word ‘falsity’, for example, come on 
off-beats, until the full word finally released on the downbeat of the next bar (see Figure 
13.1) 
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Figure 13.1. ‘fal-, fal-, fals-, falsity’ in ‘Psycho—Stutter Étude’.6 
 
Even with tremendous amounts of practice, there is always something different about 
the way a pianist interprets a rhythm like this—working backwards from a fully formed, 
metrical score—compared with the way the rhythm sounds on the track. Paradoxically, 
the pianist has a tendency to sound and feel more rhythmic and controlled, where the 
track has the illusion of freedom, because we are primed to hear and understand the text 
semantically and recognize the breaks in its flow as natural.   
These problems—or questions—highlight tensions in the performance of mixed-
music in general: a difference in perception between the appearance of music coming 
from electronic sources and music coming from live sources, and a difference between 
the way the performance of live sounds feels to the performer versus how it is perceived. 
Even when the performer succeeds at this task, there is always the horizon of failure; 
always the feeling that something isn’t quite as expected. By emphasizing technological 
failures in the electronic components of her music, Lizée exposes failure as an essential 
 
6Lizée (2010), 17. 
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aspect of human pedagogy—a part of a process of learning and growing—and also invites 
pianists to treat these pieces as pedagogical, and treat the different études as isolating 
specific problems of mixed-music performance that might train a new kind of human-
machine virtuosity and eventually assist in the performance of other works. 
Furthermore, Lizée’s Hitchcock Études contain an orientation towards pedagogy 
that emphasises the fact that as a pianist, one is only a small part of the performance of 
such a piece. This is consistently emphasised in Lizée’s pieces, perhaps most tellingly in 
the dynamic instruction: ‘the dynamic of the piano should never overtake track except at 
the very end of the étude’.7 
Listening to a click track provides a perceptual confusion for any performer, that 
makes us aware, if not of our failings per se, at least of the fact that human perception is 
not ubiquitous, or all-encompassing, but radically subjective. For example, significant 
research suggests that human performers do not execute rhythms with mathematical 
precision, even when these are extremely simple.8 Listening to and performing with a 
click track is an experience that renders a performer sometimes frustrated, but also often 
humble, in the face of another way of rendering rhythm in the world—not objective, but 
simply other. It is an experience that places human and machine in conversation, in which 
both are asked to confront their relative inadequacies with respect to each other. 
Because Lizée’s Hitchcock Études explore this problem by asking the human performer to 
imitate a human sound—in the case of the ‘Stutter Étude’, a faltering human voice—with 
mechanical precision, they emphasise the strangeness of this problem, as well as the way 
in which both human and machine are in a process of change and growth. Furthermore, 
they allow the limits of the human body to be reconfigured: understood in terms of what 
human and machine can accomplish together when learning from each other. 
 
7Lizée (2010), 17. 
8See Alf Gabrielsson, ‘Perception and Performance of Musical Rhythm’, in Music, Mind, and Brain: The 
Neuropsychology of Music, ed. Manfred Clynes (New York: Plenum, 1982), pp. 163-68. 
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CODA 
 
So far, I have discussed these sets of études by Conlon Nancarrow, John Cage, György 
Ligeti, and Nicole Lizée separately, using different bodies of theoretical literature. 
Although the discussions have been quite disparate, historical correspondences between 
these four sets of works have emerged. For example, both Ligeti’s Études pour Piano and 
Cage’s Etudes Australes were written after their respective composers had heard—and 
been impressed by—Nancarrow’s studies. John Cage was among the first people to hear 
Nancarrow’s music and promoted it as early as 1960. The way in which Nancarrow’s 
works deliberately push beyond the boundaries of the human at the keyboard can be 
clearly heard in Cage’s Etudes Australes, written indeed just after Cage had visited 
Nancarrow in Mexico in 1974. Like Nancarrow, Cage experiments in the his Etudes 
Australes with multiple layers of writing, rather than being confined to the bounds of two 
hands, with using the entire range of the instrument, and with extremes of speed. 
 Likewise, Ligeti began composing his Études pour Piano soon after he was 
introduced to Nancarrow’s music. In their early encounters, both composers were keen 
to comment upon pre-existing latent similarities in their works. Ligeti wrote to Charles 
Amirkhanian, Nancarrow’s producer, that he was struck by ‘analogies between his and my 
music (however, the style is at the base very different). He couldn’t know my music, and I 
had no idea of his until May 1980—so the analogies are result of some common ideas 
which are “in the air” at a certain time, in a certain cultural-artistic context’.9 If similar 
ideas were ‘in the air’ for both composers in 1980, the addition of tangible contact did 
not diminish the ‘analogies’ between their work thereafter. Ligeti turned to writing piano 
studies almost immediately after this encounter: his first set of Etudes pour Piano was 
 
9Letter from Gyorgy Ligeti to Charles Amirkhanian, 4 January 1981. 
 223 
published in 1985. The studies exploit many similar radical temporal layerings and push at 
the frontiers of human capabilities in much the same way as Nancarrow surpassed them. 
Ligeti’s Etude 14a, famously, is so difficult that it was thought unplayable at the time it 
was composed. Further cementing the relationship to Nancarrow, Ligeti had it arranged 
for player piano to acknowledge its superhuman difficulty.10 
 Nicole Lizée is from a generation younger than that of Cage, Ligeti, and Nancarrow: 
she was born in 1974, as many of these pieces were being composed. Nonetheless, her 
conceptual and compositional lineage to Nancarrow is undeniable. Even if her own 
investigations are based on the temporal extremes that followed and were ushered in by 
Nancarrow’s work, rather than an encounter with Nancarrow directly, her interest in 
using analogue means—live performers—to finely control precise, subtle shifts in tempo 
and simultaneous layers is remarkably like the fine control of the player piano. Indeed, the 
click track operates in much the same way as Nancarrow’s player piano—as a way to 
control for the inability of live, human performers to manipulate tempo with extreme 
precisions. Similarly to Nancarrow, Lizée frequently employs nostalgic allusions and 
obsolete instruments in her work: her keyboard études feature clips from classic black 
and white films, her sonic palette includes frequent reference to 1-bit video game 
sounds, and in other pieces she has composed for the 1970s electronic game Simon. 
 Beyond their shared titles and these historical links and lineages, what else ties my 
analysis of these four sets of pieces together? All of the theories I have used explore 
different aspects of the limits of the body. I have emphasised the way that the étude 
genre is capable of expanding what is possible for human bodies: whether that expansion 
happens through challenging the body to accomplish new tasks, reframing how the 
boundaries of possibility are configured, or extending the body using technology. 
 In this way, I suggest that the étude also has the capacity to change our 
 
10The arrangement was done by Juergen Hocker for performance in Donaueschingen in 1994, and can be 
viewed on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3rNy06IVdY 
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assumptions. The étude is unusual as a genre, as it is embedded in the body: both 
through the virtuosic display of the concert hall and the quotidian banality of practising. 
The fact that études are often concerned with fundamental problems of technique or 
composition means that they are also in a position specifically to reframe what we take 
for granted. Nancarrow’s expansive collection of Studies for Player Piano, for example, 
each explore novel rhythmic and temporal relationships. Although they were not even 
composed for human bodies, they have radically shaped the kinds of temporalities with 
which later composers have experimented. As a result, performers have attempted 
rhythmic feats that previously would never have been dreamed to be possible. 
 Études quite simply have a way of getting inside of the body and under the skin; 
they not only show up in the concert hall but embed themselves in the bodies of those 
that practice and learn them. It is from this position that they are so fundamentally tied to 
divergent cultural trends—as I argued in Book I—and therefore offer a unique perspective 
on their cultural context. It is also from this position that they hold the power to 
challenge and change those very same bodies, which I suggest these late 20th and early 
21st century études do by questioning the idea of the body in general. 
 In Book I, I emphasised the ways in which the étude as a genre was closely 
connected to cultural and aesthetic trends in the 19th century, even when these were in 
tension with each other. It is a genre that has the capacity to both reflect on and shape 
its context. In my reflections in the Coda, I will return to this idea. What revelations do 
these four sets of études offer about their respective contexts of composition and the 
period of 1950-2010? In what ways do they, and have they, shaped 20th-century 
aesthetics and culture? 
 One framework that I will use to discuss these études in relationship to one 
another is with respect to the title ‘transcendental’ that Liszt used to refer to his own 
études. Samson defines Liszt’s transcendence as ‘a sense in which virtuosity might reach 
beyond (transcend) not just our normal expectations of human skills, but anything 
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measurable or even imaginable within human existence’.11 Indeed, both Chopin’s and 
Liszt’s études make a point of emphasising difficulty, pedagogy, process, and pushing the 
body beyond its means.  While pushing the body outwards, these études also push form 
and structure inwards, finding ways to weave works made up of technical problems 
rather than themes, transcending also the bounds of what a work might be. They 
transcend, too, in their celebration of surplus, excess, and surface, allowing these layers 
to detach and exist as objects of value in their own right. Yet transcendental is also 
related to the Kantian idea of the transcendental subject. The idea that human beings 
exist as stable, perceiving selves—and that bodies might aspire to pre-determined ideals 
of the human—is tied to a 19th century concept of subjecthood that has been thoroughly 
questioned in the 20th century. 
 I reframe the four sets of études that I study as post-transcendental, in their 
encounters with virtuosity, the work of art, and the subject. The prefix ‘post-’ signifies, on 
the one hand, that they go beyond the previous limits of Liszt’s ‘transcendental 
execution’. They are more demanding, more extreme, and more adventurous than Liszt’s 
technical experiments. Of course, this is partly the case because they are so much later 
than Liszt’s études, and ‘post’ also refers here to temporal succession: the études of 
Cage, Lizée, Ligeti, and Nancarrow reflect what happens after the transcendental. They 
no longer adhere to a transcendental virtuosity, or a transcendental subject, or a romantic 
ideal of the work of art. The final meaning of post-transcendental in my analysis is the 
idea that these études are self-conscious and self-critical, reflecting and commenting on 
their genre and their relationship to the transcendental virtuosity of the past. Even the 
fact that each set is deliberately given the title of ‘étude’ or ‘study’ already sets up this 
self-conscious reflection. This relationship to the past, therefore, signifies both continuity 
and rupture, and the post-transcendental nature of these études inevitably implies a close 
connection between the pieces I have discussed in Book II and their antecedents 
 
11Samson (2004), 87. 
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explored in Book I. Thus, in considering these études post-transcendental, I also 
significantly return to the themes that I introduced in Book I in order to show how they 
prefigured and setup the kinds of possibilities that later composers could explore. 
 At the same time, I wish to emphasise that the notion of the post-transcendental is 
not specific to the repertoire that I have studied here, or indeed even specific to the 
étude. The fact that it finds a natural home in the étude genre—and that these particular 
étude-titled pieces have key relationships and similarities—simply make the études a 
useful starting point for examining broader questions of 20th century virtuosity in a 
focused way. The reflections that follow will in fact reflect a more expansive notion of 
post-transcendental virtuosity that occur in a wide range of musics and cultural products, 
exemplified in rather than limited to the étude. 
 
Virtuosity 
The performing arts [...] have indeed a strong affinity with politics. Performing artists-
dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like — need an audience to show their 
virtuosity, just as acting men need the presence of others before whom they can 
appear; both need a publicly organized space for their `work,' and both depend upon 
others for the performance itself. 
--Hannah Arendt12 
In order to better understand the post-transcendental virtuosity of these pieces taken 
together, I turn to the work of another thinker on virtuosity outside of the musical 
sphere. Political theorist Paolo Virno offers a theory of virtuosity that clarifies the close 
relationship between the étude and the political world. According to Virno, ‘all virtuosity 
is inherently political’13 just as all politics is inherently virtuosic. He develops this 
 
12Hannah Arendt, Between the Past and Future (New York: Penguin Classics, 1961), 45. 
13Paulo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life (Cambridge: MIT 
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definition and understanding of virtuosity from both Hannah Arendt and Aristotle. For 
Aristotle, there exists in human behaviour a distinction between poesis (production) and 
praxis (action). The fundamental difference between these two lies in their material 
instantiation. Whereas poesis results in the production of some object in the world, praxis 
is action. It is this second kind of human behaviour, praxis, that Virno designates as 
virtuosic, because it is ‘activity which finds its purpose in itself without settling into a 
finished product’.14 Indeed, the suspicion and amazement with which virtuosos were 
accorded in the 19th century was predicated precisely on this quality of finding purpose 
exclusively in itself. The common charge of ‘superficiality’, for example, had to do with 
the technical brilliance of the performer being not in the service of a musical work or an 
idea, but rather for its own sake. As in the case of the piano étude, technical skill is both 
the form and content of virtuosity. 
 Virno’s theory of virtuosity is especially useful here because of his interest in a 
change in the relationship between labour and politics in the late 20th century with the 
era of post-industrialism. For Virno, this new age is characterised by new forms of labour, 
in which all production is ‘virtuosic’. With the rise of automation, the decline of the 
factory, and the transition to ‘knowledge economies’ and ‘cognitive capitalism’, labour in 
general has come to replicate the form of the culture industry. 
 This was not the case in the 19th century, as Chopin and Liszt were composing 
études and defining the form of the virtuoso. Virno echoes Marx’s assumptions about 
labour under 19th century industrial capitalism, in which performing artists were the 
exception: their labour consisted not of production, but instead of the action itself. In 
contrast to the dominant mode of labour, virtuosos were exceptions in the 19th century. 
This is not to say that virtuosos themselves were rare, as Paul Metzner’s account of 
virtuosity in Paris details, but rather that the kind of labour in which they were 
 
Press, 2004), 53. 
14Virno (2004), 52. 
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participating differed from the general conditions of capitalism. 
 As the economic conditions of capitalism have changed, the act of virtuosity has 
become more ubiquitous beyond the musical and performance sphere. Capitalism in 
general has taken on characteristics formerly reserved to performance. Virno’s account 
lends credence to the notion of a close relationship between social conditions, political 
action, and virtuosic activity, while explaining a context in which 20th and 21st-century 
composers of études might take a radically different approach to the limits of the body. 
 All four of the composers that I have discussed wrote in the context of late 
capitalism and ubiquitous virtuosity described by Virno. I suggest that common threads 
between these works point to the creation of a distinct post-transcendental virtuosic 
technique. In general, this change is marked by a shift away from the idea of technique as 
something universal: a goal which—when achieved—would gain pianists access to the 
ability to perform other works. Instead, post-transcendental technique is reframed as 
material and contingent. 
  One aspect shared by these new virtuosities is a skilfulness of imitation. This is 
most pronounced in Nicole Lizée’s études for piano, video, and glitch, in which the 
rhythms of the pianist are synchronised with the speech of characters in the film. I have 
described already the way in which the ‘Stutter Étude’ creates a sense of disorientation 
because pianist must be precise and deliberate in their execution, while the effect created 
by the stutter is haphazard and accidental. This disorientation is not only a 
phenomenological property of performance, or an aesthetic manifestation of post-human 
performativity and technological failure. Lizée describes: 
All performances call for precision but in the case of glitch pieces it embraces the 
unlikely, the unnatural, the irrational. Nothing is quantized - so I need to use 
whatever means possible to properly convey this new unreasonable instrument. 
Technically this will mean very specific metre changes, constant tempo changes, new 
written terms, etc. It’s this kind of precision that creates a new type of virtuosity. The 
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glitch lures the performer to interact and express differently and to add new 
performance practices to their roster.15 
Lizée's own reference to a ‘new type of virtuosity’ addresses the highly specific difficulty 
of imitating the irrational using extreme precision. 
 In contrast to the kinds of technical skills generally treated as virtuosic, what is 
noticeable about this piece is that its technical virtuosity is not replicable. Although based 
on imitation, the specific skill of imitating a voice is contingent on the particularities of the 
voice being imitated. This is exaggerated by Norman Bates’ stutter: learning to perform 
this étude requires precisely conforming to an irregular and unpredictable rhythm. As a 
result, to perform another piece based on the rhythms of a different stuttering speaker 
would require a completely new training. 
 Thus, this new virtuosity is fundamentally tied to particular human bodies: not only 
the specific bodies of the performers, but also the body and speech patterns of the voice 
being imitated. Instead of virtuosity being a property that relates to a specific performer’s 
body while striving towards a universal technical standard, here the performer’s body 
achieves virtuosity by aspiring towards a particular technical effect.  Not only is this 
technical effect highly specific, it is also an effect created by a failure of speech. As a 
failure of communication, the stutter itself is in fact almost the opposite of a traditionally 
virtuosic property. By creating a new virtuosity that is achieved by the difficult, skilful 
imitation of such a phenomenon, Lizée moves virtuosity away from a transcendental 
quality—an aspiration towards technical greatness that translates to a general, universal 
facility at the instrument—into something personal, contingent, and specific, and 
therefore non-transferable. 
 The contingency and specificity of this new virtuosity is echoed in Ligeti’s technical 
experiments in ‘Touches bloquées’.  Where 19th century études were lauded especially 
 
15Email from Nicole Lizée to the author, 4 Feb 2019. 
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for their usefulness—a common trope among piano teachers remains that anyone who 
can play all of the Chopin études can learn any piece in the piano repertoire—‘Touches 
bloquées’ trains skills that, while difficult, are decidedly non-useful. The tainted octaves in 
the middle section of the piece, for example, only make it more difficult to play 
conventional octaves. The piece’s primary feature—the technique of playing keys which 
are already held down—requires retraining the ear against the expected relationship 
between striking a key and hearing a sound.  As Jeremy Denk describes, ‘Ligeti directs 
you toward the opposite of what your piano teacher always wanted’.16 As in Nicole 
Lizée’s ‘Stutter Étude’, the piece also requires using notated precision to create the effect 
of instability and change. Although the pianist is playing even, running quavers, the fact 
that some of these are already depressed creates the illusion of missing notes and 
faltering scales, which Ligeti describes in the opening expressive marking as stotterned, or 
“stuttering”. 
 Cage’s Études Australes also requires a kind of imitation. Instead of imitating a 
specific human, though, Cage requires the pianist to imitate a non-human, even non-
planetary entity: the placement of stars on a map. As with the other études, this also 
creates a virtuosity that is not based on universal principles. By shifting the source of 
inspiration for the piece’s goals away from human achievement and towards something 
unachievable by human means, Cage turns virtuosity into something determined by 
contingency, change, and materiality. 
 The contingent, material quality of virtuosic expression is most evident in 
Nancarrow’s player piano studies. In these pieces, the idea of aspiring to transcendent 
human perfection is evidently not present, since there is no human performer. 
Nancarrow claimed to be using technology to extend the possibilities of music beyond 
the capabilities of human minds and bodies. That said, the way in which he did so was 
inherently tied to the material possibilities of the technology with which he was working. 
 
16Denk (2012), www.nonesuch.com [accessed 1 July 2019] 
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Thus, this virtuosity is based not only on extending the human, but also on manipulating 
and extending Nancarrow’s own specific machines. 
 In many ways, this kind of virtuosity shares many features with that of the 19th 
century. For example, both kinds of virtuosity share the quality of being superfluous, 
whether with respect to the notion of the work of art, or to the ideal human subject. The 
subversive and experimental nature of virtuosic expression was very much part of the 
discourse surrounding Liszt in the 19th century, and—as I explored in Book I—extended 
beyond musical virtuosity. 
 In this post-transcendental virtuosity, though, virtuosity has been transformed by 
rejecting and reframing the transcendental subject, reflecting new relationships between 
virtuosity and labour, and shifting from the transcendental and universal to the specific 
and contingent. Above all, the post-transcendental virtuoso abandons the sense that the 
body operates at its limits teleologically, towards a universal goal. The variety in these 
composers’ specific techniques and approaches emphasises the fact that the limits of the 
body can be extended in many directions. 
   
 
The Subject 
One way in which these sets of études reflect new discourses and social ideas is in the 
rejection of 19th century ideas of subjectivity. The close connection in the 19th century 
between virtuosity and the subject makes this transformation logical.  In many of these 
pieces, the notion of a transcendental subject who performs, listens, or composes is 
undermined by the ways that agency is dispersed amongst multiple human and non-
human agents. This is evidently the case, for example, in the études of Lizée and 
Nancarrow. Although Nancarrow’s Studies and Lizée’s Hitchcock Études were written in 
different times and social contexts, both sets of virtuosic studies respond to and confirm 
a notion of the subject that is not unified, transcendental, or even centred in the human. 
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For Lizée, emphasis is placed on the subject as maximally dispersed, and caught between 
the many different technological, fictional, and human subjects composing and 
performing the work. Her études include performances from a live pianist, a pre-written 
video, a hidden clicktrack, an electronic soundtrack, and the many actors on screen. Her 
own characterisation of the piece as ‘chamber music’ explicitly emphasises collaboration 
as a virtuosic quality. Indeed, the subtitle of the piece describes these not as études for 
piano, but rather études ‘for piano, video, and glitch’. Explicitly, then, the agents whose 
virtuosity is being trained and displayed in these études are multiple, composed of both 
humans and machines. The virtuosic subject here is post-transcendental, in that it has not 
only left behind the idea of a unified whole that acts and perceives, but is expanded and 
extended into a collaborative entity. 
 The way Nancarrow explores virtuosic expression through new forms of 
subjectivity is slightly different. In Lizée's Hitchcock Études, the human body is pushed 
beyond its own limits by acknowledging a continuity and collaboration with machines; the 
pianist is able to accomplish new feats of tempo relationships and technical skill with 
assistance from elements like the click track, while all of the performing agents 
collaborate to accomplish the virtuosity on display. Nancarrow, too, allows a machine—
the player piano—to act as an extension of human ability. However, his innovation was to 
treat the human subject as optional, eliminating the human performer from music 
altogether.17 Whereas 19th century virtuosity was essentially a form of self-expression, 
relying heavily on emerging concepts of human subjectivity and individual heroic 
dominance, Nancarrow reconfigures the étude to show that virtuosic expression is 
possible even in the absence of a human subject. 
 The punching machine, which Nancarrow used to perforate, by hand, a hole of 
each of the many notes in his studies, offers an especially interesting critique of the 
subject. The method of perforation is, naturally, related to the binary means of storing 
 
17Even before the rise of electronic composition in the 1950s. 
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information in computing. In this respect, the punching machine is a digital ‘inscription 
technology’, which Katherine Hayles defines as ‘a device [that initiates] material changes 
that can be read as marks’.18 Yet inscription is only one part of the device’s capacity for 
information storage and recognition. The information stored on the piano roll is digital: it 
can therefore be read on any number of devices, transferred into MIDI files, or even used 
to produce a completely different set of sonic (or non-sonic) data. However, the 
experience of watching and producing the music is inseparable from its material. For 
Hayles, this is called ‘incorporation’: ‘an incorporating practice such as a good-bye wave 
cannot be separated from its embodied medium’.19  The punching roll inscribes musical 
information, but the ghostly presence and embodied relations it conjures are 
incorporated. 
 Meanwhile, Ligeti’s boundary-pushing études disrupt the virtuoso subject through 
different means altogether. Amy Bauer has used the term ‘reluctant virtuoso’ to describe 
the way that Ligeti’s Études complicate the 19th-century relationship between virtuosity 
and subjectivity, especially insofar as the 19th-century virtuoso subject was portrayed as 
heroic. 
The heroic signifiers of both "Désordre” and “Vertige” conflict with a modernist 
practice whose reflexive codes establish a critical distance from a compromised 
virtuosic tradition. Performer and composer emerge from these collaborations 
neither as conquering Romantic heroes, nor cynical "anti-heroes" dismantling 
tradition, but unite, in Edward Said’s summation, a humanist sympathy towards the 
past with a dogged resistance and self-reflective critique toward established 
attitudes. But Ligeti’s critical études add something more: in the stubborn attempt to 
synchronize unwieldy cycles in both hands, or yoke a mechanically-produced aural 
illusion to pop harmonies and punishing tempi. Each work rises to a darkly comic 
apotheosis that results partly from the mechanical execution and repetition of 
 
18Hayles (2002), 199. 
19Hayles (1999), 199. 
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virtuosic tropes.... “Désordre” and “Vertige”—and the performers who labour under 
their signs— tacitly acknowledge the contemporary absurdity of the heroic virtuoso, 
while locating that figure in a radically transformed social space.20 
Her assessment of the self-critique implicit in ‘Désordre’ and ‘Vertige’ is equally applicable 
to ‘Touches bloquées’. In this étude, the virtuosic hero is compromised because failure is 
embedded in the piece. A performance of ‘Touches bloquées’ thus takes a self-critical 
stance toward the opposition between success and failure implied by its own extreme 
difficulty and the virtuosic tradition from which it emerges. Here, the ‘reluctant’ virtuoso 
subject is post-transcendental in another sense: the ‘post’ here refers also to self-
reflection on the subject. 
 This self-consciousness is also manifested in the way that failure in ‘Touches 
bloquées’ reframes the idea of a transcendental subject’s universality. Privileging the 
exceptional over the normal has always been part of the project of virtuosity. However, 
the aspirational and heroic quality of 19th century virtuoso rhetoric also tended towards 
extreme success as a goal towards which anyone might aspire. As demonstrated by queer 
theory, failure offers a more complex perspective of subjectivity, in which the 
performance of difficult, painful art can be a critical tool to disrupt notions of self, time 
and normativity.21 In psychoanalysis, the critical potential of failure in fact emerges from 
the recognition of an essential failure within the self and the subject. There is, for Lacan, 
an ‘impediment, failure, crack’22 with which the subject is always plagued, and it is in this 
lacuna that the unconscious emerges. The idea of the subject relies on coherence, but the 
 
20Amy Bauer (2018), unpublished draft, ‘From Pulsation to Sensation: virtuosity, modernism and heroic codes 
in the reception and conception of Ligeti’s first and ninth etudes’, referencing Edward Said, ‘Heroism and 
Humanism’ Al-Ahram Weekly Online 463. 
21See Halberstam (2011) 
22‘achoppement, défaillance, felure’ from Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI, 25. 
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failure privileged by Ligeti in his Études exposes the impossibility of coherence and 
perfection. 
 Anxiety about contemporary subjectivity can also result in simply abandoning the 
subject altogether—a post-transcendental subject may be an absent one. This is, in some 
ways, the project of Cage’s Etudes Australes. As Aden Evens writes, Cage’s chance-based 
compositional methods were an attempt to ‘[eliminate] his own intention, his self, through 
aleatory and Zen techniques, which constitute his very methods of composition’.23 Cage’s 
repeated claims that he was giving ‘sound itself’ autonomy speaks to the recognition that 
the human does not have free reign over agency, but rather, that agency is something 
contained in particles, objects, waves, and sounds: ‘One may give up the desire to control 
sound, clear his mind of music, and set about discovering means to let sounds be 
themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human 
sentiments’.24 
 Although his Etudes Australes in some ways replicate the conventions of the 19th 
century étude and the virtuosic subject—composed as they were with a particular idea of 
transcendent virtuosity in mind (so transcendental that it might reach outer space!) and 
written to showcase the skill of a specific performer—Cage’s allowance for chance 
privileges actors other than humans in both composition and performance. The notes of 
the piece, for example, were taken from the Atlas Australis, a map of the stars in the 
southern hemisphere, the selection of chords was taken from the shape of Grete Sultan’s 
hands, and the specific chords chosen for each position were selected using chance 
operations from the Chinese book of divination, the I Ching. 
 Whereas the concert étude in the 19th century largely responded to and 
strengthened an emerging notion of individual human subjectivity, each of these 
 
23Aden Evens, Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience (2005), 48. 
24John Cage, Silence (1961), 10. 
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composers undercut the subject and abandon it in response to changing social and 
economic conditions. 
 
Labour 
The 20th century virtuosic études discussed in this thesis also demonstrate new forms of 
labour politics in performance and composition. Given the close relationship between 
virtuosity and labour illuminated by Paolo Virno, it is no surprise that the essential role of 
virtuosity in contemporary knowledge economies has also influenced changes in virtuosic 
musical performance. Thus, the development of a post-transcendental musical virtuosity 
in the works of Nancarrow, Cage, Lizée and Ligeti is a response to changing attitudes 
towards labour as much as towards changing notions of the subject. As I have described 
in Book I, the way in which the virtuosic étude originally emerged was in the context of 
specific notions of industrial capitalism and bourgeois sensibilities; equally, these four 
composers’ post-transcendental virtuosity is actively related to the breakdown of these 
same ideas. 
 The earliest compositions of these four composers are those of Nancarrow, 
which he began writing at the turn of the 1950s at the very beginning of changes in 
capitalism.  Nancarrow’s own personal opinions about capitalism and labour are 
particularly revealing. Nancarrow himself was an avowed communist, part of the reason 
he left the United States for Mexico. In Mexico, he deliberately eschewed many 
traditional demands of capitalism and contemporary life25. Furthermore, the instrument of 
the player piano on which Nancarrow composed his studies was once a fixture of 
bourgeois aspirations in the United States.26 Nancarrow’s music seems an ironic response 
 
25Ironically, he relied on a trust fund from his wealthy parents for sustenance during this time. 
26See David Suisman, ‘Sound, Knowledge, and the “Immanence of Human Failure”’, Social Text (2010). 
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to de-skilling and alienation of labour, whereby he champions a new use of the player 
piano in which the instrument is no longer reproducing an original, but instead producing 
its own creation. 
 In the emerging landscape that Virno describes, in which virtuosity itself 
becomes the form of labour and value-production, Nancarrow’s reframing of virtuosity at 
the hands of the player piano is also notable precisely because it did not participate 
effectively in capitalist economy. The pieces were distributed privately as tapes, and 
rarely earned money. Live performance, a venue by which some revenue might have 
been gained, was impractical, and generally presenters were uninterested in presenting 
the tapes ‘live’ for royalties. When the studies did eventually gain recognition and 
acclaim, this resulted in income for Nancarrow, but in the form of a prestigious grant—the 
MacArthur Fellowship—rather than payment for his studies in particular. And after he 
became more famous, he even turned away from composing for player pianos. Although 
this was for a number of practical reasons, including the deterioration of his machines, he 
also described that this was partly because there was more money in writing for live 
performers. That the extremely virtuosic player piano studies could not themselves make 
money seems another feature of their resistance to the demands of capitalism and 
traditional avenues of labour. 
The relationship between these works and contemporary labour is also a function 
of the obsolescence of the instrument. As William Gaddis explored in his unpublished 
cultural history of the player piano, and posthumously published novel, Agape Agape, the 
capacity to have music performed automatically (to have mechanised even such a 
domestic pastime) is in many ways the epitome of Marxist alienation.27 It certainly bears 
many similarities to the Fordist economic system that dominated the early twentieth 
century, in which machinery was not only a means but also a metaphor for an emphasis 
 
27Gaddis, cited in Suisman (2012), par. 21. 
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on efficiency and productivity. According to Alan McKinlay and James Wilson, ’the 
machine metaphor was enormously broad, and deeply ambiguous, at once conveying a 
dehumanizing logic while also suggesting a bountiful meritocracy’.28 In this model, labour 
became de-skilled and products become standardized, such that workers become 
interchangeable, seeing as they have been reduced to a small, de-subjectivised task 
within a much larger process. The relationship of the player piano to such broader trends 
of cultural production at large is hardly surprising. After all, in its early days, the player 
piano was seen as comparable to the phonograph in terms of importance and potential to 
change our approach to consuming music. It was scorned as sure to get rid of the 
amateur performer,29 just as it was lauded as the harbinger of musical modernism.30 
Nevertheless, the way we might read the player piano in these studies is crucially 
different. Nancarrow began writing these pieces in the late 1940s and continued through 
the 1980s. At the beginning of this period, player pianos were already at the dawn of 
obsolescence; by the end, they were almost non-existent. The moment at which 
technologies go out of fashion, though, is in fact the point at which Walter Benjamin 
suggests they are at their most interesting and revelatory.31 No longer is there any fear 
that the instrument might overtake and replace the live performer, or mistaken belief that 
a new, idyllic world of player pianos might be at hand.32 Nancarrow also wrote these 
pieces at a moment in which capitalism has begun to change—at the dawn of what we 
 
28Alan McKinlay and James Wilson (2012), 48. 
29A 1906 article entitle ‘The Menace of Mechanical Music’ claimed that it is ‘simply a question of time when 
the amateur disappears entirely, and with him a host of vocal and instrumental teachers, who will be 
without field or calling’. Sousa (1906), 280. 
30Adorno celebrates the barrel organ’s cylinders for ‘[anticipating]… modernity itself’. Adorno (1984), 37. 
31Armstrong (2007), 1. 
32The Aeolian company marketed the player piano as a democratic invention that, in de-skilling musical 
performance, could thus bring music into the homes of the masses, ‘just as the printing press opened the 
world of knowledge and literature… through to all men instead of to the few’. Dolan (2009), 139.  
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might call late capitalism. In the post-Fordist era, labour became more and more 
decentralised and global, as products become more finitely differentiated, even as they 
continue to be mass-produced in ever more global networks. 
The player piano studies attest to this, for example, in the globalised environment 
in which Nancarrow composed them—living and composing in Mexico City, travelling to 
New York City, receiving visits from German player piano specialists to restore his 
instruments. At the same time, though, the process and content both articulate an 
alternative to this economic model.  After all, the player piano was by this point an 
obsolete remnant of an earlier economic age. The instrument reached its highest levels of 
popularity in the 1920s, and by 1950, the phonograph and vinyl had already completely 
taken over the market for bringing standardized, recorded music into the home.33 Rather 
than adapt to a new economic model, Nancarrow resisted by clinging to an old one, and 
exploring its radical possibilities. 
In her dissertation on works for player piano, Wente suggests that the future 
Nancarrow explores is one in which composers are no longer burdened by the physical 
contingencies of performing bodies, and that his studies for player piano are an attempt 
to ‘bypass the performer’.34 Regardless of whether that analysis reflects his expressed 
opinions, I think that—from the perspective of labour—Nancarrow’s studies invite us to 
see something more complicated at work. After all, the idea that the performer is 
something to be bypassed is a reflection of a model of music and musical performance in 
which a static concept of the music exists, which is then manifested in sound: whether by 
a performer or a performing instrument. What if, instead, we see all works of music 
(whether performed or not) as just that: works—in which the work of many labours, 
including instrument builders, composers, collaborators, instruments, tools, technology, 
 
33Ord-Hume (1970), 41. 
34Wente (2016), 240. 
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and (yes, if they exist) performers participate. After all, the labour of the Nancarrow 
studies is hardly invisible—in that manner that the labour is in our commodity-saturated 
world. Even though no physically-labouring performer is visible, the études foreground 
their (imaginary) difficulty: they sound ‘hard to play’. The virtuoso phantom performer is 
not disappeared or bypassed, but rather contains multiple human and non-human entities 
and complicates our understanding of performing subjectivity. 
In embodying such nuanced labour relationships in his Studies, is Nancarrow also 
producing a study of a communist utopian future?  Not exactly. Nancarrow’s move to 
Mexico, of course, was enabled not just by his willingness to eschew traditional financial 
structures and resistance to accumulation—it was also made possible by a large amount 
of privilege: his father had left him a significant inheritance in the form of a trust from 
which he sustained himself until receiving the highly prestigious MacArthur ‘Genius’ 
Award in 1982. At the very least, though, his use of the instrument—in the context in 
which he first composed the pieces, the environment in which they were first performed, 
and, of course, in our present reception—lends itself to being understood as allowing for 
a different kind of labour relationship. Rather than exemplifying the alienation of de-
subjectivised labour, the Studies for Player Piano instead call for a more nuanced and 
complex attention to subjectivity and the kinds of agents that can act, relate, and have 
effects in the world.   
 Where Nancarrow subverts capitalist assumptions by translating the virtuosic 
labour of performance onto an obsolete medium, études also challenge the assumptions 
of contemporary capitalism by exposing labour, in the context of an economic system in 
which labour is often hidden. The invisibility of labour is also a feature of traditional 
virtuosic performance, and of the aesthetics of virtuosity in the 19th century. Even in 
works that are extremely difficult, the ability to make them seem effortless is valued as a 
performance quality. However, the piano études that I have discussed actually make such 
ease impossible, emphasising effort and difficulty instead. This is true of both Cage’s 
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Études Australes and Ligeti’s Études pour piano, for example, in which the work that the 
performers have put into execution is not only obvious to the listener, but also in some 
ways the goal of the performance. 
 Ligeti’s études, for example, often dramatize a sense of endlessness and exhaustion. 
‘L’escalier du diable’ creates the illusion of constantly rising in pitch, such that when the 
piece ends we have the sense that it might keep going indefinitely, and that it has been 
cut off prematurely—devastatingly limited by the constraints of the keyboard’s size. The 
dynamic markings—extending up to ffffffff—can only be realised by a visible and dramatic 
exertion of effort. This quality of exhaustion is complemented by the persistent emphasis 
on failures of execution. In ‘Touches bloquées’, the performer’s perceived effort is a key 
effect: it emerges when the performer strikes keys that are not sounding and ‘octaves’ 
that are not consonant. As with many of Ligeti’s études, this effect builds to an extreme 
point at the very end of the piece: the final seconds of the piece consist of the pianist 
visibly striking a series of keys without making any sound, because they are already 
depressed by the other hand. 
 The études also expose the labour of the listener, which generally goes unnoticed. 
Amy Bauer describes that ‘the performative encounter with virtuosity engages the 
audience in a dialectic that exposes both the [labour] of performance and that of listening 
— of aurally following a dialogue with the moment through to its exhausting end’.35 The 
labour of listening is partly vicarious—it is exhausting to watch a performer exhaust him 
or herself. Yet the labour of listening is compounded by the auditory complexity of 
Ligeti’s études, which, like Nancarrow’s studies, layer temporalities and rhythmic features 
in a way that does not render them easily legible to the ear. 
 The idea of the étude as a labour of difficult listening is equally applicable to Cage’s 
Études Australes, despite their differences to Ligeti’s études. The difficulty in these pieces 
is not in gradually building exhaustion or effort, though, but rather in the never-ending 
 
35Bauer (2018). 
 242 
sequence of seemingly-random chords. As the chords themselves were determined by a 
map and the I Ching, rather than by narrative logic, the listener of these études is caught 
constantly trying to make sense of the ordering and spacing of the gestures, even as they 
show themselves over and over again to not make ‘sense’. As in the Ligeti Études, it is 
watching the performer that conveys the clearest sense of the effort in performance. In 
Cage’s Études Australes, the division of notes between the right and left hands is 
determined by the score, and both hands cover the full range of the keyboard. This 
results in wide leaps across the keyboard and often cross over and under each other. The 
deliberate visual awkwardness of this effect makes the labour of the performer 
impossible to ignore. Unlike in skilfully executing an étude by Liszt, there is no way to 
toss off such hand crossings as effortless or invisible. The desire of all of these 
composers to expose the labour of the performer (whether human or machine), rather 
than to hide it, marks a clear difference between the contemporary étude and its 19th 
century predecessors. 
 
The Work 
In tandem with these concerns, it is worth returning to the other important cultural trend 
that shaped the development of Chopin and Liszt’s concert études: the idea of Werktreue. 
As Jim Samson, David Trippett, and other scholars have described, Werktreue was a 
contradictory force for virtuosity in general, and the étude in particular, in the 19th 
century. The value accorded to virtuosic musical performance stood as a challenge to 
Werktreue, as it undermined the sanctity of a musical score and stability of a constant 
musical work. At the same time, the concert étude distinguished itself from the tradition 
of pedagogical pieces (exercices and ubungen, among others) by preserving unity, 
structural coherence, and aesthetic independence: all features of the concert étude that 
were qualities of Werktreue. Chopin and Liszt’s études— particularly as they have 
persisted in the musicological and performance canon—thus also contributed to the idea 
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of the musical work. As a result, Chopin and Liszt’s novel genre both contributed to and 
diminished the idea of the work simultaneously. As autonomous structures in which the 
formal coherence was in fact based on a physical, technical property, they emphasise a 
paradoxical middle space between virtuosity and the work. 
 Each of the études studied in this thesis approach the idea of the musical work in a 
different way, influenced by changes in the contemporary understanding of musical 
works at the level of discourse and composition. Nancarrow’s studies, for example, offer 
a conflicted picture of artistic autonomy and the work-concept. On the one hand, they 
privilege coherent and logical structure, to a degree that even exceeds what most 19th 
century composers might have imagined. Nancarrow’s studies are constructed to fit into 
rigid and carefully measured rhythmic templates, with the placement of each note fitting 
precisely into a mathematical structure. In many cases, Nancarrow’s temporal and 
rhythmic structures were determined prior to any other aspect of the composition, 
representing a kind of ideal work to which the notes merely fit, almost falling in place to 
demonstrate the temporal ideas. Although the studies are identified primarily by cardinal 
number, Nancarrow often also gave them names in brackets to identify these 
fundamental relationships at the heart of the work, as simple as ‘No. 14 (Canon 4/5)’ or 
as elaborate as ‘No. 27 (Canon 5%:6%:8%:11%)’ and even ‘‘No. 37 (Canon 150:160 
5/7:168 3/4:180:187 1/2:200:210:225:240:250:262 1/2:281 1/4)’. Nancarrow’s own 
life and personal aesthetic also imitates some aspects of the Romantic idea of the artist. 
He always composed alone, in a reclusive, hermit-like existence in Mexico City. A ‘solitary 
genius’, his musical ideas were also radically different from most other American 
composers of his era. Although he subscribed to a range of new music magazines, and 
clearly kept abreast of musical developments, he cultivated the sense that he was 
working completely alone and uninfluenced by his contemporaries. 
 On the other hand, although each study has a highly distinctive underlying rhythmic 
pattern, they often lack distinction in other ways. Melodically and harmonically, they 
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sound extremely similar, and even interchangeable. Nancarrow himself claimed 
ambivalence about the specific notes of his music: ‘I don’t think of a line, but of a 
collection of temporal relationships, and, in fact, the melodic line is simply a crutch in 
order to realize certain temporal ideas.’36 Although some of the Studies for Player Piano 
stand alone in terms of character—such as the Study no. 12 (‘Flamenco’) and the Boogie-
Woogie Suites (Studies 3a-e and Studies 45a-c)—most are written in a similar 
homogeneous style. In this sense, they undercut a romantic ideal of an autonomous, 
unique, self-generating work. Instead, their iterability returns to an earlier notion that 
musical pieces of the same genre might be interchangeable and fungible. This attitude is 
even seen in Nancarrow’s reception of the pieces. In both recordings and publications, he 
was generally unconcerned with the specific pieces presented or in which order they 
would occur, instead allowing the practicalities of timing—and especially, his desire for 
recognition and sense of which studies would make the best impression—to dictate their 
appearance in the world. 
 In this respect, they are very similar to Cage’s Études Australes.  Aesthetically and 
sonically, the thirty-two studies are virtually indistinguishable from each other. Not only 
were all composed with the same methods, but also composed with methods that 
explicitly favoured the use of chance as a compositional tool. The notion of chance as 
composition could not be further from the idea that a musical work might be autonomous 
and self-sufficient. Indeed, this is one way in which Cage’s rejection of Werktreue is more 
extreme than that of Nancarrow, for the use of chance was precisely one area in which 
the two disagreed. For Nancarrow, the composer’s privileged form of agency was 
something that he was never able to give up. He was so dismissive of aleatoric practices, 
that he once asked Cage why he would choose musical notes by chance, if he was not 
prepared to eat mushrooms elected by chance procedures.37 
 
36Nancarrow, quoted in Reynolds, ‘Inexorable Continuities’, Soundings 4, 28. 
37Letter from Nancarrow to Peter Garland, September 2, 1982. 
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 Compared to Cage’s other pieces from this period, though, the Études Australes 
stand much closer to the 19th-century ideal of a work than his radio plays (such as An 
Alphabet, composed in 1982) or percussion works (notably Child of Tree for percussionist 
playing plants as instruments). After all, they are presented as a fully—and densely—
notated score. However, Cage incorporates key aspects of performance-orientation and 
virtuosic accommodations that tilt the études away from upholding traditional ideals of 
the work. For example, while Cage asks the performer to calculate relative temporality 
according to spacings on the page, he notes in the preface that ‘circumstances sometimes 
arise when it is necessary to “shift gears” and go, as the case may be, faster of slower’.38 
Even the notes—the element of performance most typically thought to be fixed in non-
improvised music—he leaves malleable: ‘Notes written for the left hand above the C two 
leger lines above the treble clef may be omitted in a performance. Likewise, any notes 
written for the right hand below the A on the lowest space of the bass clef may be 
omitted.’39 As Nicholas Cook suggests of the music of Brian Ferneyhough and the new 
complexity movement, summarising Ian Pace, ‘asking whether Ferneyhough’s rhythms 
can be played accurately is the wrong question’.40 Instead, Cook observes that the social 
meaning found in music may well be found in scores which are ‘overdetermined’, as these 
demonstrate that performance is always something more than simply a poor 
representation of the score. These particular ‘overdetermined’ scores not only privilege 
performance, but also disrupt the traditional musical subjects by emphasising and 
reinforcing the posthuman and inter-agential relationships at play in post-transcendental  
virtuosic music-making. This implicit emphasis on performance and social relationships 
undercuts the work’s aesthetic power. 
 Meanwhile, the Etudes Australes also demonstrate a different orientation to the 
 
38Cage, Etudes Australes, 1. 
39Ibid. 
40Nicholas Cook, Beyond the Score: Music as Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 280. 
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work due to their relationship between form and content. As I have described, the use of 
chance rejects any presumption of autonomous creation or inherent structural 
coherence. Equally, there is no sense of any relationship between technique and form 
that marked the uniqueness. Again, this recalls the fungibility of Nancarrow’s player piano 
studies, and 18th-century ideas of musical pieces as interchangeable. In fact, Cage’s 
études in this respect are much more like didactic exercises, especially given the 
progression that Cage offers: the set of 32 études becomes more and more difficult as it 
goes along, since each successive piece contains a higher proportion of multi-note chords 
than the last. 
 Along these lines, it is perhaps Ligeti’s Études pour piano that seem closest to the 
Romantic ideals that I have characterised as fundamental to the origins of the étude 
genre. Much more than the pieces of Nancarrow and Cage, Ligeti’s études stand alone 
individually. The specific themes and tools on which each of the pieces is based are 
internally consistent, and distinct from one another. They often bear poetic titles 
(‘Désordre’, ‘Arc-en-Ciel’, etc.) and each identify clear questions or problems (technical or 
conceptual) that are explored and worked through over the course of the étude. 
Furthermore, the études maintain an internal integrity and consistency—of texture and 
figuration especially—that create a sense of logical and formal coherence. This is 
especially evident when listening to or performing several études in a row. Despite the 
surface level similarities between, for example, the most rhythmically complex of the 
études, listening, playing, and analysis reveals that the textures are clearly distinct from 
one another, and logically maintained within the whole. As a result, the pieces seem to 
hold up the illusion of the work of art as an organic product that germinates from the 
smallest of ideas into a self-sufficient whole. And yet these pieces, too, subvert some 
conventional ideas of the work. By almost always beginning as if in medias res and ending 
as if cut-off, the études convey the sense of being ripped out of some larger whole. The 
sense of ruptured eternity captured at the end of ‘Desordre’, for example, reminds both 
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listener and performer that the études cannot be self-contained, but gesture towards 
some much longer project. 
 Finally, Lizee’s études challenge the work in an entirely different way. 
Acknowledging the fallacy of aesthetic self-sufficiency, Lizée instead bases her études on 
external works, the films of Alfred Hitchcock. Indeed, she compares her project to the 
work of filmmaker Douglas Gordon, who produced a slowed-down version of Hitchcock’s 
Psycho in order to ‘uncover the unforeseen ‘micro-narratives’ lurking in Hitchcock’s 
film’.41 In some ways, her études resemble an act of translation, and the musical material 
contained within them relies heavily on the transcription and translation of voices and 
foley sounds into rhythm and notation.42 The études then, offer interpretations of 
Hitchcock as much as they represent works of their own, a clear challenge to artistic 
autonomy. 
 
 
These late 20th- and early 21st-century études by Cage, Ligeti, Nancarrow, and Nicole 
Lizée each demonstrate the ways in which the étude genre has changed since its origins 
in the 19th century. Nonetheless, considering them in relationship to the culture of 
virtuosity, subjectivity, the work of art, pedagogy, and other cultural developments that 
shaped early keyboard études lends interesting insight into the relationship between 
music and culture today. In particular, it suggests that composers of keyboard études 
over the past 60 years have used these works to subvert traditional expectations of 
genre and performance, and to respond to corresponding changes in technology, 
subjectivity, and economics. 
 The study of performance alongside these cultural insights is a particularly 
important way of assessing the entangled relationships between music and society, in 
 
41Lizée (2010), 1. 
42Lizée (2019). 
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particular in works such as these that easily seem abstract and apolitical. The embodied 
practice that is necessarily part of a performative understanding of music is an essential 
part of the way in which musical works relate to their social and political environment, as 
performing bodies inherently form part of the body politic: responding to, interacting 
with, and constructively shaping society. Through the prism of the body, it becomes clear 
that the étude is an experimental genre, pushing against existing boundaries, bodies, and 
musical ideas. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The fascination of what’s difficult/has dried the sap out of my veins. 
  - -W. B. Yeats1 
 
The project of this thesis has emerged out of fascination. On the one hand, this is the 
fascination of society with abnormal, extreme, and impossible feats of musical 
performance, exemplified by the popularity within classical music of virtuoso performers, 
and an ever-increasing trend in musical performance, competitions, and recordings 
toward superhuman feats of accuracy, speed, and skill. This cultural fascination traces its 
origins back to the virtuosos of the 19th century. Despite its longstanding presence, a 
relative inattention to the topic within musicology—especially with respect to 
embodiment—has motivated my research. In the context of 20th- and 21st-century 
études, I have attempted to reframe the understanding of extremely difficult music by 
recognizing the ways in which notions of difficulty are contingent upon particular bodies, 
instruments, and contexts, shaped by society. The various theories through which I have 
studied these feats of impossible performance—utopian thought, failure, and 
posthumanism—have revealed that both the bodies that perform and the notion of 
‘possible’ tasks are constructions of social and cultural context. As a result, these theories 
call into question the very boundaries between possible and impossible: this inquiry is 
situated instead in the liminal spaces between. 
 The thesis has also emerged out of my own fascinations. I have been captivated by 
 
1The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 93. 
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the practice of learning to perform pieces by Cage, Ligeti, and Lizée. This ongoing process 
has been thrilling, challenging, frustrating, and rewarding in equal measure, but most 
importantly, it has also motivated all of the theoretical approaches undertaken in my 
thesis, whether or not these explicitly pertain to my own experience. My engagement 
with the piano—and fascination with my own body’s limits, constraints, and 
(im)possibilities—not only informs my understanding, but is also the very mechanism by 
which I am able to think through and with these musical works. From the perspective of 
my own body, I show how these diverse methodological frameworks might be used to 
understand the impossible in musical performance. I would welcome further 
investigations into these relationships from other perspectives and through other bodies, 
just as I intend to continue exploring them in my own work. 
 The choice to limit my study to these four specific composers was motivated as 
much by my own fascinations as it was by the inevitable limit of time and space. I might 
equally have considered any number of other étude composers from this time period, 
including Marc-André Hamelin, David Rakowski, Unsuk Chin, Philip Glass, Nikolai 
Kapustin, Olivier Messiaen, Louise Talma, William Bolcom, Daisuke Asakura, or Maurice 
Ohana (among others), each of whom would have brought different insights and 
questions. The study of études for instruments other than the piano—such a Brian 
Ferneyhough’s Study 1 for Bass Clarinet—would also further complicate and enrich our 
understanding of genre and the body, given the piano’s distinctive constraints and limits.  
  Additionally, the thesis as it stands draws a link between the four composers 
studied and the earlier études of Fryderyk Chopin and Franz Liszt in the mid-19th 
century. A more extensive study might also draw a genealogical link through other études 
composed in the first half of the 20th century. The études of Claude Debussy would add 
a particularly rich contribution to this narrative, as would the rhythmic experiments of 
Olivier Messiaen and the pianistic explorations of Sergei Rachmaninoff.    
 Indeed, even the choice to limit my study to études in particular—rather than to 
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explore a more extensive range of liminal works, which might have included the New 
Complexity Movement, or the paradoxical explorations of Fluxus composers, or works 
outside of music from performance art and theatre—was primarily a function of the scope 
of a doctoral thesis. Further exploration of relationship between pedagogy and 
performance at the limits of the body, for example, might study Cornelius Cardew’s The 
Great Learning (1971), for any number of untrained singers and instrumentalists. Many 
other composers and artists have also directly confronted notions of the impossible. 
Particular relevant to the methodologies and approaches of this project is the use of 
paradox in pieces like Tom Johnson’s Infinite Melodies and Failing: a very difficult piece for 
solo string bass.   
 An obvious extension of my research on posthuman virtuosity in Nancarrow and 
Lizée would be the contemporary genre of Black MIDI, in which composers remix songs 
using millions or billions of notes, and ‘perform’ these using piano training software on 
YouTube.2 Black MIDI songs stretch not only the limits of what might be possible at the 
keyboard, but also push at the limits of the technology: the YouTube videos often include 
visible lags because of the computer power involved in rendering the video files. 
 As I have explored throughout the project, however, limiting my work to études 
offers an ideal starting point for further research. Études are cases in which these issues 
are especially resonant, and so provide good examples for these first explorations. The 
origins of the étude in pedagogy and as technical examples mean that there is historical 
and logical basis for using observations made about études to discuss issues of virtuosity, 
subjectivity, and labour in wider repertoire. Likewise, these observations are not meant to 
suggest that the way the étude operates at the limits of the body is different from other 
forms of music-making, historical or contemporary. In fact, the opposite is true. My 
approach suggests that the étude is not limited to a genre but rather can be thought of as 
 
2An arrangement of Queen’s ‘Bohemian Rhapsody’ using 2.06 million notes can be found at 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjwzR3BqMZ4> [accessed 1 July 2019] 
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a way of approaching music. This notion emerges from the 19th century, in which—as the 
genre was emerging—many pieces that were not études were thought of as being, or 
having the potential to be étude. As such, étude-thinking is a practice that might be 
applied to any form of music-making. This is especially true of the act of performance. 
Performers apply étude thinking in their practising all the time, to any kind of music in 
which they are struggling with a problem, or seeking to improve. So, too, can étude-
thinking be understood as part of any music-making from a scholarly perspective.  
 As I suggested in the introduction, I believe that limitations are productive, and 
constraints can reveal rather than obscure general truths. By studying ‘impossible’ music 
at the limits of the human body—revealing the fractures and gaps that this topic poses—I 
have explored how the act of performance engages at all times with the liminal space 
between possible and impossible, creating utopian leaps between instantiation and 
imagination. These are the same leaps that must be made in all writing about 
performance—which, as Carolyn Abbate memorably described, suffers from the non-
negotiable ‘present pastness [performance] must have to make possible any act of 
writing’.3 The études studied in this thesis remind us of the possibility of making such 
imaginative leaps and the value of striving towards impossible goals. By harnessing the 
étude as a way of thinking, doing, and writing, what other impossible tasks might we 
accomplish? 
 
 
 				 	
 
3Abbate (2004), 530. 
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